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The creation of the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) program 
provides a natural experiment where a difference-in-differences estimation design is 
employed to isolate how state merit aid funding may lead institutions to change their 
institutional grant aid.  Principal agent and resource dependence theories together 
establish state and institutional context as well as inform potential institutional 
responses to the TELS program.  Data are primarily observed at the institution-level 
from 2000 to 2009 and come from the Integrated Postsecondary Data System 
(IPEDS).  The difference-in-differences estimation strategy incorporates multiple 
comparison groups and separate specifications by Carnegie Classification.   
The results indicated that the nine Tennessee public four-year institutions 
reduced their recipient average institutional grant post-TELS.  However, institutional 
responses differed across Carnegie Classification.  Tennessee Doctoral Extensive 
 
public institutions increased the number of students receiving institutional grant aid 
post-TELS.  Tennessee Doctoral Intensive public institutions reduced their total 
institutional grant and number of recipients post-TELS, and thereby decreased their 
average institutional grant aid post-TELS.  Tennessee Master’s College and 
Universities, excluding Tennessee Technical University, also reduced their 
institutional grant aid post-TELS.    
The results from this study provide some informative commentary for theory, 
research and policy.  First, the combination of principal agent and resource 
dependence theories provide a more comprehensive set of potential responses that 
move beyond the Bennett hypothesis to suggest that institutions might not just reduce 
institutional grant aid.  Second, this study created a comparison group of institutions 
subject to a state governing or coordinating board with budget authority, which 
produce more efficient estimates.  Future research on financial aid or institutional 
finances may benefit from moving beyond the tradition governing board classification 
to include state coordinating boards with budget authority.  Third, state policy on 
financial aid should better align new initiatives with existing institutional financial aid 
to ensure state funding is used effectively.  With better goal alignment between state 
governments and institutions, it could reduce the agency problem that develops and 
ensure state does not duplicated existing financial aid strategies.   
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State-level public funding for higher education changed substantively in the past 
thirty years, where state financial support has declined while tuition revenue has grown.  
Direct state subsidies (e.g. state appropriations) provided a majority share of operating 
revenue to public institutions of higher education until the early 1990’s (e.g. 
Toutkoushian, 2001; State Higher Education Executive Officers [SHEEO], 2015).  
Between 1990 and 2005, state appropriations per full-time equivalent student declined by 
thirteen percent at public higher education institutions nationally (SHEEO, 2015).   
Tuition and fees represent a growing proportion of revenue at public institutions (e.g. 
Toutkoushian, 2001; SHEEO, 2015).  From 1990 until Tennessee created their merit aid 
program in 2005, tuition per full-time student increased by 47% at public higher 
education institutions nationally (SHEEO, 2015). This shift in funding from state 
appropriations to tuition revenue marks a privatization of public higher education, where 
students and families are paying a larger share of costs of higher education (e.g. 
Johnstone, 2004).  Simultaneously, during the earlier the 1990’s, a handful of states, such 
as Alabama and Georgia, created statewide merit aid programs (e.g. Soqjuist & Winters, 
2012).  The creation of these merit aid programs also marks a shift in how states fund 
public higher education, where large forms of new funding go directly to students as 
opposed to just providing institutions with a larger state appropriation (NASSGAP, 1991; 
2006).  In fact, state financial aid expenditures increased by 438% between 1990 and 
2005 nationally (NASSGAP, 1991; 2006).  In addition, the expansion of state merit aid 
programs presents one of the most substantive changes to financial aid policy in recent 





merit aid programs injects a marketization in the state funding model (e.g. Heller, 2006; 
Hossler, 2004; Jongbloed, 2004), which may change how institutions allocate 
institutional aid (Long, 2004).    
The marked shift in public funding given to directly students instead of colleges was 
exemplified in Tennessee.  While other states also have shifted their funding model to 
provide merit aid, Tennessee allocated $1.6 billion for the Tennessee Education Lottery 
Scholarship (TELS) program in its first six years (Tennessee Higher Education 
Commission [THEC], 2011).  In that same time period, Tennessee allocated $7.1 billion 
in state appropriations for institutional operating expenses (calculated from IPEDS survey 
data).  Thus, the TELS program represented nearly one-fifth of Tennessee’s total 
investment in the operating expenses of higher education between fiscal year 2005-2010.  
Hu, Trengrove and Zhang (2012) indicate that much of the research on state merit aid 
programs has focused on student-level outcomes of the policy, such as student access and 
migration, but they suggest that state merit aid programs should be looked at more 
broadly.  One way of looking more broadly at state merit aid programs is to investigate 
institutional responses of these new and additional funds, such as changes in institutional 
grant aid, especially since the state merit aid program represents a large share of funding 
for higher education.  Thus, this study will examine how state merit aid funding changes 
institutional grant aid funding for first-time, full-time students at Tennessee public four-
year universities.  This investigation will provide context to how state-level shifts toward 
market-based funding may yield productive or opportunistic responses from institutions, 
such as increasing or maintaining institutional grant aid (e.g. productive response) or 
decreasing institutional grant (e.g. opportunistic response).   The Tennessee Education 
3 
Lottery Scholarship (TELS) program provides a natural experiment where a difference-
in-differences estimation design can begin to isolate effects of merit aid funding on 
institutional behavior, especially with respect to institutions changing their grant aid.  
Under this research design, public four-year institutions in Tennessee will be compared to 
a subset of similar institutions in the United States to determine if the influx of merit aid 
changes institutional grant aid funding.       
In order to situate this study, prior empirical and theoretical research will provide 
some context for understanding how Tennessee four-year institutions might respond to 
additional funding from a statewide merit aid program.  Put simply, Tennessee public 
four-year institutions may have changed institutional grant aid funding in response to the 
indirect subsidies from the Tennessee state merit aid program in one of three ways: 1) no 
change to total institutional aid; 2) increasing institutional aid funding; or 3) decreasing 
institutional aid funding.  Certainly, institutions could make other adjustments to their 
institutional grant aid, such as shifting funds from merit-based awards to need-based 
awards, but these other adjustments cannot be measured or observed from nationally 
available data.  Prior research provides some evidence that public institutions will 
increase their willingness to pay for students who already receive Pell grants (Turner, 
forthcoming).  Given Turner’s findings with federal aid, this study will investigate 
whether Tennessee public four-year institutions increase institutional grant aid 
expenditures and access as a result of the Tennessee merit aid program.   Similarly, 
Simone (2016) finds that both institutional and state grant aid increases for Pell 
recipients, which suggest that both institutions and states are willing to provide more aid 
to students already receiving a federal grant.  However, institutions could use the state 
4 
grant aid to replace institutional grant aid.  Long (2004) found that private institutions in 
Georgia decreased expenditures on institutional grants when a statewide merit aid 
program was created in the earlier 1990’s.  Thus, the advent of Tennessee merit aid 
programs may induce institutions to maximize revenue by reducing expenditures on 
institutional aid, thereby providing indirect funding/revenue to institutions from the 
TELS merit aid program.  While it is informative to use prior empirical studies to 
hypothesize how Tennessee institutions might respond to the advent of a statewide merit 
aid program, it is also instructive to draw on theoretical work to explain institutional 
behavior.   
This study will utilize prior theoretical and empirical research to help explain how 
Tennessee four-year institutions may adjust institutional grant aid funding in response to 
a statewide merit aid program.  The theoretical framework in this study will be explained 
in two parts based on: 1) institutional/organizational behavior to explain how public four-
year universities might respond; 2) and appropriately situate institutions in the state 
context/environment where they are located.   The resource dependence (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003) and principal agent (Lane & Kivisto, 2008) theories will be used to 
hypothesize institutional responses to the TELS merit aid program and whether these 
responses will be productive or opportunistic.  In addition, the principal agent theory will 
be used to explain how public four-year universities function within a state-specific 
context (e.g. Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  This study can provide perspective on whether 
market-based, state-level initiatives can assist with yielding productive or opportunistic 
responses from public four-year institutions within a principal agent and resource 
dependence theoretical framework.    
5 
Background of the Problem 
The advent of larger state merit aid programs did not begin until the early-1990’s 
(Doyle, 2006). Prior to this, state financial aid programs/policies were based primarily on 
financial need criterion (Doyle, 2006; Heller, 2004; 2006; Hu, Trengrove, & Zhang, 
2012).  In fact, financial aid from federal, state, and institutional sources were based on 
an equity principal to provide financial support to students with greatest financial need as 
defined by a student and/or family’s ability to pay for higher education (Heller, 2002).  
Need-based financial aid is provided to equalize some inequities related to prior 
accumulation of wealth, resources, or access, which takes the form of redistribution 
(Heller, 2002; Paulsen, 2001).  However, beginning with Arkansas and Georgia, states 
created financial aid with primarily merit-based criteria in 1991 and 1993, respectively.  
Since then, at least 29 other states have adopted merit-based programs, where Tennessee 
was one of the most recent adopters of the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship 
(TELS) program (e.g. Soqjuist & Winters, 2012).  Tennessee is one of the few exceptions 
to have some means-tested parts of their award program (Heller, 2006; Ness, 2008).  
Heller (2004) takes issue with expansion of state merit aid program as detracting from the 
traditional purpose of financial aid, which is expanding college access and make sure it is 
affordable.  In addition, Heller (2004) characterizes state merit aid program as giving 
financial support to student would already attend college even if they did not receive the 
grant.  Heller (2002; 2004; 2006) asserts that state merit programs do little to help with 
any of the state rationales for creating their programs—expand access, keep the best and 





and associates (2005) also take issue with state merit-based aid since it consumes 
exorbitant resources for little benefit and likely detracts financial support from need-
based aid programs.  The Tennessee merit aid program, like many other states, funds the 
program from lottery revenue, which is a regressive tax since lower income people 
purchase tickets (Bowen et al., 2005).  Despite these criticisms, state merit aid programs 
proliferated being in the early 1990’s and continuing into 2000’s (Soqjuist & Winters, 
2012).  
Doyle (2006) has one of the few quantitative studies attempting to explain how and 
why state merit aid programs expanded through the 1990’s and early 2000’s by looking at 
a series of political, economic, educational/academic attainment, and demographic 
aspects.  Political aspects, such as state government liberalism and party control were not 
predictors of states adopting a merit aid program (Doyle, 2006). However, states with 
higher median incomes were more likely to adopt the statewide merit aid program 
(Doyle, 2006), which may suggest that merit aid programs were a program to give 
benefits to middle- and upper-income voters but this has not be backed evidence.  In 
addition, states with lower education attainment and lower direct enrollment from high 
school to college are more likely to create state merit aid program.   
 The aspects leading Tennessee to create a merit aid program did not differ from 
the other states.  Most of Tennessee’s state financial aid had only need-based criterion 
until the creation of the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) in 2004-05 
(Ness, 2008).  There was much debate in the Tennessee state legislature on the need- and 
merit-based criteria, where the original proposal had income caps on near all awards, but 





Legislators wanted the middle- and upper-income constituents to have access to the merit 
program (Ness, 2008).  The notion of equity in the TELS program creation was usurped 
in order to ensure the TELS legislation would pass (Ness, 2008).  The need-based parts of 
the program ended up being small supplements.  A full description of the Tennessee 
context leading up the creation of the TELS program is in Appendix A and includes a 
description of the TELS award criteria.   
Leading up to the creation of merit aid programs, there are some noticeable shifts in 
the public financing of higher education nationally.  Toutkoushian (2001) provided more 
detail on the scope of education and general revenue sources within public institutions 
from 1974-75 to 1994-95.  In particular, he found that the largest change in the 
proportion of revenue dependence was with state appropriations.  In 1974-75, state 
appropriation represented 57 percent of the total net education and general revenue at 
public institutions, but the proportion of revenue from state appropriations declined to 47 
percent in 1994-95.  The second largest change in revenue dependency during this twenty 
year period was with net tuition and fees, which increased by roughly seven percent in 
the share of overall budget.  Other studies have indicated a decline or leveling off of state 
support to public higher education after the 1970’s (e.g. Zumeta, 2004).  Thus, state 
appropriations were leveling off or declining leading up to the creation of statewide merit 
aid programs.   
With public institutions less dependent on state appropriations, public institutions 
may turn to other methods of increasing net tuition revenue (e.g. gross tuition revenue 
less any institutional grant aid).  Tennessee public institutions may have turned to the 





institutions could increase net tuition revenue by reducing their expenditures on 
institutional grant aid in lieu of the new TELS awards.  Tennessee public higher 
education institutions had limited growth in state appropriation leading up to the creation 
of the TELS program, and there is some evidence that Tennessee public institutions 
viewed the TELS program as a new revenue source (Ness, 2008).  In the implementation 
process Tennessee public institutions were trying to limit the flow of TELS funding to 
private institutions (Ness, 2008), which demonstrates their propensity to act in their own 
self-interest and try to actualize as much new revenue as possible.  The advent of the 
TELS program infused an additional $1.6 billion funding into Tennessee’s higher 
education industry between 2005 and 2010.  The substantive influx of state funding may 
encourage institutions to substitute state aid in place of institutional aid.  The substitution 
effect would allow Tennessee public four-year institutions to capture the TELS funds to 
augment its net revenue, which could be construed as an opportunistic response to this 
state policy.  There is some evidence demonstrating that institutions use other financial 
aid to replace institutional grant aid (Long, 2004).   Georgia private institutions reduced 
institutional grant aid when the Georgia HOPE Scholarship began (Long, 2004).  
Similarly, when examining federal financial aid, McPherson and Schapiro (1993) found 
institutional aid expenditures decreased at public four-year institutions when federal 
financial aid increased, but it was not statistically significant.  In addition, it is also 
possible for Tennessee institutions to admit more in-state students who might carry a 
TELS award, but this was not the case in Tennessee, where the number of admitted 
students (e.g. both resident and nonresidents combined) did not change post-TELS (see 





Alternatively, Tennessee public four-year institutions could continue to hold 
institutional aid constant or increase spending on institutional aid.  There is some 
evidence that institutions will increase institutional aid spending when students carry 
external grant aid, such as federal grants (McPherson & Schapiro, 1993; Turner, 
forthcoming).  McPherson and Schapiro (1993) found that private institutions increased 
institutional scholarships when federal financial aid increased.  Turner (forthcoming) 
found that institutions increase their willingness to pay for students receiving a federal 
Pell grants.  Given prior research showing institutions providing more aid to grant 
recipients, it is possible that Tennessee public four-year institutions would increase their 
expenditures on institutional grant aid in order to attract TELS award recipients.   
 
Purpose of this Study 
  This study will build on prior research that examined how institutions change 
institutional grant aid funding relative to other sources of financial aid.  In particular, this 
study will investigate whether Tennessee public four-year institutions changed their 
institutional grant aid funding when a statewide merit aid program was established in 
2004-05. The primary research questions explored in this study are the following:   
 
1) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their total expenditures on institutional grants given to first-





2) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change the number of first-time, full-time students receiving 
institutional awards when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
3) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their entire class average institutional award amount for 
first-time, full-time students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
4) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their recipient average institutional award amount for first-
time, full-time students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
 
This line of inquiry is situated within a conceptual framework that explains how these 
institutions might respond to a state policy, such as the creation of the TELS program, 
and utilizes a combination of principal agent and resource dependence theories.   As will 
be discussed in the next section, the complementarity of these two theories suggest that 
institutions may respond to additional state funding, via the TELS awards, with either 
opportunistic or productive responses.    
   
Theoretical Framework 
 Public four-year institutions are complex organizations where institutional 
decisions and behaviors operate within a broader state context.  Given that this study is 
investigating how Tennessee public four-year institutions change institutional aid funding 
upon the creation of a statewide merit aid program, this conceptual framework will need 





state financial aid policy changes.  Principal agent and resource dependence theories will 
be used in this study to construct an appropriate theoretical framework to explain the 
environment that states and institutions operate in and address how institutions might 
respond to a new state merit aid program (Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
2003).  Principal agent theory provides a framework to explain how state governments 
and public institutions operate and contract with each other to provide education 
opportunities (Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  State governments in some form or another 
contract with public institutions to provide education opportunities, where institutions are 
agents beholden to the state government acting as a principal (Lane & Kivisto, 2008; 
Kivisto; 2005, 2007, 2008).  In exchange for providing education opportunities, states 
provide funding for public higher education, which often come in the form of state 
appropriations but can also come through state financial aid programs, such as the TELS 
program.  The contractual and financial relationship between states and public institutions 
can be explained in resource dependence theory, where organizations will seek out 
external resources and maintain revenue/funding streams (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
Resource dependence theory stresses the primacy that a broader environment plays in 
organization decisions making (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), which is why it will be 
necessary to appropriately describe state context through state-level characteristics.  In 
addition, both principal agent and resource dependence theories provide rationales for 
how Tennessee public four-year institutions might respond to the new funding from the 
TELS program.   
 Principal agent theory provides some rationales to explain how institutions might 





principal agent theory is that the agent (e.g. college/university) will act in their own self-
interest unless regulated or monitored (Kivisto, 2008; Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  Within the 
context of principal agent theory, a public four-year university will respond to state 
policy changes in either an opportunistic or productive manner (e.g. Lane & Kivisto, 
2008).  Principal agent theory assumes that the universities, as agents, will seek an 
opportunistic response if left unchecked by monitoring or accountability efforts (e.g. 
Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  In the context of Tennessee, principal agent theory would 
suggest that public four-year institutions will reduce their expenditures on institutional 
grant aid and replace those funds with the TELS award.  In the TELS creation process, it 
was clear that Tennessee public four-year institutions were trying to act in their self-
interest by attempting to limit the TELS funds that would flow to private 
colleges/university (Ness, 2008).  In addition, Tennessee public four-year institutions saw 
the TELS funding as a new revenue source when there were scarce additional revenue 
from other sources (Ness, 2008).  These two aspects demonstrate Tennessee public 
institutions’ willingness to act in its own interest to garner additional revenue.  
While principal agent theory would suggest an opportunistic response in 
Tennessee, resource dependence theory provides another explanation for how institutions 
might respond to the new TELS funding.   A tenant of resource dependence theory 
explains that institutions/organizations will seek to maintain and expand revenue (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 2003).  Thus, in an effort to control additional revenue, Tennessee public 
four-year universities would seek to maintain or increase enrollment of TELS award 
recipients.  Hillman (2012) explains that institutions may use institutional grants to attract 





institutional grant aid to attract/recruit TELS award recipients.  Thus, resource 
dependence theory would suggest that public four-year institutions might provide TELS 
award recipients with additional institutional grant aid.    
 
Research Design 
The central line of inquiry in this study is to investigate how Tennessee public 
four-year institutions respond to new indirect subsidies/funding from the Tennessee 
Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) program by changing institutional grant aid.  
Cellini (2008) discusses how there are numerous quantitative methods to investigate 
research questions on financial aid, but suggests experimental and quasi-experimental 
designs that can deal with reverse causality and omitted variable bias.  Reverse causality 
arises when controlling and outcome variables are simultaneous determined (Cellini, 
2008).  For example, some state legislatures jointly determine tuition rates and state 
appropriations, so it would be inappropriate to use one as a predictor of other.  Omitted 
variables bias occurs when determinants of the outcome are not included in the 
estimation.  In order to overcome these issues, Cellini (2008) suggests using fixed effects 
and difference-in-differences estimation, when random assignment or regression 
discontinuity design cannot be applied to financial aid research inquiries.  Thus, the 
research design in this study will move from the most basic ordinary least squares (OLS) 
to fixed effects estimations before using a difference-in-differences design to show how 
variation in other controlling variables is not substantive.   
Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, this study will identify how 
Tennessee public four-year institutions change institutional aid spending in response to 





accounted much more succinctly in a difference-in-differences estimation than other 
estimation strategies since it accounts for levels in the dependent variable before and after 
the TELS program was created and includes a comparison group of institutions. 
Difference-in-differences estimation can be modeled using a basic ordinary least squares 
regression model, but simply accounts for time in a very specific way and includes a 
group of observations experiencing a treatment and another group of observations not 
experiencing the treatment.  Time can be parameterized using panel data techniques that 
include a dichotomous variable for each year (e.g. time effect) and by adjusting the error 
terms to account for the repeated measures of institutions.   Here, treatment means that 
something different is happening to an observation, which could be a policy change such 
as implementing a statewide merit aid program.   In this study, difference-in-differences 
is essential for determining how the TELS program may have influenced changes in 
institutional grant aid spending at public four-year institutions relative to a comparison 
group of similar public institutions in other states.  For example, if an increase or 
decrease in institutional aid was found after the TELS implementation, it would be 
difficult to attribute the effects solely to the TELS award without a valid counterfactual.   
A comparable group of public four-year institutions in other states is needed to develop a 
hypothetical counterfactual.  By constructing a comparison group, Tennessee public four-
year institutions can be compared to public four-year institutions in similar states both 
before and after the TELS program implementation.  In essence, a natural experiment 
exists with the implementation of the TELS program, where the shock of new funding 
available functions as a treatment to Tennessee public four-year institutions.  The 





important differences or comparisons: 1) the change or difference in institutional grant 
aid over time; and 2) the Tennessee specific change or difference in institutional grant aid 
levels from pre-TELS time periods to post-TELS time periods.  The additive product of 
these comparisons or differences reveal any changes in institutional behavior that occur at 
Tennessee public four-year institutions as a result of the TELS implementation that are 
different from other comparison public four-year institutions.  Even though this method 
may seem complex, difference-in-differences estimation has long history of addressing 
policies changes affecting only a particular group and growing usage in higher education 
research (e.g. Hillman, Tandberg, & Gross, 2014; Hu, Trengrove, & Zhang, 2012; 
Tandberg & Hillman, 2014).     
 
Data 
This study will incorporate institutional level observations before and after 
Tennessee implemented the TELS merit aid program in 2004-05.  A panel data set will be 
constructed on U.S. public four-year institutions to capture how financial aid is allocated 
for undergraduate students.  Institution level data will primarily come from the U.S. 
Department of Education, Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), 
which is the most comprehensive data available on higher education institutions.  
Annually, IPEDS fields a series of surveys to college and universities participating in the 
Title IV federal financial aid programs to gather data on such aspects as institutional 
characteristics, admissions statistics, financial aid, and revenue/expenditures.  Within 
IPEDS, nine Tennessee public four-year institutions can be examined for five years 





implementation for a total of ten year (e.g. Fall 2000-2008 or fiscal year 2000-2009).  In 
addition, a comparison group of just over 390 public four-year institutions can be drawn 
from the United States during this same time period, but these public four-year 
institutions will be divide into different subgroups.  Public four-year institutions will be 
identify in IPEDS using the 2000 Carnegie Classifications of Doctoral 
Extensive/Intensive Universities and Master’s College and University I since these are 
three Carnegie Classifications that represent the nine Tennessee public four-year 
institutions.  Much of the data for this study will be captured at the institution level, but 
state level higher education governance, merit aid program participation, and 
demographic characteristics will be incorporated to provide an appropriate state context.   
Institutional level data on four-year public institutions will primarily come from 
IPEDS.  In particular, this study will focus on the IPEDS Student Financial Aid (SFA) 
surveys to examine institutional enrollments of in-state and out-of-state first-time, full-
time college students.  In addition, the SFA survey includes information on financial aid 
awards for these first-time, full-time students disaggregated by awards from institutional, 
state, federal, and loan sources.  The IPEDS Institutional Characteristics, Fall Enrollment, 
and Finance surveys provide important information on tuition/fee pricing, institutional 
type, Carnegie Classifications, geographic location, enrollment information, and revenue.   
 
Variables 
The dependent variable used in this study will be institutional grant aid, but 
expressed in four ways.  First, institutional grant aid will be expressed as the total 





calculated from the IPEDS Student Financial Aid Survey.  Second, institutional grant aid 
will be expressed as the recipient average amount given to first-time, full-time recipients 
of the institutional funding in a given year.  Third, the total institutional grant funding 
will be averaged over the entire entering class of first-time, full-time students.  Fourth, 
the number of institutional grant aid/ recipients will investigated as an outcome. These 
four ways of examining institutional grant aid will provide a more comprehensive picture 
of potential changes in institutional grant aid, which show changes in total expenditures, 
recipient average award amounts, entire class average award amounts, and number of 
recipients.   
 The simplest specification of a difference-in-differences (DID) model does not 
require any other covariates or independent variables beyond a variable for pre- and post-
treatment and a variable indicating which institutions are treated (e.g. Tennessee public 
four-year institutions).  This study will run a simple specification of the DID model, 
which will include an indicator for being a Tennessee public four-year institution, an 
indicator for years after the implementation of the TELS program, and an interaction of 
these two indicators to capture the effect of being a Tennessee public four-year institution 
after the implementation of the TELS program.  However, other institution and state level 
variables will be included as explicit controls in the model to improve precision of 
estimates or as a means for constructing an appropriate comparison group.   A series of 
difference-in-differences models will be run with institution fixed effects and time effects 
to account for an unobserved time invariant aspects associated with public four-year 





Additional controlling variables may not be necessary to yield an effective 
difference-in-differences model, but a series of institution and state level independent 
variables will be included to see is if model precision can be improved or to better isolate 
an appropriate comparison group.  In particular, independent variables controlling for 
institutional access to donative resource, such as state appropriations, investment income, 
and private gifts, are needed to account for any varying availability of revenue (Paulsen, 
2001; Winston, 1999, 2004).  Total amount of federal grant aid given to first-time, full-
time students in a given year to account for changes in financial need of the income class.  
In addition, the state population of eighteen-year-olds will be included to account for 
demographic shifts traditional college-aged entrants.  As suggested by the principal agent 
theory, the governance structure of public four-year institutions will account whether an 
institution is controlled by a consolidated governing board or coordinating board with 
budget authority, where this variable will be used to construct different comparison 
groups. In addition, states participating in pre-existing large merit aid program will be 
used to construct another comparison group based on Dynarski’s (2004) suggestion that 
states adopting a merit aid program are potentially more similar to each than other states 
without a merit aid program.  Each of these institutional and state level variables will be 
included in the statistical model only to improve model precision or used to construct a 
comparison group.  
 
Statistical Method 
Applications of difference-in-differences (DID) estimation in research related to 





2006; Dynarski, 2000; Goodman, 2008; Long, 2004).  However, many of these DID 
models assessed how students respond (e.g. student demand effects) to the advent of 
statewide merit aid programs in Georgia and Massachusetts (Dynarski, 2000; Cornwell et 
al, 2006; Goodman, 2008).  Long (2004) used a similar DID model as in the student 
focused studies, but she used DID to estimate the institutional responses to the Georgia 
HOPE scholarship.  In addition to economists using DID methods, researchers in the 
higher education field of study have used DID estimation as well.  Tandberg and Hillman 
(2014) used a DID estimation strategy to see how state performance based funding 
influences degree completion.  Tandberg, Hillman and Gross (2014) examined how 
Colorado’s shift in funding higher education effected cost efficiencies and college access. 
These prior studies using DID models provide methodological context and guidance on 
how the TELS program may influence institutions to change their institutional aid 
expenditures.   
 A difference-in-differences (DID) estimation technique provides two primary 
advantages for this study.  First, DID models can separate institutional levels before and 
after the implementation of the TELS program by partitioning time into a pre- and post-
levels of the institutional grant aid.  Second, DID models allow for comparisons between 
Tennessee and other public four-year institutions, where institutional grant aid levels can 
be compared between these two groups both before and after the TELS program was 
implemented.  This comparison group provides a reference and helps determine what 
might have happened in Tennessee had the TELS program not been implemented.  When 
applied appropriately, the DID model will isolate how institutional grant aid changed at 







This study has three limitations to consider that may affect the results and 
interpretation.  First, with respect to study design, the results of these analysis can only 
show aggregate changes in institutional grant aid.  Unfortunately, it cannot measure 
changes in merit-based and need-based aid separately because institutional aid is not 
reported in a form that disaggregates aid by need- versus merit-based criterion.  Second, 
the results/effects in this study are predicated on the validity of the comparison groups.  
This study employs multiple comparison groups to ensure the findings hold up against 
numerous specifications, but causality is based on the assumption that this comparison 
groups provide a sufficient control or counterfactual.  Mora and Reggio’s (2014) DQD 
analysis is employed to see if alternative parallel path assumptions are needed in 
estimation.  Third, a critical assumption of the statistical method (e.g. difference-in-
differences) is that other shocks or policy changes that would affect the outcomes of 
interest did not occur within Tennessee at the same time that the TELS program was 
implemented.  It is only large changes in other covariates at the critical time point of 
implementing the Tennessee merit aid program (2004-05) that would bias the results.   
However, a difference-in-differences estimation strategy can handle time-invariant 
characteristics and observable time varying characteristics, which can be controlled for in 
the model (Hu, Trengrove, and Zhang, 2012).  Fourth, with only nine Tennessee public 
four-year institutions, it may limit the ability to detect changes in institutional grant aid 







 This study presents a series of implications for theory, research, and policy.  First, 
this study evaluates how public four-year institutions respond to a state policy with 
productive or opportunistic reactions, which provide context for future state policies in 
higher education.  Second, the study pushes theoretical discussions in higher education 
research by integrating principal agent and resource dependency theory to explain 
productive and opportunistic institutional responses to state financial aid policy.  Third, 
this study employs a variety of methods for constructing a comparison group, which 
provides the field of higher education research with aspects to consider when 











The primary focus of this study is to determine how public four-year institutions 
in Tennessee change their institutional grant aid with the creation of a broad statewide 
merit aid program.  This study draws from principal agent and resource dependence 
theories to explain or hypothesize how Tennessee public four-year institutions might 
respond to the advent of the statewide merit aid program.  As will be discussed in this 
chapter, both theories provide some indication of how institutions might respond to the 
Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) by either increasing, maintaining, or 
decreasing institutional grant aid.  In addition, principal agent and resource dependence 
theories emphasize how a state environment/context may influence how Tennessee public 
four-year institutions respond to the TELS program.  Thus, the institutional response 
conceptual framework explained later in this chapter is derived from both theories and 
prior empirical research.    
Within this chapter, the first section addresses prior studies that assess state and 
federal financial aid programs including any institutional responses to these financial aid 
programs.  The second section examines how previous studies investigated governance 
over higher education and how it shapes state and institutional policies.  The third section 
discusses other state and institutional characteristics related to institutional financial aid 
in empirical research.  The fourth section explains applications of theory used in prior 
studies that attempt to determine institutional responses to state or federal aid.  The fifth 





have been used in prior empirical research in higher education, and explains how these 
theories can be used to guide this study.  These four sections in this chapter address gaps 
in the literature while bringing together prior theoretical and empirical work to guide the 
intended purpose of this study.   The focus of this study is to determine how Tennessee 
public four-year institutions change their institutional grant aid when a statewide merit 
aid program was created, where the primary research questions explored in this study are 
the following: 
1) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their total expenditures on institutional grants given to first-
time, full-time students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
2) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their recipient average institutional award amount for first-
time, full-time students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
3) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their entire class average institutional award amount for 
first-time, full-time students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
4) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change the number of first-time, full-time students receiving 







Previous Studies on Financial Aid Programs 
Empirical Studies on State Merit Aid 
 
Since the advent of statewide merit aid programs in the early 1990’s, empirical 
studies investigated their creation (e.g. Ness, 2008; Ness & Misserta, 2010), dispersion 
(e.g Doyle, 2006), effects on students (e.g. Hu, Trengrove, & Zhang, 2012) and effects on 
institutions (e.g Long, 2004).  Prior to their creation, most state financial aid had 
primarily need-based criteria (Heller, 2002; Ness, 2008).  Ness (2008) chronicled the 
creation of the state merit aid programs beginning with Georgia in 1993 and concluding 
with Tennessee in 2003, where he discussed the political process leading to the creation 
of these program and compares the award criteria across states.  Doyle (2006) 
investigated how and why merit aid program spread throughout the U.S.   In addition, a 
series of studies investigated how state merit aid programs affected student enrollment 
and degree completions (e.g. Dynarski, 2004; Cornwell et al., 2006; Goodman, 2008; 
Oruswan & Heck, 2009; Zhang & Ness, 2010).  For example, these existing studies 
indicate that an additional $1,000 of financial aid increases college attendance by 3-6 
percentage points (Dynarski, 2000; Dynarski, 2003; Cornwell, et al., 2006; Zhang & 
Ness, 2010).  The expansion of state merit has received criticism, where these programs 
are taken to task on whether they improve college access and attainment (Dynarski, 2000; 
Heller, 2002; 2004; 2006).  For instance, Dynarski (2000) found that 80% of the Georgia 
HOPE Scholarship funds go to students who would normally go to college without a state 
merit award.   Despite the student-level studies and criticism, only a limited few studies 
have investigated how state merit aid programs change institutional behavior (e.g. Long, 





research examining how institutions respond to state merit aid but this line of inquiry is 
expanded to include federal financial aid as well. 
 
Empirical Studies on Institutional Effects of State Grant Aid 
 
A few studies, such as in Long (2004) examined the effects of state financial aid 
policy changes on institutional tuition/fees pricing and expenditures as result of the 
Georgia HOPE scholarship.  Utilizing a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, she 
determined that the Georgia HOPE scholarship may have induced public colleges to 
decrease tuition (constant dollars) by three percent and increase room/board fees by five 
percent when compared with other southeastern states.  However, she did not examine 
the public institutions’ responses with their own institutional aid, which may have been 
due to the lack of available data at that time and structure of the Georgia HOPE 
Scholarship.  Yet, she was able to determine that private colleges in Georgia with a high 
proportion of HOPE Scholarship recipients were increasing their tuition prices (6%) and 
decreasing their institutional grants (19%).  In particular, she found that some private 
Georgia colleges were capturing 30 cents of every dollar in state merit aid by either 
increasing tuition or reducing institutional aid.  Thus, there appears to be some incidence 
occurring at both public institutions with fees and private institutions with tuition and 
institutional aid.  However, there is a need to more closely investigate how public 






Empirical Studies on Institutional Effects of Federal Grant Aid 
 Institutional responses to federal financial aid and tax credits are areas where 
more empirical research has delved in the past three decades.  While not the first study to 
investigate the institutional effects of public sector for higher education, McPherson and 
Schapiro (1993a) examine how government funding via appropriations and financial aid 
affects institutional behavior in a more comprehensive way.  They use a two stage least 
squares econometric model to determine how state/local appropriations and federal 
financial aid affect tuition pricing, institutional grant aid, and instructional expenditures.  
Their analysis is run separately by institutional type for four-year private, four-year 
public, and two-year public institutions, where they do find different effects by these 
institutional types.  They find that increases in federal financial aid corresponded to an 
increase in institutional grant aid at four-year private institutions, but no effect at the 
public institutions.  The authors suggest that private institutions are complementing the 
federal aid with more institutional aid. They were only able to isolate an effect of federal 
financial aid on tuition pricing for four-year public institutions, where a one dollar 
increase in federal aid corresponded to a 50 cent increase in tuition and fees.  In addition, 
federal financial aid did not have an effect on instructional expenditures.  However, it 
was unclear in their panel data, if they included a fixed effect for institutions and years to 
account for unobserved aspects associated with institutions and any shocks to all 
institutions in a given year.  In addition, they note that their model includes some 
endogenous variables especially with tuition/fees and institutional aid, where a one dollar 
increase in institutional aid at four-year private institutions corresponded to $2.57 





discriminating using a high tuition, high aid model, but their study cannot confirm what is 
occurring between these two variables.     
McPherson and Schapiro (2006) continue to question how institutions might 
maximize their revenue for their own objectives.  For instance, in the context of 
institutional grant aid, they discuss whether or not institutions would pay for institutional 
merit aid increases by reducing need-based aid funding.  In addition, McPherson and 
Schapiro (2006) bring up the notion that institutions might be capturing federal aid by 
increasing prices or reducing institutional grants.  This notion has been dubbed the 
Bennett hypothesis.  They note this is a difficult area to research given the financial 
interdependencies, such as pricing, aid, expenditures, and admissions policies.     
 Additional studies reviewed how institutions respond to federal financial aid by 
either adjusting tuition prices or changing financial aid (e.g. Cellini & Goldin, 2012; 
Simone, 2016; Singell & Stone, 2007; Turner, 2012; Turner, forthcoming).  Cellini and 
Goldin (2012) examine a few select states’ private for-profit institutions eligible for Title 
IV federal aid and find that these institutions charge higher tuition than their counterpart 
for-profit institutions who are not eligible for Title IV aid.  Their incidence findings on 
for-profit institutions eligible for Title IV aid hold across different specifications.  Even 
within for-profit institutions, programs eligible for Title IV aid charge higher tuitions 
than programs at the same institution that were not eligible for Title IV aid.  The intra-
institution difference in tuition price demonstrate that the higher tuition prices are likely 
not a result of institutional quality.  Even though Cellini and Goldin (2012) focused on 
for-profit institutions, their studies shows how institutions can adjust institutional policies 





financial aid, which account for institutional grant aid changes as well (Simone, 2016; 
Turner, forthcoming).        
 Using a more comprehensive set of data and institutions, Turner (forthcoming) 
examined the economic incidence with respect to the federal Pell grant program.  She 
found that institutions captured roughly 15 percent of every dollar of Pell grant aid 
through tuition pricing.  However, there were important differences in pass through of 
Pell grant funding by institution type and sector.  Private non-profit and for-profit 
institutions captured more Pell grant aid (0.179 and 0.677, respectively).  Public 
institutions presented relatively low levels of global incidence and presented a higher 
level of willingness to pay Pell grant recipients.  Turner’s (forthcoming) findings suggest 
that some institutions are willing to provide more institutional grant aid to Pell recipients.       
 
State Context in Higher Education Governance 
 The state environment/context is important for this study for two primary reasons: 
1) it was the Tennessee state government that created the Tennessee Education Lottery 
Scholarship (TELS) program; and 2) the theoretical framework described later in this 
chapter explains how state context matters from a governance and environment 
perspective.  The state governance structures and systems overseeing higher education 
present an aspect to consider when assessing how the TELS program may influence 
institutions to change institutional grant aid.  State governments contract with public 
institutions to provide educational opportunities and with these contracts state 
governments have some ownership/control of the public institutions (e.g. Kivisto, 2006, 





governance structures over higher education, where states establish some combination of 
single or multiple coordinating agencies and governance boards that serve as 
intermediaries between individual universities and the state governments (e.g. Lowry, 
2001; 2003; Tandberg, 2013).  The presence and composition of these governance 
structures can effect institutional operations, such as an institution’s ability to generate 
revenue from tuition (McGuiness, 1997, 2001; Lowry 2001; 2003; Tandberg, 2013).  
Even beyond the structure, the extent of power and control state governments and their 
intermediaries varies across states (Tandberg, 2013).  For example, coordinating agencies 
or governing boards in Tennessee and North Carolina have authority to set tuition rates 
(SHEEO, 2011).  Prior studies attempted to categorize this variation in governance 
structures and highlight how governance structures affect public higher education.    
 McGuiness (1997; 2001) pioneered much of the early work attempting to 
categorize difference in higher education governance.  Governance structures over public 
higher education are complex and vary between states.  However, a taxonomy to define 
and categorize state governance of public higher education was refined and maintained 
by the Education Commissions of the States (McGuiness 1981; 1986; 1888; 1991; 1994; 
1997).  McGuiness (1997; 2001) first makes a distinction between governing boards and 
coordinating boards/agencies, where governing boards oversee the operation of one or 
more colleges.  Governing boards can be further categorized into three types including a 
consolidated, segmental, and campus based governing board (McGuiness, 1997; 2001).  
A consolidate governing board oversees multiple campuses, such as all public institutions 
in a given state (McGuiness, 1997, 2001).  A segmental governing board is a derivation 





governing board are grouped by institutional type, such as all public four-year or all 
public two-year institutions (McGuiness 1997; 2001).  Coordinating entities have more of 
planning role in state but can sit between institutional or consolidated governing boards 
and the state government (McGuiness 1997; 2001).  For instance, Tennessee has a 
coordinating board that works with the consolidated governing boards for public colleges 
and universities.  Essentially, the coordinating board is an extra layer in the governance 
of higher education, where it can assist with coordinating higher education offerings and 
provide more monitoring/accountability.  McGuiness’s taxonomy of governance over 
public higher education is detailed and comparative, which is why empirical research has 
incorporated aspects of it.  
Researchers have built on McGuiness’s taxonomy (1997; 2001) by layering in 
additional nuances to highlight the complexity and diversity of public governance over 
higher education (e.g. Knott & Payne, 2004; Lowry 2001; 2003).  A series of studies 
endeavored to explain the relationship state governance has with state appropriations, 
financial aid, and tuition revenue (e.g. Knott & Payne, 2004; Lowry 2001; 2003; 
Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003; Tandberg, 2013).  Of these prior studies, Lowry (2001; 
2003) was an early adopter of McGuiness’s higher education governance taxonomy and 
explored the potential effects of governance structure on public institutions including 
centralization of higher education and trustee/regent selection.  In particular, Lowry 
(2001) issues a series of hypotheses on how governance structure, through number of 
campuses governed and trustee selection, might influence institutional decision making 
on net tuition revenue and expenditures.  Lowry (2001) uses McGuiness’s taxonomy 





responsibilities over public higher education and states with multiple governing boards.  
His findings from a single year cross-section suggest that the presence of state 
coordinating board or external politically appointed trustees reduce tuition/fee prices, but 
states with multiple governing boards or larger volumes of institutions increase net 
tuition/fee revenue.  Building on his own earlier work, Lowry (2003) takes up the same 
hypotheses to test as before whether governance structures over public higher education 
institutions has an effect on tuition revenue.  Lowry’s (2003) findings were similar as 
before (Lowry, 2001) where state coordinating boards correspond to lower tuition 
revenue, more governing boards in a state increase tuition revenue, and more 
representation of external (e.g. non-academic) trustees is associated with lower tuition 
revenue.  Again, Lowry (2003) conducts simultaneous equation modeling on a single 
year of data.  There were only direct effects of governance variables are on net tuition 
revenue (e.g. no indirect effects).  The presence of a statewide coordinating board and 
more external representation (e.g. politically appointed elected) independently lower 
tuition revenue, but the existence of more governing boards in a state increased tuition 
revenue.  However, Lowry’s studies (2001; 2003) were only based on data from fiscal 
year 1995 where results can only address between state differences in tuition revenue in a 
single year, but both of Lowry’s studies provide a foundation for other research.     
Pushing empirical research beyond Lowry’s (2001; 2003) initial application of 
higher education governance, Knott and Payne (2004) expand their analysis to include 
multiple years and shift the governance focus to address the extent of regulatory control 
that governing bodies have over public higher education.  In their study, governance and 





governing boards, coordinating boards, and planning agencies, where consolidated boards 
have the highest regulatory control and planning agencies typically have the least 
regulatory control.  Their utilization of cross-sectional, time series data to account for 
regional fixed effects, which was a needed addition to build on Lowry’s (2001, 2003) 
earlier work.  The regulatory distinction they make are based on governing entities 
having authority over budgets and program approval, where some statewide entities, such 
as planning agencies, do not have any regulatory authority.  In addition, they address 
centralization and define it dichotomously where a board oversees multiple institutions or 
a single institution.  They indicated that Tennessee shifted from a state with moderate 
regulatory control to high regulatory control in 1997.  Governance structures appeared to 
have little effect on total revenue at any public institutions, but moderate and high 
regulatory environment appear to reduce total revenue at public flagship institutions.  
Highly regulated states (e.g. with a consolidated governing board) were associated with 
lower tuition revenue, but these higher regulated states did not appear to provide more 
state subsidies relative low regulated states.  In addition, both in-state and out-of-state 
tuition prices were lower in highly regulated states relative to states with lower regulation 
levels.  Regulation levels did not appear to impact endowment levels except for states 
that shifted to more regulation.  Knott and Payne’s (2004) research indicate that 
governance structures can influence access to revenue, which demonstrate the need to 
account for differences in higher education governance when comparing public higher 
education across states.   
A fundamental distinction in empirical research developed to address whether 





is the impact of state governance a moderating effect on other state aspects such as 
political characteristics (e.g Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003; Tandberg, 2013).  Put 
another way, this more recent line of inquiry hypothesized that higher education 
governance systems change how state governments and institutions interact, which may 
differentially influence how funding is allocated to public institutions.  The first to take 
up this line of inquiry, Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003), interact governance structures 
and political aspects.  In their study, they define higher education governance into a 
single dichotomous variable that indicates if a state has a consolidated governing board.  
Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003) are trying to determine if the presence of a 
consolidated governing board changes the political relationship between the state 
government and public funding of higher education.  They do find significant interactions 
between higher education governance structures and political characteristics.  The 
interaction of governance structures with political aspects produce heterogeneous effects 
on an institutional tuition revenue, state appropriations, and state financial aid allocations, 
where these political variables operate differently in an institution controlled by a 
governing board versus coordinating board.   However, it appears they did not account 
for any fixed effects by region or state, which could be biasing some of these results 
where inherent differences between states are operating through the independent 
variables.   
Developing a similar approach to Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003), Tandberg 
(2013) interacted governance structure with political aspects, but he delved more into 
some of the complexities of the governance and political aspects.  Tandberg (2013) 





consolidated governing board, which is the governance structure in McGuiness’s 
taxonomy (1997; 2001) with the greatest control over institutions. In Tandberg’s study, 
he found that the presence of a consolidated governing board had a main negative effect 
on state appropriation per $1,000 of personal income.  In addition, his study indicated 
that more electoral competition, budget powers of governor, representation of higher 
education interest group, and a democratic governor had positive effects on state 
appropriations.  The interaction of the consolidated governing board indicator with all the 
state-level political aspects yielded both positive and negative associations with state 
appropriations.  However, when looking at some of the published graphical 
representations of the association, it appears that a few outlier states might be driving the 
relationship between these political variables and state appropriations.    
While this series of studies on higher education governance address different 
outcomes than that in this study, they provide an important framework for how to define 
and categorize the diversity of higher education governance structures.  In addition, they 
provide suggestive evidence that the higher education governance structure influences 
institutional access to different types of revenue, such as state appropriation, tuition, and 
in some cases financial aid.  Certainly, other research has demonstrated that other state-
level characteristics can influence state appropriations.  However, from the few studies 
that account for higher education governance structures, it is clear that governance over 
public higher education is an important aspect to consider when trying to account for 
institutional access to multiple revenue streams (e.g. state appropriations, tuition revenue, 





statewide merit aid program, it will be important to account for other revenue streams and 
control for the governance structure over public four-year institutions.    
Other State and Institutional Characteristics 
Of the few studies that examined the effects of state merit aid programs on 
institutional behavior, researchers attempted to control or account for variation between 
states over time on key aspects such as unemployment rate, personal income levels, and 
educational attainment (e.g. Long, 2004).  However, the statistical relationship of these 
variables with institutional behaviors was not discussed (Long, 2004), but other state-
level higher education studies have examined these aspects in more depth and discussed 
how they can effect state and institutional policies.   Curs and Dar (2010a; 2010b) 
account for similar state level characteristics in their assessment on how state financial 
aid programs affect institutions’ tuition prices and institutional grant aid, where they 
found that only the population of 18 to 24 year olds living in state seemed to have 
statistically significant relationship with institutional grant aid.  In particular, Curs and 
Dar (2010a) found that the population of 18 to 24 year olds residing in state corresponded 
to an increase in institutional grant aid, but this effect did not hold in their later research 
where they tried to account for a distinction between need versus merit aid.  Given Curs 
and Dar (2010a) finding that suggests relationship between traditional college-aged 
population in state and institutional grant aid, it is a state level characteristic worth 
considering in this study.   
There are additional state level characteristics beyond the college-aged population 
in state that related to this study.  As discussed, a significant development in the U.S. 





state merit aid programs in U.S. states.   Prior research differs on which states should be 
counted as having a merit aid program (e.g. Doyle, 2006; Hu, Trengrove, & Zhang, 2012; 
Sojquist & Winter, 2012).  However, Sojquist and Winters (2012) present a more 
comprehensive and complete categorization of states with merit aid programs.  They 
identify 29 states with either large (e.g. “strong”) or small (e.g. “weak”) program.  Nine 
states—Georgia, Florida, New Mexico, Louisiana, South Carolina, Kentucky, Nevada, 
West Virginia, and Tennessee—were categorized by Sojquist and Winters (2012) as 
having larger state merit programs given the number of potential recipients and dollar 
amount of the award.  Tennessee was the last state to create a large merit aid program.  
Twenty states were characterized as have a small or weak state merit aid program at some 
point in the past three decades (Sojquist & Winters, 2012).  The variation in the state 
grants program identified by Sojuist and Winters (2012) presented an important 
distinction in the literature where all state merit aid program should not be treated equally 
or as common entity.  Thus, it will important for this study to consider whether a state has 
an existing merit aid program and the relative size of the program using the Sojquist and 
Winter’s (2012) taxonomy.   
Beyond these additional state level aspects, there are facets of institutional context 
relevant for study consider given prior research.  Institutions are complex entities with 
numerous missions, develop of different sectors (e.g. public, nonprofit, and for-profit), 
and access to different financial resources.  However, empirical research has endeavored 
to parameterize and quantify different institutional characteristics, which can assist with 
comparing institutions.  Some of these aspects include the modification of the Carnegie 





Department of Education, Integrated Postsecondary Data System (IPEDS) to create 
common definitions and collect information on institutional grants, state appropriations, 
investment income, private gifts, and numerous other aspects.  Since the creation of this 
information, researchers have examined these aspects and used these characteristics to 
compare/contrast higher education institutions.  For instance, the tabulation of 
institutional grant aid has led some research to explore how it is related to other aspects in 
higher education.   
Institutional financial aid or grant aid is a growing area of research where scholars 
endeavored to explain how and why institutions offer such funding.  Instead of providing 
merely general subsidies to all students, some institutions provide institutional funds for 
some students based on financial need or merit based criterion (e.g. Winston, 2004; 
Hillman, 2012).  Institutional aid can be used to attract and enroll students with certain 
characteristics, such as academic preparation or diversity (e.g. Bowen, Kurzweil, & 
Tobin, 2005; Paulsen, 2001; Hillman, 2012).  In addition, institutions may discount prices 
for some students in an effort to generate more revenue (e.g. Hillman, 2012).  
Institutional financial aid or tuition discounting functions more as a form of price 
discrimination, which may differ across students (McPherson & Schapiro, 2006).  
Institutional aid can be used to offset increases in gross tuition prices (Kane, 2006).  
However, the ability to provide institutional aid or tuition discounts is likely dependent 
on access to donative resources (e.g. Winston 1999; 2004), which is a more central line of 
inquiry that relates to this study.  In particular, Winston (2004) explains, “US higher 
education is a highly stratified hierarchy of institutions where society’s resources—as 





students pay” (p. 352).  Winston (1999; 2004) goes on to chronicle how institutions vary 
in their access to donative resources and suggests this may affect institutions’ ability to 
give institutional grants.  Thus, access to donative resources such as private giving and 
state appropriations may affect institutions’ ability to provide tuition discounts.   
Some additional empirical research has explored the relationship between 
donative resources such as state appropriations, investment income, and private gifts.  For 
instance, Curs and Dars (2010a; 2010b) further investigate the relationships between 
donative resources and institutional grant aid.  They found that increases in state 
appropriations were associated with a decrease in institutional grant aid (Curs & Dar, 
2010a; 2010b).  However, they found that increases in investment income were related 
with increases in institutional grant aid (Curs & Dar, 2010a; 2010b).   They did not find 
any statistically significant relationships between private gifts and institutional grant aid 
(Curs & Dar, 2010a; 2010b).  A larger body of research exists assessing the relationship 
between donative resources and gross or net tuition prices.  For instance, Long (2004) 
included state appropriations as a control when she assessed whether the Georgia HOPE 
Scholarship induced public colleges/universities to change their gross tuition prices.  
Given the conceptual arguments from Winston (1999; 2004) and empirical evidence from 
Curs and Dar (2010a; 2010b), donative resources, such as state appropriations, 
investment income, private gifts, are additional aspects to consider in this study to 






Theoretical framework  
Application of Theory in Prior Studies 
McPherson and Shapiro (1998) discuss how applicable theories and 
corresponding evidence are not extensive when it comes to explaining institutional 
responses to financial aid programs.  In particular, they indicate the theories on for-profit 
firms or companies are not entirely applicable to public and nonprofit higher education 
institutions (McPherson & Shapiro, 1998).  However, there are a series of recent studies 
investigating institutional responses to financial aid programs that developed primarily in 
the field of economics (e.g. Long, 2004; McPherson & Shapiro,1993; Turner, 
forthcoming) but are slowly spreading to the field of higher education research 
(Tandberg, Hillman, Gross, 2014).  As expected, these studies drew from economic 
rationales, such as crowd out, to explain institutional responses to financial aid programs, 
where public funds take the place or crowd out private funds.  In the context of this 
discussion, crowd out refers to the phenomena where institutions substitute the 
state/federal aid in the place of their own institutional aid.  For instance, when Long 
(2004) examined how institutions would change financial aid in response to the creation 
of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship program, she hypothesized that private institutions 
would substitute their institutional aid with the state financial aid.  Put another way, Long 
(2004) tested whether private institutions lowered their expenditures on institutional aid 
when the Georgia HOPE Scholarship program was created in 1993.  However, Long 
(2004) did not present a broader theoretical argument of why institutions would reduce 





structure of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship program, Long (2004) could only investigate 
private institutions’ changes to institutional grant aid in her study.  
The series of studies that looked at how institutions respond to federal financial 
aid also investigated crowd out or capturing revenue.  The impetus for McPherson and 
Shapiro’s (1993) study of institutional behavior appeared to be in response to former U.S. 
Secretary of Education, William Bennett’s (1987) assertion that colleges raise tuition 
price when federal financial aid is increased.  However, McPherson and Shapiro (1993) 
also investigated how institutions changed their institutional aid expenditures, but they 
did not situate this in any other theoretical framework beyond what was dubbed the 
Bennett hypothesis of raising prices in concert with increased financial aid.  Turner 
(2012) modified the Bennett hypothesis to include institutional grant aid, where he 
asserted that institutions could reduce institutional grant aid when students receive tax 
credits.  Besides referencing the Bennett hypothesis, these studies did not discuss any 
other theoretical underpinnings, which is in part due to the fact that the crowd out 
phenomena is a well-accepted rationale in applied microeconomic research addressing 
the role of public funding in areas such as healthcare and education (Culter, 2002).  
Crowd out refers to situations when public resources or funding replace a function that 
was already funded by the private sector or another entity.  However, crowd out is not a 
phenomena investigated by researchers that developed out of the field of higher education 
studies.  Yet, some higher education researchers have looked at the interaction of states 
and public colleges/universities and applied other theoretical frameworks to explain how 





More broadly, some studies that investigated public higher education within the 
context of states use principal agent theory to explain how states and public institutions 
interact.  Often principal agent theory was used simply to explain the structure of public 
higher education where the state acts as principals and public colleges/universities 
operate as agents (e.g. McLendon, Deaton, & Hearn, 2007).  In addition, Titus (2009) 
used principal agent theory to explain how states interact with higher education 
institutions through policies such as providing state appropriations and financial aid.  
Some studies apply principal-agent theory to explain how and why states and institutions 
behave in certain way, such as states wanting more oversight or accountability and 
institutions acting in their own self-interest.  Lane and Kivisto (2008) explain that 
“…[Principal agent theory] can be useful for investigating and explaining why 
universities respond to legislative action in different ways” (Lane & Kivisto, 2008, pp. 
142).  For instance, Tandberg and Hillman (2014) utilize principal agent theory to explain 
why states might impose performance based funding to achieve more accountability and 
how institutions might respond to performance based funding by doing what is best for 
themselves.  Similarly, Liefner (2003) incorporated principal agent theory to explain how 
resource allocation and performance funding might change institutional and faculty 
behavior, where different modes of funding might incentivize positive and negative 
responses.  While the applications of principal agent theory are limited but growing in 
higher education research, these few prior studies incorporating principal agent theory 
demonstrated how this theory explains both the relationship of state governments and 





Beyond principle agent theory, resource dependence theory is another framework 
used to explain how public institutions change institutional revenue and expenditure 
patterns and policies.  However, resource dependence theory has not specifically been 
applied to studies investigating how institutions change institutional financial aid 
funding.  Instead, resource dependence theory has been used as a framework to address 
institutions shifting tuition revenue.  In particular, Delaney and Kearney (2016) apply 
resource dependence theory to their study investigating how Illinois public colleges 
respond to a state imposing a guaranteed in-state tuition policy.  These authors found that 
Illinois public four-year institutions increased fees and out-of-state tuition when a state 
mandate was imposed limiting the ability to raise revenue from in-state tuition (Delaney 
& Kearney, 2016).  While their study did not look at institutional financial aid as an 
outcome, it does suggest that public institutions are willing to adjust financial aspects 
within their direct control, such as setting fee and out-of-state tuition rates.      
 





Theoretical Perspective and Conceptual Model to Guide this Study 
Principal agent theory provides a core theoretical framework to understand state-
level policy changes and any potential impacts on institutions.  Kivisto (2005, 2007, 
2008) provides the most comprehensive set of discussions analyzing how principal agent 
theory can be used in higher education research addressing state policies and 
college/universities.  Principal agent theory describes hierarchal relationships or 
contracts, such as between states and institutions (Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  In the example 
of higher education, the state operates as a principal on behalf of citizens and students to 
contract with colleges and universities to provide educational opportunities.  Colleges and 
universities are the agents that have the expertise to provide postsecondary educational 
opportunities among other goods and services, such as research and public service.  
While multiple hierarchical principal-agent relationships exist in public higher education 
(Kivisto, 2007, 2008), the discussion herein will be simplified to the construct of a single 
principal-agent relationship between state governments and public four-year institutions.  
Principal agent theory goes beyond this simplistic specification of relationships/contracts 
in higher education to explain why such a contract may exist in the first place and what 
behaviors may manifest in the principal-agent relationship.   
A principal engages in a contract with an agent when the principal needs goods or 
services that might better be performed by a given agent.  In the context of the U.S. 
higher education, state governments contract with colleges and university to provide 
undergraduate and in some cases graduate education, which is in part due to a perceived 
expertise credited to postsecondary institutions (Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Kivisto, 2008).  





the state and institutions, where these intermediaries are governing boards or coordinating 
boards (e.g. Tandberg, 2013).  Historically, states provide appropriations to institutions in 
exchange for the educational offerings or services (Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  Depending on 
the state and institution, the nature of the contract could be explicitly articulated in 
legislation, statute, or charter, but in some case, it is more of an implicit contract with 
strings attached to funding (Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  Each state has slightly different 
funding guidelines for how appropriations are allocated, but all states with the exception 
of Colorado provide some form of direct financial support to public institutions 
(Tandberg, Hillman, & Gross, 2014). Beyond an explanation of the contract between 
states and institutions, principal agent theory explains how and why the contract may not 
work as it was intended.   
Principal agent theory acknowledges that tensions exist between principals and 
agents were agents may act in their own self-interest and principals may not have the 
ability or resources to ensure that contract objectives are fulfilled (Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  
Thus, the implicit contract between states and colleges could present some principal-
agent problems where institutions will knowingly or unintentional shirk their 
responsibilities in participating in the state merit aid program (Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  
Beyond shirking, Lane and Kivisto (2008) summarize the potential opportunistic 
behavior of institutions for their own self-interest in effort to obtain prestige, garner more 
revenue, or subsidize other facets of the institution.  In addition, to achieving these ends, 
institutions may knowingly or inadvertently not work toward the contract objectives or 
distort monitoring efforts (Lane & Kivisto, 2008).   When agents choose private/self-





agency problem or moral hazard.  Agents that seek self-interest may exploit information 
asymmetries and since institutions are highly specialized the information asymmetries 
might be more pronounced (Kivisto, 2005).  Kivisto (2007; 2008) explains a few 
potential ways that an institution may operate in their own self-interest, such as shirking 
or underperforming, pursuing prestige, seeking revenue, cross-subsidizing, and 
circumventing monitoring activities.  Certainly, some of these activities, such as pursuing 
prestige or revenue are not inherently an agency problem, but they become an agency 
problem if they run counter to the contract objectives.  The notion of shirking is described 
by Lane and Kivisto (2008) as when, “A university behaves opportunistically when it 
deliberately produces less or less effective outputs with the same inputs or consumes 
more inputs with same output” (p. 161).  However, principal agent theory assumes public 
universities will act in its own self-interest, but it does not provide a strong theoretical 
basis for this argument.   
An example of institutions pursuing their on self-interests exists in Long’s (2004) 
study, where she found that Georgia private non-profit institutions increased tuition 
prices and decreased institutional grant when the Georgia HOPE Scholarship was created.  
In addition, she did find the public institutions increased their room and board expenses 
and decreased their resident tuition price after the Georgia HOPE scholarship was created 
(Long, 2004), but was not able to observe institutional grant aid change in part since data 
was not available in IPEDS.   While it is difficult to know why Georgia public 
institutions did not increase tuition prices like private institution, it is possible that tuition 
pricing is a highly regulated and monitored aspect of public institutions, where some 





However, financial aid strategies are subject to less public monitoring and approval, 
where financial aid expenditures are buried in institutional budgets and financial sheets 
making it difficult to monitor and track at the state level.  However, if a public institution 
doesn’t change their tuition price but reduces their institutional grant aid expenses while 
maintaining enrollment, then a public university would have more net revenue available 
to subsidize other aspects of the institution.  It appears Tennessee has little monitoring of 
institutional grant aid aside from governing boards approving operating budgets, which 
make it more possible for public institutions to change with impunity.  In addition, Ness 
(2008) identified that institutions saw the TELS program as a new revenue source: “the 
higher education community realized that this lottery revenue was the only source of new 
money their sector would claim for years to come” (p. 119).  Tennessee public four-year 
institutions may operate in their own self-interest by reducing institutional grant in an 
effort to garner more net tuition revenue.     
Principal agent theory presents a near unidimensional perspective of institutional 
behavior, where institutions will only act in their self-interest unless they are monitored 
(Kivisto, 2008; Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  However, resource dependence theory provides 
some alternative explanations of institutional behavior and how an institution might 
respond to a merit aid program.   Resource dependence theory, developed out of 
organizational studies/theory, posits that institutions or organizations will seek additional 
revenue or resources and attempt to maintain the revenue/resources in effort to gain more 
autonomy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  In addition, Pfeffer & Salancik (2003) 
acknowledge that this notion of institutions or organizations seeking revenue may seem 





institutions/organizations achieve more revenue/resources through tactics.  In particular, 
they describe how institutions and organizations will attempt to control sources of 
revenue/resource.  Bowen and associates (2005) acknowledge that institutions will act in 
their own self-interest to maintain position and quality, which can include using financial 
aid.  While Pfeffer and Salanick (2003) do not describe specifically how public 
universities would control revenue/resources, some higher education studies have 
incorporated resource dependence theory, which help to examine how institutions might 
attempt to control revenue/resources.            
A few studies have found resource dependence theory to be applicable to public 
colleges/universities (Delaney & Kearney, 2016; Fowles, 2014).  Delaney and Kearney 
(2016) find that Illinois public four-year institutions expand alternative revenue streams 
when a primary revenue source is constrained.  Fowles (2014) applies a resource 
dependence framework to assess whether institutions respond to changes in revenue.  In 
the context of state merit aid program, institutions do not have direct control over the 
funding, however by attracting and enrolling merit aid recipients they could garner 
indirect access to the funds from the financial aid program.  Higher education institutions 
often use institutional grant aid to attract and enroll students (Hillman, 2012).  
McPherson and Shapiro (1998) validate this notion that institutions use institutional 
financial aid as means for managing enrollment and revenue, where institutions use 
institutional aid to garner more tuition revenue.  In addition, Bowen et al. (2005) 
discussed the various uses of institutional grant aid to help build an entering class by 
enhancing equity in access and attracting talented students.  Since state merit aid 





institutions may attempt to attract and retain students with merit aid awards by using 
institutional grant aid.  Within a resource dependence theory framework, Froelich (1999) 
suggests that organizations will adapt and align their practices and policies to increase 
their likelihood of obtaining new funding, especially for relatively stable government 
funding.  Thus, resource dependence theory suggests that public four-year institutions 
may be willing to pay or provide more institutional grant aid to TELS recipients.        
The use of resource dependence theory to explain how public institutions respond 
to changes in state fiscal policy is a growing area in higher education literature.  
However, in the other disciplines, resource dependence theory is used more extensively 
(Davis & Cobb, 2010).  By investigating citations, Davis and Cobb (2010) found that 
resource dependence theory is used in education studies but more often it is used in 
business, sociology, political science, and health care research.   For every three 
education articles using resource dependence theory, there were nearly 100 articles in 
other disciplines using resource dependence theory (Davis & Cobb, 2010).  However, 
Delaney and Kearney (2016) used resource dependence theory to explain how Illinois 
public institutions responded to a state law allowing for guaranteed in-state tuition prices 
for residents.  This state policy would constrain Illinois public institutions’ access to in-
state tuition revenue, which the authors hypothesized would push institutions to raise 
revenue from other fees and out-of-state tuition revenue.  Delaney and Kearney’s (2016) 
hypothesis was based squarely on resource dependence theory which suggests 
organizations will seek addition resources/revenue when a primary resource is 
constrained.  The authors note that this is a form of revenue/resource diversification that 





addition, Delaney and Kearney (2016) establish an appropriate state context for their 
empirical analysis, which is another key principle of resource dependence theory.       
While the core basis of the principal agent and resource dependence theories 
suggest different institutional responses, the two theories align on the importance of 
environment and context.  Resource dependence theory details the importance of the 
broader environment to determining institutional or organizational behavior (Davis & 
Cobb, 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  In resource dependence theory, the parameters 
used to define environment are inherently broad and universal to cover a myriad of 
different types of organizations.  Resource dependence theory addresses how 
organizations manage their environments through different tactics in order to garner or 
maintain more resources (Davis & Cobb, 2009).  Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) use a higher 
education example that highlight state government as key part of environment where a 
change in state government led to changes in financial support for the University of 
Illinois.  Resource dependence theory is flexible enough to encompass the financial 
relationship between states and public institutions and the theory is more acutely aware of 
how organization use tactics to garner or maintain resources.  However, principal agent 
theory provides a more succinct approach to defining the state environment or context for 
public four-year institutions.   
Principal agent theory defines the environment of public universities more 
succinctly in part since it has been more widely applied in empirical research on higher 
education.  State governments and governance structures over higher education are key 
aspects of state context/environment that account for how institutions are able to operate, 





appropriations.  Tandberg (2013) found that the presence of a consolidated governing 
board does affect how public institutions are funded, where institutions governed by a 
consolidated governing board receive less state appropriations.  Other studies have shown 
some relationship between consolidated governing boards and institutional tuition 
revenue, tuition rates/prices, and expenditures (e.g. Knott & Payne, 2004; Nicholson-
Crotty & Meier, 2003).   Thus, state governance systems over the public four-year 
institutions in Tennessee and comparison states might be an important aspect to consider 
in a study on a how a state merit aid program could influence institutions to change their 
institutional aid.   
Beyond governance over higher education, another aspect of environment worth 
considering is institutional access to other revenue sources such as state appropriations 
and investment income.  Resource dependence theory addresses the importance of 
considering all revenue sources as part of assessing and describing environment (Pfeffer 
& Salanik, 2003).  Institutions’ existing revenue sources reveal how and whether 
institutions are constrained by their financial situation (Pfeffer & Salanick, 2003).  In 
addition, the sources and relative sizes of revenue may reveal important 
interdependencies for institutions (Pfeffer & Salanik, 2003), where some public four-year 
institutions may have differential access to revenue due to their environment (Winston, 
199; 2004).  Access to donative resources, such as state appropriations, investment 
income, or private donations can impact institutional grant aid, where more donative 
resources might allow more institutional grants or lower tuition prices (Paulsen, 2001).  
Winston (1999, 2004) describes how higher education institutions have differential 





financial aid.  However, Winston (2004) indicates that there is less variability in access to 
donative resources at public institutions when looking within a given Carnegie 
Classification.   Given the importance of existing resources in resource dependence 
theory, the established primary revenue streams at public four-year institutions will be 
important aspects to consider when assessing institutional behavior.  Aside from tuition, 
the three other primary revenue streams related to undergraduate enrollment are state 
appropriations, investment income, and private gifts.   Thus, a study on institutional 
behavior will need to account for access to state appropriations and 
endowment/investment income to help establish the existing environment.    
Given that this study draws from principal agent and resource dependence 
theories, Figure 2.1 displays how these theoretical concepts combine to explain how 
public four-year institutions might respond to the Tennessee Education Lottery 
Scholarship (TELS) program while account for state and institutional 
context/environment.  Both principal agent and resource dependence theories address the 
necessity of establishing the broader state context that Tennessee public four-year 
institutions operate, which is being explained in this study in Boxes 1-3.  Principal agent 
theory describes the relationship more precisely between state governments and public 
higher education institutions, which operates through a state’s governance structure (Box 
1).  Resource dependence theory asserts the importance of accounting for other revenue 
when assessing institutions, which includes private gifts, investment income, and federal 
grants (Box 2).  In addition, resource dependence theory suggests accounting for aspects 
specific to the institutional environment, which in the context of this study is 





revenue dependency theories address a need to account for the broader state level 
environment, which is accounted for in this study by the college-aged population in state, 
existence of prior state level merit aid program, and state appropriations (Box 3).  The 
population of college-aged students is an aspect to consider given prior empirical 
literature on institutional grant aid (e.g. Curs & Dar, 2010a).  Existing state 
appropriations and state financial aid funding are two additional important aspects of the 
state context, since they highlight how the state and public institutions operate/transact.   
These state and institutional environment are depicted as aspects affecting public four-
year institutions in Tennessee (Box 5), but these environmental factors are also acting 
upon any other public four-year institution that could provide a comparison.   In 2004-05, 
Tennessee created a broad merit aid program (Box 4), which is shown as influencing 
Tennessee public four-year institutions.  It is the effect of the creation of the TELS 
program on institutional grant aid that is the primary aspect of interest in this study.  
After the creation of the merit aid program, Tennessee public four-year institution could 
respond by increasing, decreasing, or maintaining their institutional grant aid funding for 
new students (Box 6), which will be the primary focus of this study.  An increase or 
maintenance of institutional grant could be viewed as an attempt to control or maintain 
revenue from enrollment, which is based on resource dependence theory.  A decrease in 
institutional grant could be an attempt to replace state aid for institutional aid, which 







McPherson and Shapiro’s (1998) assertion that limited theories and evidence exist 
to explain institutional responses to financial aid remains true nearly twenty years later 
especially for public institution.  Many studies still reference the Bennett hypothesis 
when assessing how public institutions respond to financial aid programs, but this 
hypothesis lacks empirical evidence.  However, a series of recent studies presented 
convincing empirical evidence addressing how public institutions respond to financial aid 
by using concepts of crowd out and willingness to pay.  Turner (forthcoming) provides 
substantive evidence explaining how public institutions respond to students receiving Pell 
grants by increasing their willingness to pay (e.g. give them more aid).  In addition, 
Simone (2016) identify a similar result where all institutional types are willing to provide 
more institutional grant to Pell grant recipients.  Given the limited theoretical 
developments and investigation into how institutions respond to financial aid, there is a 
need for both the development of theory and empirical evidence to address how public 
four-year institutions respond to changes in state merit aid.   
This study endeavors to bring together a more comprehensive theory to explain 
institutional responses to financial aid programs and research how Tennessee public four-
year institutions responded to the creation of a statewide merit aid program.  This study 
will draw from principal agent and resource dependence theories to explain how 
Tennessee public four-year institutions will respond to the expansion of state financial aid 
while appropriately establishing the state context and institutional environment.  In 
addition to these theories, the growing research on state level policy will help guide this 





higher education.  The primary research questions explored in this study are the 
following:   
1) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their total expenditures on institutional grants given to first-
time, full-time students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
2) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change the number of first-time, full-time students receiving 
institutional awards when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
3) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their entire class average institutional award amount for 
first-time, full-time students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
4) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their recipient average institutional award amount for first-




























Figure 2.1. Conceptual frame for how Tennessee institutions may change institutional aid in 
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Using principal agent and revenue dependency theories, this study examines 
whether the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) influences public four-year 
institutions in Tennessee to change their institutional grant aid funding.  This chapter will 
be divided up into six sections.  First, the research questions discussed in the prior 
chapter will be reintroduced for context.  Second, a discussion of the data used in this 
study will be discussed followed by a subsection detailing the variables.  Third, a detailed 
discussion of the statistical method will be explained.  Fourth, a series of alternative 
specifications are described as potential checks on the robustness of any results.  Lastly, 
the limitations of the proposed method will be addressed to help shape the reliability of 
the potential results.   
 
Research Questions 
The primary research questions explored in this study are the following:   
 
1) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their total expenditures on institutional grants given to first-





2) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change the number of first-time, full-time students receiving 
institutional awards when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
3) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their entire class average institutional award amount for 
first-time, full-time students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
4) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their recipient average institutional award amount for first-
time, full-time students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
 
Data 
 In order to address these questions, data was gathered from multiple sources to 
appropriately account for institutional and state level context.  However, the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Data System (IPEDS) provides the 
core data for this study through its numerous annual surveys.  The IPEDS survey began 
collecting institutional level data beginning in 1980 on all institutions participating in 
Title IV financial aid programs.  Earlier data collection efforts by the US Department of 
Education date back even further in the Higher Education General Information Survey 
(HEGIS) collections.  Over the years, IPEDS has expanded its data collection efforts and 
it developed a Student Financial Aid (SFA) survey that began collecting data in 1999.   
This first iteration of the SFA survey included some basic information on financial aid for 
undergraduate students.  In the subsequent years, the SFA survey was expanded in 2003 





aid.  The creation and expansion of the IPEDS institutional survey allowed for more 
precise analysis on the effects of state merit aid programs, but are limited to first-time, 
full-time students, which exclude first-time, part-time and transfer students.  The 
exclusion of these part-time and transfer students from the SFA metrics may eliminate 
some state merit aid recipients that enroll part-time and in later post-TELS years ignore 
some transfers students.  Long’s study (2004) had to rely on a cruder categorization of 
institutional financial aid in her assessment on the effects of the Georgia HOPE 
Scholarship program, because the SFA survey did not exist.  However, this study will 
rely on the more detailed SFA survey to derive an analytic sample of institutions to 
evaluate whether or not institutional financial aid changes when the TELS began 
providing funding.   
The analytic sample in this study is based on the population of institutions that 
participate in the Title IV federal financial aid and provide annual reporting in the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), Student Financial Aid (SFA) 
survey.  As the research questions suggest, this population of institutions focuses on 
public four-year institutions from 2000 through 2009 in order to balance pre- and post-
TELS observed years.  During this time period, Tennessee had nine public four-year 
institutions that operated and participated in the IPEDS SFA Survey.  In the other US 
states, there were 390 public four-year institutions that participated in the IPEDS SFA 
survey, which can be used to draw a comparison group of similar institutions as those in 
Tennessee.   
As mentioned, this study is focusing on public four-year institutions in the 





Andrew W. Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching’s (e.g. Carnegie 
Foundation) grouping of institutions in 2000.  While the Carnegie Foundation has 
classifications dating back to 1970, this study uses the 2000 classification in part because 
it aligns with the creation of the IPEDS SFA survey and was the classification used up 
through the implementation of the TELS merit program in 2004-05.  The Carnegie 
Classification in 2000 created ten broad types of institutions including:  
1) Doctoral/Research Universities—Extensive, 
2) Doctoral/Research Universities—Intensive, 
3) Master’s Colleges and Universities I, 
4) Master’s Colleges and Universities II, 
5) Baccalaureate Colleges—Liberal Arts, 
6) Baccalaureate Colleges—General,  
7) Baccalaureate/Associate’s Colleges, 
8) Associate’s Colleges,  
9) Specialized Institutions, and  
10) Tribal Colleges and Universities.   
This study focuses on the Doctoral/Research Universities designated as research 
extensive or intensive and Master’s Colleges/Universities I by the 2000 Carnegie 
Classification since these three categories include all Tennessee public four-year 
institutions.  When creating these categories, the Carnegie Foundation defined them as 
the following: 
  “Doctoral/Research Universities—Extensive: These institutions typically 





graduate education through the doctorate.  During the period studies, they 
awarded 50 or more doctoral degrees per year across at least 15 
disciplines.  
Doctoral/Research Universities—Intensive: These institutions typically 
offer a wide range of baccalaureate programs, and they are committed to 
graduate education through the doctorate.  During the period studied, they 
awarded at least 10 doctoral degrees per year across three or more 
disciplines, or at least 20 doctoral degrees per year overall.  
Master’s Colleges and Universities I: The institutions typically offer a 
wide range of baccalaureate program, and they are committed to graduate 
education through the master’s degree.  During the period studies, they 
awarded 40 or more master’s degrees per year across three or more 
disciplines” (CFAT, 2001, pp. 1). 
Prior studies relied on Carnegie Classifications to account for the diversity of higher 
education institutions in the U.S.  For instance, Winston (2004) used the Carnegie 
Classification system to demonstrate differences in prices, subsides, and financial aid 
across and within sectors and institutional types.   In addition, some studies, such as 
Knott and Payne (2004), employ the Carnegie Classification to segment higher education 
institutions, such as institutions with comprehensive and doctoral classification.   
 Beyond the Carnegie Classification and IPEDS SFA survey, this study draws 
from other IPEDS surveys to appropriate establish an institutional and state context.  In 
particular, aspects of the IPEDS Institutional Characteristics, Enrollment, and Finance 





Beginning in 1980, the Institutional Characteristics survey gathers information on 
educational offering, location, tuition/fees, and other directory information.  The 
Enrollment survey annually collects information on fall enrollments that provide 
demographic information on the undergraduate and graduate student population going 
back to 1980.  The Finance survey has changes over the years since its initial collection 
in 1980, but provides information on the revenue and expenditures at institutions. When 
institutions participate in a system of institutions, they have the option of reporting 
information as a single institution or grouped with other institutions in a system.  Thus, 
IPEDS data will need to be assessed to insure that all variables are reported at a common 
level, such as at the single institution level.  This study will account for the appropriate 
parent and child reporting relationships to ensure all variables are listed or adjusted to be 
at a single institution level (e.g. Jaquette & Parra, 2014).  The IPEDS survey data provide 
information on the institutional context but other data sources will be needed to establish 
public four-year institutions’ state context or environment.  
 Information on governance over higher education institutions comes from the 
Education Commissions of the States (ECS).   McGuiness (1981) established a taxonomy 
for classifying higher education governance structure as a consolidating governing board 
or coordinating agency going back at least as far as 1981.  Since then, McGuiness has 
made periodic updates of the governance classification to account for any changes 
(McGuiness 1981; 1986; 1888; 1991; 1994; 1997).  These regular updates on higher 
education governance capture whether one board governs one institution or one board 





coordinating boards/agencies have in each state by categorizing their authority to 
set/review budgets and approve academic programs.         
 Given that Tennessee was a late adopter of a statewide merit aid program, it is 
necessary to understand which other states had previously adopted a merit aid program.  
The few research studies that have looked across states come up with different lists of 
states with merit aid programs (e.g. Doyle, 2006; Hu, Trengrove, & Zhang, 2012; Ness, 
2008; Sjoquist & Winters, 2012).   State merit aid programs can offer a wide range of 
dollar amounts and number of students receiving an award, where some research studies 
many not acknowledge smaller award programs.  However, Sjoquist and Winter (2012) 
provide the most comprehensive list of states with merit aid program, where they 
categorize stronger (e.g. larger) and weaker (e.g. smaller) programs.  Tennessee is 
included in this categorization of states that implement a larger merit aid program in 
2004-05.   In addition to Tennessee, there are 28 other states that adopted a small or large 




 Institutional grant aid is the dependent variable in this study but parameterized in 
four different ways, where each is potentially influenced by the creation of the Tennessee 
Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) 2004-05.  The key independent variable in this 
study is the dichotomous variable indicating when Tennessee started awarding TELS 
awards to graduating high school students.  A series of other independent variables 
relating to state appropriations, endowment income, private gifts, financial aid, 





better comparison group and improve precision of estimates.  All variables based on a 
dollar amount are adjusted for inflation using the CPI-U adjustment.  In addition, all 
continuous/scaled variables will be log transformed so results can be interpreted in 
percentage change rates.        
 
Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variable, institutional grant aid, is drawn from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) Student Financial Aid survey.  
Institutional grant aid refers to any scholarship or grant that is funded by the institution or 
where the institution selects the recipient, which can include such awards as merit-based 
scholarships awarded on the basis of prior academic/talent performance, grants awarded 
on the basis of financial need, or athletic awards.  Unfortunately, there is not a means to 
disaggregate this overall institutional aid into distinct need-based and merit-based 
criterion.  IPEDS collects institutional grant aid on undergraduate degree-seeking 
students who are enrolling for the first-time in college at a full-time status in a given fall 
semester.  An undergraduate degree-seeking student can include any student enrolled in 
two- and four-year programs where a formal degree is awarded.  A first-time student 
refers to a student who is enrolling in college for the first-time since completing high 
school.  A full-time student includes anyone enrolled for at least 12 credits in the fall 
semester or quarter or taking at least 24 contact hours in a given week.  Information on 
institutional grant aid given to first-time, full-time undergraduate degree-seeking students 
is available going back to fall 1999.  Prior to 1999, the IPEDS Finance survey collected 





continuing undergraduate students and all graduate students), which is the method that 
Long (2004) used to determine if private institutions change their institutional grant aid in 
response to the creation of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship program.  However, the 
Finance survey data on institutional grant is an imprecise measure when a research 
question focuses on a state policy (e.g. TELS program) affecting entering undergraduate 
students.  In this study, measures of institutional grant aid will be utilized in the four 
ways collected in the IPEDS Student Financial Aid Survey: total institutional grant aid, 
recipient average institutional grant aid, entire class average institutional grant aid, and 
number of institutional grant aid recipients.  These four parameterizations of institutional 
grant aid will help uncover changes in total expenditures of institutional aid as well as 
understanding how institutions change their average and number of awards.     
 
Independent Variables 
State appropriations: State appropriations provide a large share of funding to public 
institutions, where it historically has been the largest share of operating budgets at public 
institutions (e.g. Toutkousian, 2001).  Prior research has hypothesized a relationship 
between state appropriations and institutional grant aid and/or tuition pricing at public 
institutions, where more state appropriations will lead to lower gross tuition prices or 
more financial aid (e.g Winston, 1999; 2004).  Some empirical studies have investigated 
the relationship between state appropriations and gross tuition prices, net prices, and 
institutional grant aid (Curs & Dar, 2010a; 2010b). These studies’ findings suggest that 
increased state appropriations decrease institutional grant aid (Curs & Dar, 2010a; 





Georgia HOPE Scholarship changed gross tuition prices, and she found that state 
appropriations did not change the effect of HOPE scholarships on tuition pricing.  In fact, 
the inclusion of state appropriations did not even increase the precision of her model.  
Despite the limited empirical evidence on the relationship between state appropriations 
and institutional grant aid, the inclusion of controlling for state appropriations is 
warranted given the theoretical or conceptual assertions by Winston (1999; 2004).  Thus, 
this study will account for state appropriations as captured and defined in the Integrated 
Postsecondary Data System (IPEDS) as funding for operating expenses received by the 
institution from a state legislative body.  However, in IPEDS, institutions are allowed to 
report any given survey as an independent institution or grouped with institutions in their 
system.  Most public four-year institutions in the sample report finance data as a single, 
independent institution, which account for between 369 and 378 institutions in any given 
year.  Of the remaining institutions, the finance data was adjusted to distribution their 
state appropriation by their full-time equivalent (FTE) enrollment as suggested by 
(Jaquette and Parra, 2010), which accounted for an additional 20-25 institutions in any 
given year.  When finance and enrollment information was reported with institutions 
grouped together, there was not any information available to distribute aid by FTE 
enrollment, which only affected between one and five institutions.  For example, in 2005, 
there were 376 institutions with only their finance data reported, 21 institutions had 
finance data adjusted for FTE enrollment to distribute state appropriations across a group 
of campuses/institutions, and only one institution had finance data that could not be 





institutions since each of the nine institutions had complete and separate data reported in 
IPEDS.   
 
Investment income and private gifts:  Public universities have investment income which 
comes from interest or dividends from investments.  Private gifts include any funding 
given to institutions that was not added to the institution’s permanent endowment.  
Funding from investment and private gifts can provide another subsidy for universities, 
which Winston (1999) notes can be used to provide institutional scholarships/grants.  
However, institutions have varying levels of donative resources, such as investment 
income (Winston, 1999; 2004).  Given the variation and likely relationship with 
institutional grant aid offerings (Winston, 1999; 2004), investment income is an 
important variable to control for in any analysis of changes in institutional grant aid.  
Studies on the institutional effects of state merit aid program have not controlled or 
examined endowment income (e.g. Long, 2004).  However, Curs and Dar (2010a; 2010b) 
assessed the relationship between investment income and private gifts with institutional 
grant and found that an increase in private gifts or investment income corresponded to an 
increase in average institutional grant aid.  Given Winston’s (1999; 2004) conceptual 
argument and Curs and Dars’s (2010a; 2010b) empirical evidence, this study will include 
endowment income and private gifts.  Annual investment and gift income is collected in 
the IPEDS Finance survey will be the source data for these aspects.    Since this 
information came from the IPEDS survey, any grouped institutions had investment 
income and private gift aid distributed across campus, but this only affected at most 6.3% 






Federal financial aid:  Federal financial aid, such as Pell and Supplemental Education 
Opportunity Grants (SEOG), can vary by institution and year depending on the financial 
need of a given institution’s student population.  Curs and Dar (2010a; 2010b) and 
Simone (2016) find that an increase in federal financial aid can correspond to an increase 
in institutional grant aid.  Similarly, Turner (forthcoming) found that public institutions 
increase their willingness to pay for students receiving a Pell grant.  Thus, given the 
empirical evidence suggesting a positive relationship between federal and institutional 
grant aid, it will be an important aspect to control for in this study.   
 
Governance of higher education:  State level governance of higher education can vary 
across each of the 50 US states.  However, McGuiness created a taxonomy of higher 
education governance structures to account for variation but allow for grouping states 
with relatively similar governance structures/systems.  McGuiness’s (1997) taxonomy 
accounts for institutions that have a consolidated governing board, coordinating board 
with consolidate/aggregate budget authority, coordinating boards with less or no budget 
responsibilities, and planning agency without any budget responsibilities.  Many 
researchers have focused on only consolidated governing boards (e.g. Tandberg, 2013) or 
included another governing layer for coordinating boards (e.g. Curs & Dar, 2010a).  
However, given the study is focused on institutional funding for grant aid, it is more 
important to group governance structures by those that have consolidated budget 
authority, which includes consolidated governing boards and coordinating boards with 





account for any public four-year institution with a state governing body holding 
consolidated budget authority, which includes public four-year institutions in 38 states.  









Higher Education Governance Structures with Consolidated Board or Coordinating Board with Consolidated Budget Authority















































State Merit Aid Program:  Researchers have presented varying accounts of which states 
have a merit aid program, which is in part due to the size and intensity of these programs.  
Sjoquist and Winter (2012) account for a more full list of state merit aid programs while 
addressing the relative size and amount of funding provided by each state program.  They 
group nine states (e.g. Georgia, Florida, New Mexico, Louisiana, South Carolina, 
Kentucky, Nevada, West Virginia, and Tennessee) into a “strong” merit aid program 
because these merit aid programs are larger in size and also provide more financial aid to 
recipients.  In addition, they identify 20 states with relatively “weak” or small merit aid 
programs.  Table 3.2 shows the states that adopted a merit aid program and year the 
program was implemented, where states are grouped by the Sjoquist and Winter’s (2012) 
classification of “strong” and “weak” programs.  Table 3.3 combines information on the 
governance structure and state merit aid program to show which states have similar 
governance structure to Tennessee and had not created a merit aid program before 








States with Merit Aid Programs 
Strong Merit 
Programs 




New Mexico 1997 
Louisiana 1998 
South Carolina 1998 
Kentucky 1999 
Nevada 2000 
West Virginia 2002 
Tennessee 2004 
    
Weak Merit Programs   
Arkanasa 1991 




New Jersey 1997 





















        
State Merit Aid Programs and Higher Education Governance Structures 





Authorirty   
Non-Merit Aid States with 
Consolidated Budget Authority 
(Potential Comparison States) 
Georgia 1993 Yes   Alabama 
Florida 1997 Yes   Colorado 
New Mexico 1997     DC 
Louisiana 1998 Yes   Hawaii 
South Carolina 1998 Yes   Indiana 
Kentucky 1999 Yes   Iowa 
Nevada 2000 Yes   Kansas 
West Virginia 2002 Yes   Maine 
Tennessee 2004 Yes   Minnesota 
        New Hampshire 
Weak Merit Programs       North Carolina 
Arkanasa 1991 Yes   Ohio 
North Dakota 1994 Yes   Oregon 
Mississippi 1996 Yes   Rhode Island 
Oklahoma 1996 Yes   Vermont 
Missouri 1997 Yes   Wisconsin 
New Jersey 1997       
New York 1997       
Alaska 1999 Yes     
Utah 1999 Yes     
Illinois 1999-2004 Yes     
Washington 1999-2006       
Michigan 2000-2008       
California 2001       
Idaho 2001 Yes     
Maryland 2002-2005 Yes     
South Dakota 2004 Yes     
Massachusetts 2005 Yes     
Montana 2005 Yes     
Delaware 2006       
Wyoming 2006 Yes     
(McGuiness, 1997; Sojquist & Winters, 2012)     






Population of 18 year olds:  State population of 18 year olds provides a proxy for number 
traditional college-aged students.  In addition, it helps account for differences between 
states on the potential pool of traditional college-aged students.  Prior studies looking at 
the effect of changes in state financial aid program have included a population measure 
for 18 to 24-year olds (e.g. Curs & Dar, 2010a; 2010b), where a relationship existed 
between institutional grant aid and state population of 18-to-24 year olds (Curs & Dar, 
2010a).  The study will incorporate a measure for the population of 18 year olds from the 
U.S. Census Bureau since it is focusing only on first-year students primarily enrolling 
after high school.   
 
Analytic Framework 
Given the quantitative nature of this study, it is important to begin the 
investigation with exploratory data analysis.  A series of descriptive statistics will be an 
important first step in understanding how the dependent and independent variables vary 
between states, institutions, and over time.  First, overall averages, standard deviations, 
minimums, and maximums will be presented to provide an overall picture of the data for 
each of the dependent and independent variables.  Second, the averages will be 
partitioned into two time periods to collapse the pre- and post-TELS years, where results 
will presented juxtaposing Tennessee public four-year institutions against groups of other 
public four-year institutions.  This comparison of pre- and post-TELS years in Tennessee 
and other public four-year institutions will show if any general changes occurred when 
Tennessee implemented the TELS program relative to other public four-year institutions.  





dependent variables over time.  These initial exploratory data analyses will show a rough 
sketch of what might be occurring at Tennessee public four-year institutions and will 
provide a foundation for other advanced quantitative analyses.   
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Fixed Effects Estimation 
The analytic approach continues with assessing the general associations between 
the institutional grant aid and a series of other institutional and state variables.  This is 
similar to the work done by Curs and Dar (2010a; 2010b), which examine the 
relationship between state financial and other finance related variables to determine how 
they are related to institutional grant aid.  As a first step on the path, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimations will be applied to the four dependent institutional grant aid 
variables while controlling for a series of independent variables.  OLS estimation is long 
standing facet of education research to approximate how a series of aspects are associated 
with an outcome or dependent variable.  The OLS estimation is represented in the follow 
equation: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖      (1) 
where y represents institutional grant aid for a given institution (i) at a given time (t).  
Institutional grant aid will be defined as the recipient average, entire class average, and 
total institutional grant aid as well as number of institutional grant aid recipients.  A 
vector of initial covariates (Xi) are included to account for state appropriations, 
investment income, private gifts, federal grant aid, state population of 18 year olds, 
indicator for being governed by a board with budget authority, and indicator for states 





all of the already mentioned controlling variables as well as some admissions related 
variables, such as test scores of enrolled students, number of applicants, admission offers, 
and confirmed students.  The admissions variables are added in a separate iteration since 
IPEDS only began collecting consistent test score data in 2002, which leaves out two 
years of data for most institutions included in the analytic sample. 
 While OLS estimation is fine for a single cross-section, it is inappropriate to 
extend to studies where there are multiple measurements on subjects (e.g. more than one 
time period for each institution).  A simply parameterized OLS model assumes 
independence of the error term, but with multiple measures on same subjects the 
independence of error is violated since the errors are being estimated across observations 
on the same institution.   However, OLS can work as an estimation strategy with multiple 
measures on subjects if the model is parameterized to include a dummy variable or fixed 
effect for each subject/unit.  The data compiled in this study include multiple or repeated 
measures on public four-year institutions from 2000 to 2013, which create a cross-
sectional, time series data set or panel data set.  Thus, a simple OLS estimation technique 
would be insufficient to analyze the data in this study given the institutions are measured 
for ten years.  Fixed effects provide a way to account for the repeated measures on the 
same public four-year institutions by creating an explicit parameter for each subject in the 
model.  This helps to ensure any time-invariant, unobserved aspects of public four-year 
institutions will not bias the estimates.  Fixed effects can be run using OLS where dummy 
variables would be created and included in any models as well as clustering the errors at 
the unit being measured (e.g. public four-year institutions).  However, panel data analysis 





fixed effects will be observed at either the institution or state level.  The use of only 
institutional effects is likely best suited for this analysis since units are measured at this 
institutional level.  The fixed equation is a slight extension of the simple regression 
equation list in Model 1: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (2) 
Here, a subscript for t is added to all parameters to account for the institutions 
measured at multiple time periods.    In addition, parameter ui accounts for any 
unobserved time invariant aspects associated with each institution.  In addition, a time 
effect (tt) is added to account for any time specific shock that would affect all institutions 
in that given time period, such as a recession.  While the fixed effect analysis in Model 2 
is marketed improvement on the simple regression in Model 1, it does little to answer the 
research questions to determine if and how Tennessee public four-year institutions 
changed their institutional grant aid post-TELS.   A slight extension of the fixed effects is 
to parameterize difference-in-differences estimation approach to explicit define a set of 
parameters to see how Tennessee changes their institutional grant aid strategy post-TELS.  
 
Difference-in-Differences Estimation 
Research on state policy interventions, such as the Tennessee Education Lottery 
Scholarship (TELS) programs, warrant a thorough quantitative analysis.  In fact, Hu, 
Trengrove, and Zhang (2012) discuss the need for casual inferences with respect to state 
merit aid programs by using quasi-experimental designs to determine the average 
treatment effect against a counterfactual or control group.  They suggest difference-in-





a merit aid program.  Difference-in-differences estimation models provide an appropriate 
analytic framework for investigating a single state policy change where it can be 
compared to a subset of the other 49 states.  Applications of difference-in-differences 
models examining higher education policies and practices have grown in the past 20 
years, but it is a technique with a longer history and more frequently usage in economics 
(Imbens & Wooldridge, 2008).  In fact, much of the research using DID models with 
respect to higher education were conducted by economists (Dynarski, 2000; Long, 2004; 
Cornwell et al., 2006; Goodman, 2008).  Within the context of state financial aid 
programs, many of these DID models assessed how students respond (e.g. student 
demand effects) to the advent of statewide merit aid programs in Georgia and 
Massachusetts (Dynarski, 2000; Long, 2004; Cornwell et al, 2006; Goodman, 2008).  
Long (2004) uses a similar difference-in-differences model as in the student demand 
studies, but she uses it to estimate the institutional responses to the Georgia HOPE 
scholarship.  A few other studies related to higher education and workforce development 
utilized a DID estimation design (e.g. Sjoquist & Winters, 2012; Tandberg & Hillman, 
2014; Tandberg, Hillman, & Gross, 2014).  These prior studies using DID models 
provide methodological context and guidance for this study on how the TELS program 
may induce Tennessee public four-year institutions to change their institutional aid 
awards.   
Given difference-in-differences (DID) estimation applications in higher education 
are bit more limited in prior research, a conceptual discussion of this estimation technique 
is warranted in this study.  DID is a broad term referring to econometric models that 





treatment observations (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2008).  The essential aspects to perform a 
DID model is to have at least two groups/units and two time periods, where one group 
was treated in the latter time period (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2008).  However, DID 
models have numerous extensions to this basic, simple parameterization, where three or 
more groups and/or multiple time periods can be included in the model (Imbens & 
Wooldridge, 2008).  The focus of DID models is on estimating the average gain or 
decline over time for the treated group while accounting for changes in the same outcome 
for a control group (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2008).  In an effort to show how a DID 
model can take form in the context of this study, it is helpful to think about the study line 
of inquiry in a hypothetical example to show how DID works as an estimation strategy.            
DID estimation may seem like a complex quantitative analysis, but it can easily 
be explained in a visual display of how institutional grant aid changes when the TELS 
program is implemented.  Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 shows visually how a DID model 
works in hypothetical example that is related to this study.  Figure 3.1 shows the average 
institutional grant aid award at Tennessee and other public four-year institutions between 
fiscal year 2000 and 2004.  In this example, Tennessee public four-year institutions 
provide smaller average institutional grant aid awards than other public four-year 
institutions.  If a prediction was generated for the average institutional grant aid in 
Tennessee and other public four-year institutions for fiscal year 2005-2010, it would 
appear as something like Figure 3.2, where both groups would increase at the same rates 
as in 2000-2004.  However, since Tennessee implemented the TELS program taking 
effect for 2005, it may cause institutions to change their average institutional grant aid.  





the TELS program was implemented, which shows that Tennessee decreased its average 
institutional grant aid award while the other states continued to increase their average 
award.   In particular, the institutional effects of the TELS program can be estimated by 
taking the control states’ increase (e.g. Line XY) in institutional aid and subtract it from 
Tennessee’s change in institutional aid allocations (e.g. Line ZB), which removes any 
permanent differences and time varying differences between the control states and 
Tennessee before the TELS program was implemented (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2008).  
Then a post-TELS comparison can be made between Tennessee and other states by 
comparing/differencing Line YZ average and Line BD average while accounting for the 
estimated pre-TELS difference.  In this process, the Tennessee pre- and post-TELS 
periods can be compared as well (e.g. Line AB versus Line BD).  While this provides a 
simplistic description of difference-in-differences estimation, it is discussed here as a 
primer to provide a general conceptualization, where more details on the empirical model 
will be explained in subsequent sections.  However, first, a series of exploratory data 
analyses will be conducted, which help provide a conceptual and analytic foundation for 







Figure 3.1. Average institutional grant aid award at Tennessee and other public four-year 




































Figure 3.2. Hypothetical average institutional grant aid in Tennessee and other public 















































































A series of difference-in-differences models will be estimated to provide a more 
comprehensive analytic picture of how institutional grant aid at Tennessee public four-
year institutions changes with the advent of the TELS program.  First, a basic difference-
in-differences model will be estimated to understand the institutional responses to the 
TELS implementation.  The simple difference-in-differences model takes the following 
form: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (3) 
where y represents institutional grand aid for a given institution (i) at a given time (t).  
Institutional grant aid will be defined as total, recipient average, and entire class average 
institutional grant aid as well as number of institutional grant aid recipients.  Since 
Tennessee institutions can be observed before the TELS program, the model can account 
for Tennessee specific pre-TELS levels in the β2 parameter that are distinct and additive 
to the other states pre-TELS levels (β1).  However, the inclusion of the fixed effect (ui) 
will take the place of β2 since they are duplicative.  The change in institutional grant aid 
in other states after the TELS implementation is accounted for by the β3 parameter.  Here, 
β4 is the parameter of interest showing the effect of the TELS program by indicating if 
and how Tennessee universities respond to the program after its implementation.  
Institutional fixed effects will be accounted for by ui and time effect is accounted for in tt.  
Standard errors are grouped at the institutional-level since this is where data are typically 
measured in this study.  Figure 3.4 shows how this empirical equation relates to the 









Figure 3.4. Example of difference-in-differences estimation of institutional grant aid with 
corresponding coefficients.     
 
 In addition, a slight extension of this difference-in-differences model is proposed 
to help improve the precision of the estimates.  Additional covariates will be included to 
potentially improve the precision by reducing the standard errors, so an additional vector 
is added to the model:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜷𝜷𝟓𝟓𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (4) 
In addition, a vector of covariates (Xit) is included to control for institutional and state 



































grant aid, and population of 18-year olds.  All other parameters in Model 4 are the same 
as Model 3.   
A more flexible function of the difference-in-differences model is constructed to 
account for a potential lagged effect, where institutions may not respond immediately to 
the creation of the TELS program.  In order to see if there was a delayed effect, each 
post-TELS year is parameterized separately to see if and when Tennessee public four-
year institutions responded to the TELS program.  Here a model with any additional 
controlling variable is represented in the following equation, but still having a separate 
parameter for each post-TELS year: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏1…5 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖1...5 + 𝜔𝜔1...5(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖1…5) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (5) 
Each post-TELS year for the comparison institutions in parameterized in τ1 for the first 
post-TELS year (e.g. 2005) through τ5 for the fifth post-TELS year (e.g. 2009).  In 
addition, ω1 accounts for the Tennessee public four-year institutions response in the first 
year post-TELS (e.g. 2005), where a separate parameter exist for each year post-TELS 
through the fifth year as ω5 (e.g. 2009).  Model 5 is replicated with the addition of other 
controlling variables to potentially improve precision, which is represented in equation 6: 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏1…5 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖1...5 + 𝜔𝜔1...5(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖1…5) + 𝜷𝜷𝟓𝟓𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(6) 
Here Xit represents a vector of controlling variables including state appropriation, 
investment income, private gifts, federal grant aid, and population of 18-year olds for 






Alternative Comparison Groups 
The identification of appropriate comparison states is important in order to ensure 
bias is not injected into the model.  Traditional, control groups in difference-in-
differences model typically rely on finite distinctions, such as states in a similar region or 
limited interdependency (Long, 2004).  While these are important distinctions, recent 
studies have found that higher education governance structure to be an important aspect 
in determining institution revenue patterns (e.g. Knott & Payne, 2004; Nicholson-Crotty 
& Meier, 2003) and institutional grant aid (e.g. Curs & Dar, 2010a).  Thus, a separate 
model will be run using the above model but limiting the comparison group of public 
four-year institutions to public four-year institutions with a similar higher education 
governance structure as in Tennessee.  Specifically, a comparison group will be 
constructed of only institutions having a governance structure with responsibility over the 
institution’s budget, such as the ability to change institutional grant aid 
allocations/expenditures.   Tennessee public four-year institutions are governed by 
coordinating boards with budget responsibility, which is why consolidating governing 
boards and coordinating boards with budget responsibilities may provide a more suitable 
comparison group.  In addition, Tennessee public institutions will be compared to other 
states with a merit aid program in existence well before the TELS program was created.  
This comparison to other states with a merit aid program is similar to Dynarski (2004), 
where she posited that non-merit states may differ substantively from a state that adopts a 
merit aid program.  In the context of this study, preexisting merit aid states might be 
similar to Tennessee in terms of the state and institutional context but on unobservable 





Since preexisting merit aid states have already experienced the policy/funding shock of 
the merit aid program, they should have relatively consistent patterns on the variables 
included in this study, which will be checked as part of the analysis.  Lastly, each 
Tennessee public four-year institution will be compared to their similar counterparts on 
the basis of their Carnegie Classification.  For instance, doctoral extensive institutions 
will be compared to other doctoral extensive institutions nationally.     
 
Robustness Checks 
A series of alternative specification will be conducted to test the robustness of the 
results.  First, a placebo test will be conducted where the above difference-in-differences 
models is run on only years before the implementation of the TELS program (e.g. 2000-
2004).  In this placebo test, an artificial treatment year will be selected at random 
between 2000 and 2004.  This placebo test should yield non-significant differences in 
2000-2004, which indicates other aspects were not influencing institutional grant aid at 
Tennessee public four-year institutions.  Second, the difference-in-differences models 
will be run systematically to leave one Tennessee public institution out of the analysis to 
ensure that one institution wa/s not biasing the results (e.g. an outlier Tennessee public 
four-year institution).   
 
Limitations 
While this study conducts a series of alternative specifications to check the 
robustness of the results, there are some limitations with this analytic approach which can 





estimation with respect to error terms.  First and foremost, any other policy/practice 
shocks to Tennessee public institutions at the same time of the TELS implementation 
could bias the results and interpretation.  In order for there to be a detectable casual effect 
associated with the TELS program, there cannot be any other substantive policy/practice 
changes in 2004-05 that are not related to the TELS program.  For instance, it would be 
difficult to link changes in institutional grant aid to the TELS program if Tennessee had 
simultaneous cut state appropriations in a dramatic way in the same year TELS was 
implemented.  Second, the sample size of “treated” institutions (e.g. nine Tennessee 
public four-year institutions) is relatively small, which may limit the statistical power to 
detect a difference between Tennessee and comparison public four-year institutions.  Put 
another way, this study might not be able to find a statistical significant difference in 
institutional grant aid between the nine Tennessee public four-year institutions and 
comparison public four-year institutions due to the small sample size.  Third, since 
institutional grant aid is measured in aggregate in IPEDS, there is not a way to measure 
institutional need-based and merit-based aid separately.  This limits the ability to hone in 
on how institutions might change need-based and merit-based in different ways post-
TELS.     
A series of limitation in this study may develop with respect to estimating the 
error terms.  First, given that this study is using multiple years before and after the 
implementation of the TELS program, it is possible that serial correlation might be 
biasing the standard errors in the difference-in-differences models.  This study will run a 
series of checks on the error terms to ensure that serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 





sectional dependence test to determine if serial correlation presents a problem for 
estimation (e.g. xtcsd in Stata).  In addition, this study will investigate whether non-
constant variance exists in the errors (e.g. xttest3 in Stata), which indicated whether or 
not heteroscedasticity presents a problem for estimation.  Depending on the results of 
these test, different estimation strategies might need to account for all three disturbances.  
Prais-Winsten panel correct standard errors (PCSE), feasible generalized least squares 
(FGLS), and Discroll-Kraay standard errors can correct for different combinations 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-sectional dependence.  However, PSCE and 
FLGS require relative long panels with between 20 and 40 time periods of data to 
appropriated correct standard errors (Beck & Katz, 1995).  Given the shorter number of 
time periods in this study, Driscoll-Kraay standards would be the better estimation 
approach if all three disturbances are present.  If only autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity are present, then the standard robust standard errors are appropriate 
and commonly used with fewer time periods and a larger number of observations 
(Hoechle, 2007a). Second, given that this study suggests including numerous independent 
variables, it may violate some classical statistics assumptions, such as multicollinearity.  
Thus, this study will explore the correlations between independent variables and many 
need to remove any higher correlated variables.   Third, as with any quantitative study, 
measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity can present issues that may bias the 
results, especially with respect to the error terms, but the presence of classical 
measurement error bias results toward zero.  However, given the difference-in-
differences design in this study, it is time varying unobserved heterogeneity that would be 





checked to see if they vary post-TELS to ensure there are not other time varying shocks 










This study examines how Tennessee public four-year institutions changed institutional 
grant aid in four different ways as listed in the following primary research questions: 
 
1)  Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their total expenditures on institutional grants given to first-
time, full-time students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
2) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change the number of first-time, full-time students receiving 
institutional awards when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
3) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their entire class average institutional award amount for 
first-time, full-time students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
4) Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year 
institutions to change their recipient average institutional award amount for first-
time, full-time students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
 
This results in the chapter are presented in way that they are meant to build on each 
other.  All results presented in this chapter are on log-point scale which is close 
approximation to percentages.  First, a series of descriptive statistics are discussed 





statistical models showing the relationships between potential additional controlling 
variables the dependent variables are discussed using ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
fixed effect models.  Third, a series of generalized difference-in-differences models are 
presented.  Fourth, year specific indicators for each post-TELS models are added to the 
model to show if institutions responded differently in any given post-TELS year.  Fifth, a 
series of additional covariates are added to these models to demonstrate any increased 
precision.  Sixth, Tennessee institutions were compared to a series of sub-groups using 
the existing models.  Seventh, a series of robustness checks were included to help 
determine the validity of the models and findings. Eighth, Tennessee institutions were 
compared with only the counterparts within their same Carnegie Classification.  Ninth, 
given the multifaceted analytic approach, this chapter will conclude with a summary of 
the results by research question, where results will be summarized across model 
specifications and different comparison groups 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 A series of descriptive statistics represent information on the analytic sample of 
public four-year institutions across the 50 US States between 2000 and 2009.  Table 4.1A 
shows the overall summary statistics as collected by their respective sources.  All 
monetary values are reported in 2013 constant dollars using the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI-U).   Appendix Table 4.1B displays the log transformation of the relevant variables.  
Given the nature of the research questions, it is important to review these descriptive 





institutions and reviewing pre-TELS and post-TELS summary statistics as shown in 
Table 4.2A and Appendix Table 4.2B.   
 
Notes. Analysis is for fiscal year 2000-2009 for all public four-year institutions with a Doctoral Extensive, 










Total institutional grant aid 3983 $2,697,095 $3,854,959 $0 $473,568 $3,179,006 $43,800,000
Number of institutional grant aid 
recipients 3983 663.4199 696.6421 0 191 890 5779
Entire class average institutional grant 
aid (includes non-recipients) 3983 $1,194 $1,050 $0 $463 $1,612 $11,290
Recipient average institutional grant aid 
(includes only recipients) 3983 $3,446 $1,894 $0 $2,141 $4,387 $16,113
State appropriations (in millions) 3939 $115.0 $122.0 $1.6 $39.3 $142.0 $872.0
Private gifts (in millions) 3963 $12.5 $30.5 -$0.3 $0.3 $9.4 $447.0
Investment income (in millions) 3963 $7.6 $67.4 -$1,970.0 $0.2 $4.3 $1,760.0
Total state grant aid 3983 $2,227,561 $3,031,582 $0 $533,859 $2,624,359 $30,000,000
Total federal grant aid 3983 $1,919,741 $1,450,491 $0 $906,724 $2,580,786 $12,800,000
Population of 18 year olds (state 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   




   
   






   




   





   




   
   






   




   






   




   














































































Institutional Grant Aid  
 There are four metrics with information on institutional grant aid for first-time, 
full-time undergraduate students including the total institutional grant aid spent per year, 
number of institutional grant aid recipients, average institutional grant aid only including 
recipients, and average institutional grant aid including both recipients and non-
recipients.  During 2000-2009, the overall mean of total institutional grant aid was 
$2,697,095 across all public four-year institutions in the analytic sample, but values 
ranged from zero to $37.8 million.  Before the implementation of the TELS program 
(2000-2004), the mean total institutional grant aid at public four-year institutions was 
$2,711,888 in Tennessee and $2,069,851 in all other states.  After the TELS program 
began (2005-2009), the mean total institutional grant aid at public four-year institutions 
was $2,692,259 in Tennessee and $3,323,144 in all other states.   
 The average number of institutional grant aid recipients across public four-year 
institutions was 663.42 between 2000 and 2009.  The range in number of institutional aid 
recipients spanned zero to 5,779 during this time period (2000-2009).  The average 
number of institutional aid recipients before the TELS implementation (2000-2004) was 
493.96 in Tennessee and 580.84 in other state public four-year institutions.  After the 
TELS program was implemented (2005-2009), the average number of institutional aid 
recipients was 665.42 in Tennessee and 749.74 in other state public four-year institutions.   
 It is also helpful to examine the average institutional aid amount at each 
institution by averaging values over recipients only and the entire entering class, which 
includes recipients and non-recipients in the denominator.   The recipient average of 





2009.  In the pre-TELS time period (2000-2004), the recipient average institutional aid 
amount was $4,199 in Tennessee and $3,072 in other states.  The post-TELS recipient 
average institutional aid amount was $4,055 in Tennessee and $3,787 in other states.  
Between 2000 and 2009, the entire class average of institutional grant aid was $1,194 
with values ranging between zero and $11,290.  The pre-TELS entire class average 
institutional aid amount was $1,277 in Tennessee and $991 in other states.  The post-
TELS entire class average institutional aid amount was $1,260 in Tennessee and $1,394 
in other states.   
 Given the estimation strategy, it is important to examine the dependent variables 
leading up to the implementation of the TELS program and afterward.  Figures 4.1-4.4 
show the log-transformed dependent variables averaged across Tennessee and all other 
public four-year universities nationally, where the y-axis is listed in log-points.  Since 
there are only nine Tennessee institutions, the Tennessee specific line will appear less 
smooth than the overall line which is averaging up to 390 public four-year institutions 
nationally.  However, the total, entire class average and recipient average institutional 
grant aid demonstrate relatively parallel trend pre-TELS from 2000 to 2004 except for a 
slight decline in 2002.  The number of institutional grant aid recipients have pre-TELS 
trends more closely intertwined between Tennessee and other comparison schools where 
they are within 0.185 log-points of each other in any given year.   In addition, Mora and 
Reggio’s (2014) DQD analysis showed that the standard difference-in-differences model 
would be sufficient for estimation, where alternates to the parallel path assumption or 















Figure 4.2. Number of institutional grant aid recipients at Tennessee and other public 






Figure 4.3. Entire class average institutional grant aid award amount at Tennessee and 






Figure 4.4. Recipient average institutional grant aid award amount at Tennessee and 
other public four-year institutions (log-transformed). 
 
State Appropriations 
 The average state appropriation across public four-year institutions was $115 
million.  Since all public four-year institutions were included the range of state 
appropriations spanned from $1.6 million and $872 million.  During the time period of 
this analysis, the State of Colorado changed their process of allocating funding to public 
institutions beginning with fiscal year 2006, which effectively eliminated state 
appropriations as reported in IPEDS.  The state appropriation values are missing for any 






Private Gifts and Investment Income 
 The average of private gifts across public four-year institutions was $12.5 million.  
However, the range of values for private gifts span from -$0.3 million to $447 million.  
The average investment income at public four-year institutions during 2000-2009 was 
$7.6 million.   Investment income ranged between -$1.97 billion to $1.76 billion.  IPEDS 
allows institutions to report both realized and unrealized losses/gains, which is why 
negative values can occur.  The -$1.97 billion occurred during fiscal year 2009, which 
was the first fiscal year recorded after the recession.   
 
Total Federal Grant Aid 
 The total federal grant aid as reported in IPEDS includes all federal financial aid 
grants given to first-time, full-time undergraduate degree-seeking students.  This include 
Title IV financial aid, such as federal Pell grants and the Supplemental Opportunity 
Education Grants (SEOG) as well as any grants from other federal agencies.   The 
average total federal grant aid at public four-year institutions was $1,919,741 between 









 The average population of 18 year olds across the fifty states was 83,297 
(calculated using state based data as to avoid duplication using institutional based data).  
Between 2000 and 2009, state population was at its lowest of 7,428 (Wyoming fiscal year 
2006) and highest of 549,643 (California fiscal year 2008).   
  
Ordinary Least Squares and Fixed Effects Estimation  
 A series of ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects estimates were 
conducted on each of the dependent variables to show the relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables.  The OLS estimates show general associations 
between dependent and independent variables.   All results are described as percentages, 
but are actually log-points, which is approximately a percentage point.  Table 4.3A-D 
shows the OLS estimates between the controlling variables and dependent variable.  
However, given there are multiple measures on each institution, the independence 
assumption is being violated, which will lead to biased results.  Institutional fixed effects 
were included to account for the multiple measure on each institution, which will help for 
any unobserved aspects that do not vary over time.  In addition, a time effect was 
included to absorb any time specific shocks that affect all institutions, such as a change in 
federal financial aid policy.  Table 4.3A-D also displays both the fixed effects estimates.   
 
Total Institutional Grant Aid 
 With respect to total institutional grant aid, the OLS estimates shows that all the 





time, full-time entering class (See Table 4.3A).   However, once fixed effects are added 
to the model many independent variables are not statistically significant.   In the fixed 
effects model, increases in total state grant aid and federal grant aid independently have a 
positive relation with total institutional grant aid funding.  A one percent increase in state 
grant aid corresponded to an approximate 6.7% increase in total institutional grant aid 
(p<.01).  Similarly, a one percent increase in federal grant aid was associated with an 
approximate 59% increase in total institutional grant aid funding (p<.01).    The addition 
of some admissions variables reduced the effect size and increased the standard errors of 
state and federal grant aid (β=0.04, p<.05 and β=0.263, p<.01, respectively), but none of 
the admissions variables were statistically significant at the p<.05 level.  However, the 
analytic sample size was reduced by over 1,000 observations due to missing admission 
variables in some years and 15 fewer institutions represented in the sample, which could 







Table 4.3A             
              
Total Institutional Aid using OLS and Fixed Effects        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







              
State Appropriations 0.940 0.531 0.216 0.194 0.228 0.031 
  (0.034)** (0.036)** (0.042)** (0.107)+ (0.101)* (0.086) 
Private Gifts 0.160 0.172 0.138 0.014 -0.000 0.020 
  (0.017)** (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Investment Income -0.043 -0.033 -0.024 0.014 0.005 0.007 
  (0.069) (0.064) (0.051) (0.047) (0.044) (0.032) 
Population of 18-yr-olds -0.208 -0.306 -0.252 0.637 0.152 0.590 
  (0.032)** (0.030)** (0.029)** (0.523) (0.494) (0.533) 
Board Budget Authority 0.112 0.062 -0.120       
  (0.060)+ (0.056) (0.055)*       
Large Merit Program -0.242 -0.344 0.052       
  (0.064)** (0.063)** (0.063)       
State Grant Aid Amount   0.050 -0.071   0.067 0.040 
    (0.016)** (0.019)**   (0.017)** (0.019)* 
Federal Grant Aid 
Amount   0.645 0.450   0.590 0.263 
    (0.032)** (0.043)**   (0.033)** (0.040)** 
Applicants     -0.099     0.029 
      (0.079)     (0.101) 
Admits     0.544     0.171 
      (0.080)**     (0.087)+ 
25th Test Percentile     -1.435     0.214 
      (0.402)**     (0.419) 
75th Test Percentile     4.361     0.739 
      (0.469)**     (0.429)+ 
Constant -2.173 -3.834 -7.189 1.989 -1.696 -2.863 
  (1.578) (1.482)** (1.463)** (6.273) (5.903) (6.494) 
              
Observations 3,939 3,939 2,895 3,939 3,939 2,895 
R-squared 0.330 0.414 0.496 0.112 0.217 0.174 
Institution FE       YES YES YES 
Time Effect       YES YES YES 
Notes.All continuous variables are log-transformed.  Admissions variables not reported in IPEDS  
for 2000-2001. See Note in Table 4.2A for sample restrictions.  Standard errors in parentheses.  










           
Institutional Grant Aid Recipients 
 In the number of institutional grant aid recipients OLS estimation, nearly all 
independent variables were statistically significant except for the indicators designating 
institutions with budget authority and states with a large merit aid program (see Table 
4.3B, Column 3).  However, after applying fixed effects to account for time invariant 
aspects associated with institutions, only a limited subset of variables still hold statistical 
significance.   A one percent increase in total state grant aid corresponded to 3.3% 
increase in institutional grant recipients in the fixed effects model (p<.01), Table 4.3B, 
Column 5).  A series of other variables were associated with increases in institutional 
grant recipients in the fixed effects model including total federal grant aid and population 
of 18 year olds (See Table 4.3B).  The addition of some admission variables reduced the 
effect sizes slightly, but the only statistically significant association was with number of 







Table 4.3B             
              
Number of Institutional Grant Aid Recipients using OLS and Fixed Effects      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







              
State Appropriations 0.714 0.444 0.216 0.086 0.100 0.018 
  (0.022)** (0.023)** (0.029)** (0.059) (0.056)+ (0.056) 
Private Gifts 0.122 0.131 0.086 0.011 0.005 0.016 
  (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Investment Income -0.013 -0.006 -0.006 0.013 0.009 0.006 
  (0.045) (0.042) (0.036) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) 
Population of 18-yr-olds -0.138 -0.201 -0.154 1.066 0.853 0.899 
  (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.021)** (0.288)** (0.277)** (0.349)* 
Board Budget Authority 0.127 0.093 -0.026       
  (0.039)** (0.036)* (0.039)       
Large Merit Program -0.201 -0.266 -0.025       
  (0.042)** (0.041)** (0.044)       
State Grant Aid Amount   0.031 -0.041   0.033 0.017 
    (0.011)** (0.014)**   (0.009)** (0.012) 
Federal Grant Aid 
Amount   0.428 0.380   0.264 0.207 
    (0.021)** (0.030)**   (0.019)** (0.026)** 
Applicants     -0.453     -0.042 
      (0.055)**     (0.066) 
Admits     0.768     0.149 
      (0.056)**     (0.057)** 
25th Test Percentile     -1.015     -0.060 
      (0.283)**     (0.275) 
75th Test Percentile     3.141     0.309 
      (0.330)**     (0.281) 
Constant -6.970 -8.084 -11.550 -8.633 -10.349 -9.985 
  (1.022)** (0.958)** (1.031)** (3.446)* (3.313)** (4.253)* 
              
Observations 3,939 3,939 2,895 3,939 3,939 2,895 
R-squared 0.404 0.482 0.553 0.123 0.193 0.156 
Institution FE       YES YES YES 
Time Effect       YES YES YES 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. See Note in Table 4.3A for additional information. 










           
Entire Class Average Institutional Grant Aid Amount 
 Nearly, all independent variables were statistically significant in the OLS 
estimates with the entire class average as the dependent variable, where coefficients 
tended to follow a similar direction as prior models with total institutional grant aid 
amount and number of institutional grant aid recipients (See Table 4.3C).  The fixed 
effects models with the entire class average also follow similar patterns as the other 
models with different dependent variables, where many of controlling variables were not 
statistically significant.  Increases in state and federal aid were associated with increases 
in the average amount of institutional grant aid given to the entire entering class 
(β=0.044, p<.01 and β=0.297, p<.01, respectively).   The addition of admission variables 
in the fixed effects models reduced the effect size and increased the standard errors as in 
other models (see Table 4.3C).  The number of applications was negatively associated 
with entire class average institutional aid amount, where a one percent increase in 
applications was associated with 14.9% decrease in the entire class average institutional 
award amount (p<.05).  Also, a one percent increase in the 75th test score percent was 
associated with 85% increase in the entire class average institutional grant award amount 
(p<.01).  However, it is important to keep in mind that a one percent increase on 75th 
percentile is a rather large increase in the upper quartile that test scores are bounded by a 






Table 4.3C             
              
Entire Class Average Institutional Grant Aid using OLS and Fixed Effects      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







              
State Appropriations 0.235 0.103 0.072 0.028 0.042 -0.014 
  (0.025)** (0.029)** (0.037)* (0.070) (0.067) (0.063) 
Private Gifts 0.135 0.143 0.118 0.010 0.003 0.014 
  (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Investment Income -0.033 -0.029 -0.018 0.009 0.005 0.006 
  (0.051) (0.050) (0.045) (0.030) (0.029) (0.024) 
Population of 18-yr-
olds -0.223 -0.234 -0.183 -0.323 -0.554 0.303 
  (0.023)** (0.024)** (0.026)** (0.341) (0.329)+ (0.391) 
Board Budget 
Authority -0.037 -0.067 -0.176       
  (0.045) (0.044) (0.048)**       
Large Merit Program -0.248 -0.219 -0.051       
  (0.048)** (0.050)** (0.055)       
State Grant Aid 
Amount   -0.036 -0.094   0.044 0.039 
    (0.013)** (0.017)**   (0.011)** (0.014)** 
Federal Grant Aid 
Amount   0.266 0.260   0.297 0.129 
    (0.025)** (0.038)**   (0.022)** (0.029)** 
Applicants     0.030     -0.149 
      (0.069)     (0.074)* 
Admits     -0.129     -0.104 
      (0.070)+     (0.064) 
25th Test Percentile     -1.722     0.167 
      (0.353)**     (0.308) 
75th Test Percentile     4.318     0.850 
      (0.411)**     (0.314)** 
Constant 3.747 2.819 -4.037 9.133 7.053 -0.534 
  (1.176)** (1.165)* (1.284)** (4.087)* (3.938)+ (4.762) 
              
Observations 3,939 3,939 2,895 3,939 3,939 2,895 
R-squared 0.136 0.161 0.218 0.126 0.192 0.162 
Institution FE       YES YES YES 
Time Effect       YES YES YES 
Notes. Standard errors in 
parentheses.  See Note in Table 
4.3A.           
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1           
 





Recipient Average Institutional Aid Amount 
   The OLS estimates using the institutional grant recipient average amount as the 
dependent variable were similar to other models, where nearly all variables were 
significant predictors except for state appropriations, investment income, the indicator for 
large merit aid states, and total state grant aid amount (See Table 4.3D).  Here results are 
reported as log-points which are a close approximation for percentage change for each 
variable.  All of the admissions related variables were significant in the OLS model 
except for the 25th percentile test score.  However, as with before, the OLS model does 
not account for the time invariant unobserved aspects associated with different 
institutions.  In the fixed effects model, only total state grant aid (β=0.034, p<.01), total 
federal grant aid (β=0.326, p<.01), and population of 18 year olds (β=-0.752, p<.05) held 
statistically significant relationships with the recipient average institutional grant aid.  
The addition of admissions variables to the fixed effect model reduced the effect size and 
increased the standard errors, but none of the admission variables were significantly 






Table 4.3D             
              
Recipient Average Institutional Grant Aid using OLS and Fixed Effects      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







              
State Appropriations 0.221 0.086 0.000 0.117 0.137 0.012 
  (0.018)** (0.020)** (0.023) (0.067)+ (0.064)* (0.053) 
Private Gifts 0.037 0.041 0.052 0.003 -0.005 0.003 
  (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Investment Income -0.031 -0.027 -0.018 0.001 -0.003 0.000 
  (0.037) (0.036) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.020) 
Population of 18-yr-olds -0.070 -0.103 -0.097 -0.479 -0.752 -0.306 
  (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.016)** (0.329) (0.315)* (0.329) 
Board Budget Authority -0.018 -0.034 -0.094       
  (0.032) (0.031) (0.030)**       
Large Merit Program -0.039 -0.076 0.078       
  (0.034) (0.035)* (0.034)*       
State Grant Aid Amount   0.020 -0.030   0.034 0.022 
    (0.009)* (0.010)**   (0.011)** (0.011)+ 
Federal Grant Aid 
Amount   0.211 0.066   0.326 0.052 
    (0.018)** (0.024)**   (0.021)** (0.025)* 
Application     0.359     0.069 
      (0.043)**     (0.062) 
Admits     -0.230     0.017 
      (0.043)**     (0.054) 
25th Test Percentile     -0.412     0.281 
      (0.219)+     (0.259) 
75th Test Percentile     1.196     0.430 
      (0.255)**     (0.264) 
Constant 4.891 4.361 4.466 11.058 9.088 7.214 
  (0.841)** (0.824)** (0.797)** (3.940)** (3.766)* (4.004)+ 
              
Observations 3,939 3,939 2,895 3,939 3,939 2,895 
R-squared 0.136 0.161 0.218 0.126 0.192 0.162 
Institution FE       YES YES YES 
Time Effect       YES YES YES 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses.  
See Note in Table 4.3A.           
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1           
 
      
Multicollinearity Checks on Independent Variables  
 A series of analysis were conducted to assess the correlation of independent 





investigated to determine the potential presence of multicollinearity.  The number of 
applications and admitted students were the two independent variables with the highest 
VIFs (12.14 and 11.07, respectively).  The 25th and 75th percentile test scores are also 
relatively high VIFs (6.52 and 6.09, respectively).  State appropriations and total federal 
grant aid were somewhat high but within an acceptable range (VIF 3.44 and 2.93, 
respectively), but in models without admissions variables these VIF drop where the VIF 
is 2.25 for state appropriations and 1.80 for total federal grant aid.  The higher levels of 
VIFs for the admissions related variables suggest that some should be dropped given their 
higher association with other variables in the model.  In addition, the independent 
variables were checked to see if there were any Tennessee specific changes pre- and post-
TELS, but there were not any statistically significant results (see Appendix Table 4.3 and 
4.4).   
While these OLS and fixed effects model show some general associations 
between dependent and independent variables, they do not address the research questions 
in this study.  In order to determine how Tennessee public four-year institutions changed 
their institutional grant aid after the TELS program was created a slightly different 
parameterization was needed to explicitly call out Tennessee in statistical models.  A 
difference-in-differences estimation is an approach to explicitly parameterize Tennessee 
pre- and post-TELS while incorporating fixed effects as in these general associations.  
 
Difference-in-Differences Estimation 
 A series of basic difference-in-difference estimations were conducted using a 





Tennessee public four-year institutions, a dichotomous variable for any post-TELS time 
period (e.g. 2005-2009), and the interaction of these two dichotomous variables to 
separately identify the unique effect at Tennessee public four-year institutions after the 
TELS program was implemented.   These indicators are how Tennessee can be explicitly 
parameterized in statistical models changes in the pre- and post-TELS behavior.  The first 
set of runs on these basic models include an institutional fixed effect and time effect.  A 
separate model was run for each of the dependent variables: total institutional grant aid, 
number of institutional grant aid recipients, recipient average grant aid amount, and entire 
class average grant aid amount.   
 Results of the basic DID models are reported in Table 4.4 as log-points given the 
log transformation of dependent and independent variables.  Log-points can be 
interpreted as an approximation for percentage-point change.  The log-points will be 
discussed as an approximate percentages in text.  After the TELS program was 
implemented, Tennessee public four-year institutions decreased the total institutional 
grant aid by 1.4% relative to other public four-year institutions, but the results were not 
statistically significant.  In fact, the standard errors around this parameter were rather 
larger (0.205) relative to the effect size, which indicated there is some variation going on 
within Tennessee public four-year institution post-TELS.   There was not a statistically 
significant effect post-TELS for Tennessee public four-year institutions in both the 
number of grant aid recipients and entire class average institutional aid amount.  
Tennessee public four-year institutions showed 19.4% increase in the number of 
institutional grant recipients (p<.10) and 2.1% decrease in the entire class average 





institutions response to post-TELS with respect to the recipient average institutional grant 
aid amount but again the result was not significant.   Tennessee public four-year 
institutions reduced their average award amount to recipients by 20.9% relative to other 
public institutions (n.s.).   
 After running these basic DID models, they were checked for autocorrelation, 
cross-sectional dependence, and heteroskedasticity.  All of the basic DID models had the 
presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity present based on the Lagram-
Multiplier test for autocorrelation correlation and a heteroskedasticity test.   Cross-section 
dependence was present in all of basic DID models except for the recipient average 
institutional grant aid amount.  Given these identified issues, the models were run using 
Driscoll-Kraay estimator to account for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and cross-
sectional dependence (when present in the analysis).  Other correction methods exist to 
handle these types of disturbance, such as panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and 
feasible generalized least squares estimation, but both these methods require panels with 
more time periods (Beck and Katz, 1995).  A series of simulations by Beck and Katz 
(1995) suggest that at least 20 or more time periods are needed to ensure that error 
corrections yield more accurate estimates.  Hoechle (2007b) indicated that Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors can be less than half the size of cluster-robust standard errors (e.g. 
standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation), but expressed some 
caution when the standard errors get to small.   However, it should be noted that even the 
Driscoll-Kraay estimator is dependent on a larger number of time periods.  Thus, both the 
Driscoll-Kraay and robust standard errors will be presented, where the estimates using 





Kraay standard errors (Hoechle, 2007b).  Cross sectional dependence was not present in 
the recipient average so robust standard errors should be sufficient to account for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Hoechle, 2007a).  Table 4.4 displays the results of 
the basic DID models with regular standard errors and robust standard errors.    
The results with corrected standard errors do not change dramatically.  In general, 
the post-TELS coefficients change slightly and the standard errors get more efficient.  For 
total institutional grant, the post-TELS effect in Tennessee remains negative but is still 
not statistically significant (β=0.014, n.s.).  After accounting for the disturbances in the 
data to produce Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, there was an 19.5% increase in the 
number of institutional grant aid recipients at Tennessee public four-year institutions 
relative to other four-year institutions during the same time period (p<.01), but the 
standard errors are likely too efficient since they reduce two-thirds the size.   The post-
TELS Tennessee public four-year institutions recipient average institutional grant award 
amount remained the same but with slightly smaller errors (β=-0.209, p<.05).  The post-
TELS entire class average institutional grant aid fluctuated some but was still not 
significant (β=-0.021, ns).  These basic models are generalizing the institutional response 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Year Specific Effects Post-TELS  
Instead of grouping all post-TELS years together, a series of models show 
changes in institutional grant separately for each post-TELS year.   Similar to before, the 
models were checked for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional 
dependence, where results were consistent with the prior tests suggesting corrections are 
needed for each dependent variables model.  Thus, the total institutional grant aid, 
number of institutional grant recipients, and entire class average models are reported 
using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.  As before, the recipient average institutional grant 
aid is reported with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
Results for the fixed effects and corrected standard errors are reported in Table 4.5, which 
show the changes in the institutional grant aid dependent variables in each post-TELS 
years.  Total institutional grant aid did not present any statistically significant differences 
in Tennessee public institutions for any of the post-TELS years.  However, the effect in 
the first through third year and fifth year post-TELS was consistently negative, but not 
significant.   The results for the fourth year post-TELS suggested that Tennessee public 
four-year institutions increased total institutional grant aid the fourth and fifth year post-
TELS, but these results were also not significant.     
The number of institutional grant aid recipients models presents some significant 
results post-TELS, where Tennessee public four-year institutions experience changes in 
the number of recipients for specific post-TELS years.   The fixed effect model suggests 
that the number of institutional grant aid recipients increased at Tennessee public four-
year institutions in each year post-TELS, but these results were not statistically 





heteroscedasticity, the Discroll-Kraay standard errors are more efficient and produce 
statistically significant effects post-TELS at Tennessee public four-year institutions in 
each post-TELS year.  With respect to number of institutional grant aid recipients, 
Tennessee public four-year institutions experienced a 11.4% increase in the first year 
(p<.05), 15.8% increase in the second year (p<.01), 20.4% increase in the third year 
(p<.01), 24.5% increase in the four year (p<.01), and 25.1% increase in the fifth year 
(p<.01) relative to public four-year institutions in other states for each year (see column 6 
in Table 4.5).      
Tennessee public four-year institutions had a lower recipient average institutional 
grant aid in every year post-TELS, but the third and fifth years after the TELS 
implementation were statistically significant.  In the third year Post-TELS (2007-08), the 
Tennessee public four-year institution recipient average institutional grant aid amount 
was 30.6% lower than public institutions in other states for that same year (p<.05).  Also, 
in the fifth year Post-TELS (2009-10), the Tennessee public four-year institution 
recipient average institutional grant amount was 25.5% lower public institutions in other 
states (p<.05).  The models suggest that Tennessee public four-year institution had lower 
institutional grant aid recipient averages in other post-TELS years relative to non-
Tennessee public institutions, but no other year produced a statistically significant result.  
This suggests that much of difference in recipient average institutional aid amounts from 
the pooled year DID model discussed earlier (see Table 4.4) is driven by the difference in 
the third and fifth years.  The models using the entire class average did not present any 
significant results as before, but  Tennessee post-TELS years one through three were 





 For some of these models specifications, the standard errors are still relatively 
large, which suggest this some variation within these estimate that could benefit for 
different model parameterization.  The inclusion of additional controlling variable could 
potential help with improving precision, which will be explored in the next section.  Also, 
model precision might be improve when the sample is segmented by Carnegie 





Table 4. 2 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DID Models Including Additional Controlling Variables 
Total Institutional Grant Aid with Controlling Variables   
The addition of controlling variables to the basic DID model does not change the 
results in any substantive manner.   The results show a slight down turn in total 
institutional grant aid after the TELS program was implemented, but as before, this is not 
a statistically significant effect (See Table 4.6A).  In fact, the addition of the controlling 
variables do not increase the precision of the model, but instead increase the size of the 
standard errors across specifications using the Discroll-Kraay estimator.  Federal grant 
aid was positively associated with total institutional grant aid (β=0.669, p<.01, 
respectively).  As before, these model repeated but using a parameterizing where each 
post-TELS has its own indicator (Appendix Table 4.6B).  The inclusion of the additional 
controlling variables increased the Discroll-Kraay standard errors suggesting the 
additional covariates do not provide greater precisions to the models.  Here it appears 
Tennessee public four-year institutions lowered their total institutional grant aid in the 
third year post-TELS by 23.4% (p<.01).  All other post-TELS year coefficients where 
negative, but not statistically significant.  With the additional controlling variables, 
investment income and total federal grant aid were positively associated with total 






Table 4.6A     
     
Total Institutional Gift Aid Difference-in-Differences with Additional Controlling 
Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Total  Total Total 
          
TN*Post-TELS -0.014 -0.014 -0.099 -0.109 
 (0.224) (0.080) (0.180) (0.089) 
Post-TELS 1.081 0.564 0.604 0.368 
 (0.084)** (0.126)** (0.143)** (0.060)** 
State Appropriations   0.255 0.257 
   (0.180) (0.218) 
Private Gifts   -0.002 -0.019 
   (0.028) (0.011) 
Investment Income   0.007 0.002 
   (0.003)* (0.003) 
Federal Grant Aid   0.646 0.669 
   (0.155)** (0.163)** 
Population of 18-yr-
olds   0.012 0.517 
   (0.891) (0.837) 
Constant 13.332 13.599 -0.455 -6.167 
 (0.071)** (0.088)** (10.040) (6.579) 
          
Observations 3,983 3,983 3,938 3,938 
Institution FE YES YES YES YES 
Time Effect YES  YES  
Robust SE YES  YES  
Driscoll-Kraay SE   YES   YES 
Notes. Sample identify on pages 57-62. Continuous variables are log transformed. Time 
effect included in robust standard error specification.  Time effect is not included in the 
Driscoll-Kraay specification since error corrections use time lags.  Robust standard errors 
are identified in the table.  
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Table 4. 3 6A: Total Institutional Gift Aid Difference-in-Differences with Additional Controlling Variables 
Number of Institutional Grant Aid Recipients with Controlling Variables   
The inclusion of controlling variables for state appropriation, investment income, 
private gifts, federal grant aid, and population of 18-year olds reduced the effect sizes any 
post-TELS response at Tennessee public four-year institution while at the same time 
decreases the standard errors (See Table 4.7A).  However, the coefficients from models 
with and without additional covariates are still within a single standard deviation of each 





increased the number of institutional grant aid recipients by 14.3% post-TELS when 
compared with all other public four-year schools nationwide (p<.01, see Table 4.7A, 
column 4).   Here federal grant aid, and state population of 18-year-olds were statistically 
significant and positively related to the number institutional grant aid recipients (see 
Table 4.7A for results).       
The addition of the controlling variables did increase the precision in the models 
that looked at each Post-TELS year separately.  The standard errors in the Discroll-Kraay 
standard errors shrunk very slightly.  Appendix Table 4.7B reports results for the number 
or recipients with the post-TELS years listed separately.  Tennessee public four-year 
institutions experienced 8% increase in the first-year (p<.05), 15.9% increase in the 
second year (p<.01), 12.8% increase in the third year (p<.01), 16.1% increase in the 
fourth year (p<.01), and 19.9% increase in the fifth year (p<.01) relative to public 
institutions in other states.  In addition, investment income, federal grant aid, and state 
population of 18-year-olds had a positive association with the number of institutional 






Table 4.7A     
     
Number of Institutional Grant Aid Recipients Difference-in-Differences with Additional 
Controlling Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Number Number Number Number 
          
TN*Post-TELS 0.194 0.195 0.151 0.143 
 (0.126) (0.048)** (0.110) (0.037)** 
Post-TELS 0.613 0.307 0.350 0.179 
 (0.046)** (0.081)** (0.072)** (0.043)** 
State Appropriations   0.111 0.114 
   (0.082) (0.088) 
Private Gifts   0.004 -0.011 
   (0.016) (0.009) 
Investment Income   0.009 0.007 
   (0.002)** (0.003)+ 
Federal Grant Aid   0.290 0.308 
   (0.065)** (0.057)** 
Population of 18-yr-
olds   0.774 1.185 
   (0.491) (0.355)** 
Constant 5.604 5.771 -9.578 -14.230 
 (0.036)** (0.054)** (5.538)+ (3.892)** 
          
Observations 3,983 3,983 3,938 3,938 
Institution FE YES YES YES YES 
Time Effect YES  YES  
Robust SE YES  YES  
Driscoll-Kraay SE   YES   YES 
Notes. Robust standard errors are identified in the table.  See Table 4.6A for additional 
information 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Table 4. 4 7A: Number of Institutional Grant Aid Recipients Difference-in-Differences with Additional Controlling 
Variables 
Entire Class Average with Controlling Variables   
The results of the entire class average institutional grant aid amount did not 
change substantially with the addition of time variant controlling variables.  The standard 
errors on the Post-TELS response at Tennessee public four-year institutions increased 
with the inclusion of the other controlling variables and remain relative larger in relation 
to the coefficient.  Thus, the post-TELS Tennessee response remains statistically 





years separately, there is not any post-TELS years that provides a statistically significant 
result (see Appendix Table 4.8B).   
Table 4.8A     
     
Entire Class Average Institutional Grant Aid Difference-in-Differences with Additional 
Controlling Variables 










          
TN*Post-TELS -0.021 -0.021 -0.057 -0.067 
 (0.225) (0.068) (0.200) (0.069) 
Post-TELS 0.748 0.400 0.540 0.301 
 (0.054)** (0.084)** (0.083)** (0.055)** 
State Appropriations   0.059 0.062 
   (0.090) (0.078) 
Private Gifts   0.001 -0.011 
   (0.018) (0.009) 
Investment Income   0.006 -0.001 
   (0.002)** (0.004) 
Federal Grant Aid   0.333 0.358 
   (0.082)** (0.094)** 
Population of 18-yr-
olds   -0.646 0.093 
   (0.523) (0.674) 
Constant 6.267 6.428 7.892 -0.616 
 (0.044)** (0.054)** (6.012) (6.251) 
          
Observations 3,983 3,983 3,938 3,938 
Number of institutions 399 399 399 399 
Institution FE YES YES YES YES 
Time Effect YES  YES  
Robust SE YES  YES  
Driscoll-Kraay SE   YES   YES 
Notes. Robust standard errors are identified in the table.  See Table 4.6A for additional 
information 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Table 4. 5 8A: Entire Class Average Institutional Grant Aid Difference-in-Differences with Additional Controlling 
Variables 
Recipient Average with Controlling Variables 
The addition of controlling variables again did not change the results dramatically 
(See Table 4.9A).  The inclusion of the other controlling variables—state appropriations, 





increased the precision of the estimates by reducing the robust standard errors slightly.  
When including these additional controlling variables, Tennessee public four-year 
institutions decreased the recipient average institutional grant aid amount by 25% after 
the TELS program was created (p<.01).  In this model, total federal grant aid was 
positively associated with the recipient average institutional grant aid amount (β=0.335, 
p<.01).   
In reviewing the post-TELS years separately, the additional controlling variables 
improved the precision of the estimates (See Appendix Table 4.9B).  Tennessee public 
four-year institutions reduced the recipient average institution award by 19.7% in the first 
year (p<.05), 17.8% in the second year (p<.10), 36.2% in the third year (p<.01), 24.3% in 
the fourth year (p<.01), and 27.2% in the fifth year post-TELS.  These coefficients are 
essentially the same as the model without additional covariates, but the inclusion of the 
additional covariates increased the precision of the estimates.  Federal grant aid was 
positively associated with the recipient average institutional grant aid amount (β=0.355, 






Table 4.9A     
     
Recipient Average Institutional Grant Aid Difference-in-Differences with Additional 
Controlling Variables 










        
TN*Post-TELS -0.209 -0.209 -0.250 -0.250 
 (0.128) (0.106)* (0.123)* (0.077)** 
Post-TELS 0.465 0.465 0.254 0.254 
 (0.043)** (0.053)** (0.049)** (0.084)** 
State Appropriations   0.153 0.153 
   (0.064)* (0.124) 
Private Gifts   -0.006 -0.006 
   (0.013) (0.018) 
Investment Income   -0.003 -0.003 
   (0.028) (0.002) 
Federal Grant Aid   0.355 0.355 
   (0.019)** (0.098)** 
Population of 18-yr-
olds   -0.813 -0.813 
   (0.315)** (0.512) 
Constant 7.738 7.738 9.559 9.559 
 (0.030)** (0.045)** (3.764)* (6.155) 
      
Observations 3,983 3,983 3,938 3,938 
Institution FE YES YES YES YES 
Time Effect YES YES YES YES 
Robust SE   YES   YES 
Notes. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses    
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1    
Table 4. 6 9A: Recipient Average Institutional Grant Aid Difference-in-Differences with Additional Controlling 
Variables 
Different Comparison Groups 
Three comparison groups were incorporated to identify a more finite set of 
comparison public institutions that have a similar state context as Tennessee with respect 
to budget authority and presence of large existing merit aid program.   First, Tennessee 
public four-year institutions were compared with only other public institutions where a 
state-wide board had budget authority.  Second, Tennessee public four-year institutions 





(2004) suggestion that states with merit aid programs are likely similar on many respects.  
Third, Tennessee public four-year institutions were compared to other public institutions 
where states that had a large merit aid program and had budget authority at the board 
level.   Throughout all the models up until now, the three dependent variables that 
showed some potential response post-TELS at Tennessee public four-year institutions 
were the total amount of institutional grant aid, number of recipients, and recipient 
average.  More focus and discussion will be directed at these three dependent variables, 
but all are present from the basic models in Tables 4.10A-4.13A and post-years models in 
Appendix Tables 4.10B-4.13B.  The findings for the entire class average are reported in 
Table 4.12A and Appendix Table 4.12B, but none of the results were significant as 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total Institutional Grant Aid Different Comparison Groups 
In all previous models, there was only a statistically significant effect in the third 
year post-TELS when including other controlling variables (see Appendix Table 4.10B, 
Column 2).  In the overall comparison, Tennessee public four-year institutions reduced 
their total institutional grant aid by 23.4% in the third year (p<.05).  This negative effect 
held in the budget authority comparison and large merit state comparison (see Appendix 
Table 4.10B, Column 4).  The third post-TELS total institutional grant aid effect was -
9.4% in the budget comparison (p<.05) and     -12.4% in the large merit comparison 
(p<.05).  While the effects are smaller in the budget and merit comparison groups than in 
the overall comparison, they suggest that overall comparison results are still relatively 
consistent.  In addition, Tennessee public four-year institutions differed from the public 
four-year institutions in merit comparison group in the fourth year (β=0.193, p<.01).   
 
 
Number of Recipients in Different Comparison Groups 
Tennessee post-TELS generalized effect holds up in each of the comparison 
groups.  Of the three different comparison groups, the budget authority comparison group 
appears to present a better comparison group since it presents more precise estimates (see 
Table 4.11A, Column 4).  Tennessee public institutions increased their the number of 
institutional grant aid recipients by 11.4% post-TELS relative to other public institutions 
subject to governing board with budget authority (p<.01).  When compared to other states 
with larger merit aid programs, Tennessee public four-year institutions increased the 





was with other large merit aid states where governing entities had budget authority (e.g. 
budget-merit comparison group).  In the budget-merit, Tennessee public four-year 
institutions had 19.5% increase in the number of institutional aid recipients post-TELS 
(p<.01).  However, when comparing these Tennessee post-TELS coefficients, they are all 
within a single standard deviation of the overall comparison.  Table 4.11A shows all of 
the basic model specifications when the number of institutional grant aid recipients was 
used as the dependent variable.  
The model specification with each post-TELS year examined separately follow 
similar patterns as earlier models (see Appendix Table 4.11B).   As before, the inclusion 
of other controlling variables does improve the precision of the estimates in the post-
years specification.  Each of the comparison groups are presented with and without other 
controlling variables for the post-years specification in Appendix Table 4.11B, but only 
the results with additional controls will be discussed since the additional controls 
increased precision.  The pattern of Tennessee increasing the number of institutional 
grant aid recipients in each post-TELS year holds across all three sub-comparison groups.  
However, the budget comparison presents the most precise estimates of all comparison 
groups.   When compared to other public institutions subject to a governing entity with 
budget authority, Tennessee public four-year institutions increased the number of 
recipients of institutional grant aid in each post-TELS year: 8.2% first year (p<.01), 
13.5% second year (p<.01),  13.4% third year (p<.01), 11.1% fourth year (p<.01), and 
15.4% fifth year post-TELS (p<.01).  The post-TELS effects are similar between the 
budget comparison and overall comparison, where z-tests do not indicate any significant 





The results from the merit and merit-budget comparison demonstrate smaller 
effect sizes, but the standard errors are larger than the budget comparison (see column 6 
and 8 in Appendix Table 4.11B).  The large merit comparison specification still showed 
Tennessee public four-year institutions increased their number of institutional grant aid 
recipients in the second through fifth Post-TELS years: 16.4% second year (p<.01), 
18.4% third year (p<.01), 32.7% fourth year (p<.01), and 27.5% fifth year (p<.01).  In the 
budget-merit comparison, Tennessee public four-year institutions had increases in the 
number of institutional grant aid recipients in the second through fifth years Post-TELS 
(second 19.1%, p<.01; third 23.8%, p<.01; fourth 28.9%, p<.01; fifth 24.0%, p<.05).  
Throughout these models using different comparisons, the model comparing Tennessee 
public four-year institutions to other public institutions subject to governing board with 
budget authority presents the most precise post-years estimates.     
 
Recipient Average Institutional Aid with Different Comparison Groups 
The findings from the different comparison groups suggest that Tennessee public 
four-year institutions may have decreased the recipient average institutional award 
amount post-TELS after controlling for other covariates, but few of the results were 
statistically significant.  The Tennessee public four-year institutions did not present 
statistically significant and different response post-TELS when compared to other public 
institutions with budget authority, where the effect size was smaller and standard errors 
were larger than the overall comparison (see Table 4.13A).  In addition, the Tennessee 
post-TELS effect size was slightly smaller in the merit comparison group than in the 
overall comparison, but the standard errors were also slightly higher, which renders the 





comparison, it appears that Tennessee public four-year institutions reduced their recipient 
average institutional grant aid by 24.6% (p<.05), which was similar to the effect size in 
the overall comparison group.  However, the standard errors on the point estimates were 
slightly larger in the budget-merit specification than in the overall specification.  The 
overall comparison group using all other public four-year institutions produced the most 
precise estimates and yielded results similar to the three sub-group comparisons, which 
indicate that overall comparison is sufficient for interpretation of the results.     
The post-years specifications on the recipient average model followed similar 
patterns throughout the different comparison groups (see Appendix Table 4.13B).  When 
Tennessee public four-year institutions were compared to all other public institutions, the 
findings suggested Tennessee public four-year institutions reduced their recipient average 
in nearly every year. However, only the third year effect held across the three comparison 
sub-groups: -22.1% in budget authority comparison (p<.05), -29.3% in merit comparison 
(p<.05), and -28.8 in the budget-merit comparison (p<.05).  As the comparison groups 
got smaller in size, the standard errors increased.  In addition, the fifth year effect held in 
the merit and budget-merit comparison groups (β=-0.311, p<.05 and β=-0.314, p<.05, 
respectively).    
 
Summary of Overall Models and Robustness Checks 
The results for the overall models and sub-group comparisons are consistent and 
similar suggesting that Tennessee public four-year institutions are responding by 
increasing the number of institutional grant aid recipients, decreasing the recipient 





comparison sub-groups ensure that the effects are not driven or dependent on the 
comparison group of institutions, where most effects related to the number of institutional 
grant aid recipients and average institutional award amount to recipients hold up in the 
different sub-groups.  Some results slipped into marginal significance, but that can be 
expected given the sub-groups have a much smaller sample size which reduce statistical 
power.   
Beyond checking different comparison groups, a series of robustness checks were 
conducted to further examine the difference-in-difference estimation and findings.  First, 
a placebo test was conducted to determine if there were any pre-TELS aspects that may 
drive a change in results.  A year between 2000 and 2005 was selected a random to see if 
the dependent change across an artificial threshold.  Table 4.14 displays the result so of 
the placebo test.  There were not any statistically significant results from the placebo test, 
which indicates other factors are not driving the Tennessee change in any of the 
institutional grant aid dependent variables.  In addition, pre-TELS trends in the dependent 
variable were checked using Mora and Reggio’s (2014) DQD protocols, which 
determined there were not any pretreatment dynamics or trends and suggested the 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Second, the basic specification of the DID with additional covariates was rerun, 
but one of the nine Tennessee institutions was dropped from the analysis to confirm the 
consistency of results with changes in the treated sample.  The recipient average post-
TELS findings were consistent across the leave-one-out analysis, which indicate that a 
single Tennessee institution is not biasing the results.  It appears dropping Tennessee 
Technical University changed the results by more than a standard deviation in the total 
institutional grant aid (z-test=1.17), number of recipients (z-test=1.45), and entire class 
average (z-test=1.45).  While these z-test results do not pass any critical levels, they do 
suggest that Tennessee is biasing the results in a different direction.  Tables 4.15 report 
the results when Tennessee Technical University was dropped from the analysis in 
Column 10.  Without Tennessee Tech, the other Tennessee public four-year institutions 
reduced total institutional grant aid by 26.1% (p<.05) versus the original finding of only -
10.9% (n.s.).  Tennessee Tech was also pulling the effect toward zero in the entire class 
average where the other Tennessee public four-year institutions (excluding Tennessee 
Tech) reduced the entire class average by 22.5% (p<.05) versus the original -6.7% when 
Tennessee Tech was included in the analysis (n.s.).   In addition, it appears Tennessee 
Tech was driving the overall increase in the number of institutional grant aid recipients: 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Models by Carnegie Classification   
Tennessee Doctoral Extensive (DR1) 
 The basic or generalized DID model with corrections for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation suggest that Tennessee public Doctoral/Research Extensive institutions 
(DR1)—University of Tennessee and University of Memphis—responded by changing 
the average institutional award amount.  Table 4.16A shows the basic difference-in-
differences results when looking at only public Doctoral/Research Extensive institutions 
across the US.  Between 2005 and 2009, Tennessee public DR1s increased the number of 
institutional grant aid recipients by 20.5% when compared to all public DR1s with 
additional controls (P<.01).  In reviewing the post-TELS years separately (See Appendix 
Table 4.16B), it appears that Tennessee public DR1s increased the number of institutional 
grant aid recipients by 20.1% in the first year (p<.05), 11.3% in the second year (n.s.), 
22.3% in the third year (p<.01), 37.1% in the four year (p<.01), and 11.8% in the fifth 
year (p<.05) when compared to all other public DR1s nationally.  The other dependent 
variables—total, entire class average, and recipient average institutional grant aid—
followed similar partners as the other overall models, but none of the results were 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tennessee Doctoral Intensive (DR2) 
 A separate series of generalized DID and post-year specific models were run 
using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, 
and cross-sectional dependence on the public Doctoral/Research Intensive institutions 
(DR2), which include the following Tennessee institution: East Tennessee State 
University, Middle Tennessee State University, and Tennessee State University (see 
Table 4.17A).  Here the generalized DID fixed models with additional controls would 
have suggested that Tennessee DR2 institutions would respond post-TELS with a 55.4% 
decrease in total institutional grant aid (p<.01), 24.3% decrease in the number 
institutional gran aid recipients, 34.5% decrease in entire class average institutional grant 
aid (p<.05), and 31.6% decrease in recipient average grant aid (p<.01).  These results 
were consistent in the Driscoll-Kraay and robust standard error specification (see 
Appendix Table 4.17A).  The model separating each post-TELS year separately will 
further examine these generalized results.     
The post-TELS models examining each post-TELS year separately suggest that 
Tennessee DR2 made substantive change their total institutional grant aid (see Appendix 
Table 4.17B), where Tennessee public DR2s reduced total institutional grant aid by 
74.6% in the first year (p<.01), 46.3% in the second year (p<.01), 61.1% in the third year 
(p<.01), 45.5% in the fourth year (p<.01), and 29.6% in the fifth year (p<.05) post-TELS 
compared to other public DR2s nationally.   Tennessee public DR2s reduced their entire 
class average institutional in post-TELS first through third year, where the first year was 





Tennessee public DR2s decreased their recipient average institutional grant aid by 30.3% 
in the second year (p<.01), 46.9% in the third year (p<.01), 30% in the fourth year 
(p<.01), and 28.2% in the fifth year (p<.01) post-TELS when compared with other DR2s 
nationally.  While there was not a generalized difference between Tennessee public DR2s 
in the grouped post-TELS years, it appears Tennessee public DR2s decreased the number 
of institutional grant aid recipients by 65.2% in the first-year (p<.01) and 16.5% in the 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tennessee Masters Colleges and Universities I (MCU1) 
 The basic and post-years DID models were run looking just at the Master’s 
College and Universities I (MCU1) to see if there was variation in the institutional 
response occurring within this subgroup that was being masked by the specification 
comparing Tennessee to all other public four-year institutions.   Given the results of the 
leave-one-out analysis, the results are reported with and without Tennessee Tech, which 
will show the overall response of Tennessee MCU1s and only those of Austin Peay, UT-
Chattanooga, and UT-Martin using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (see Table 4.18A, 
Panel A and B).   Unlike the previous analysis, the inclusion of the additional covariates 
do not improve the precision of the models looking at total institutional grant aid and 
entire-class/recipient average institutional grant aid.  Thus, the models without additional 
covariates with be discussed herein.  Tennessee MCU1s increased total institutional grant 
aid by 20.2% post-TELS but much of this effect is driven by Tennessee Tech since when 
dropped the Tennessee MCU1 post-TELS effect is 17.4% and not statistically significant 
(both excluding additional covariates).   Similarly, the post-TELS effect for number of 
recipients after including additional covariates was 37% (p<.01) using all Tennessee 
MCU1s but diminishes to 15% (n.s.) when dropping Tennessee Tech from MCU1s.  The 
Tennessee entire class average post-TELS effect was not significant when including all 
Tennessee MCU1s and after Tennessee Tech was dropped the remaining three Tennessee 
public MCU1s decreased the entire class average institutional grant aid by 3.3% (p<.05, 
excluding additional covariates).   The Tennessee response with the recipient average 
post-TELS was -17% (p<.10) for all Tennessee public MCU1s and -32.5% after dropping 





present the reality what occurs with Tennessee’s MCU1s, the results excluding Tennessee 
Tech better describe that prevail pattern of MCU1 post-TELS response.  Appendix Table 
4.18A presents the results using robust standard errors in lieu of Discroll-Kraay standar 
errors, where the reduction in recipient average was consistent across specifications. 
 The models assessing the post-TELS years separately describe how Tennessee 
MCU1s responded in each year.  Results are reported with and without Tennessee Tech 
included in Appendix Tables 4.18B-4.18C.  The results excluded Tennessee Tech will be 
described more fully, where models without additional covariates had better precision 
except in the case of the number of institutional grant recipients.  The three remaining 
Tennessee MCU1s, Austin Peay, UT-Chattanooga, and UT-Martin, decreased in total 
institutional grant in every year, but only the third (β=-0.24, p<.05), fourth (β=-224, 
p<.19) and fifth year post-TELS (β=-0.248, p<.05, see Appendix Table 4.18C, Column 
1).  There was a brief spike in the number of institutional grant aid recipients in the first 
year at an increase of 24.5% (p<.05) but began to taper in subsequent years (see 
Appendix Table 4-18C, Column 4).  The entire class average institutional grant decreased 
in post-TELS years two through five with smallest decrease at 22.5% (p<.05) in the 
second year and largest decrease in the fifth year at 41.6% (p<.01).  Similarly, the 
recipient average decreased in every post-TELS year between 2005 and 2009: 35.9% in 
the first year (p<.01), 29.4% in the second year (p<.05), 35.2% in the third year (p<.01), 








Summary of Findings 
 Tennessee public four-year institutions did respond post-TELS by reducing the 
recipient average institutional grant aid.  It was found that Tennessee Technical 
University was potentially an outlier that was pulling the results up for the institutional 
grant aid total amount, number of recipients, and entire class average.  After removing 
Tennessee Technical University, the remaining eight institutions did reduce their total 
Table 4.18A
Master's Colleges and Universities One (MCU1) Carnegie Classification Basic Difference-in-Differences 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)











Panel A: All MCU1  
TN*Post-TELS 0.202 0.040 0.370 0.297 0.108 0.024 -0.170 -0.258
(0.085)* (0.132) (0.052)** (0.053)** (0.088) (0.116) (0.084)+ (0.126)+
Post-TELS 0.552 0.310 0.282 0.129 0.365 0.255 0.268 0.181
(0.116)** (0.051)** (0.071)** (0.031)** (0.073)** (0.046)** (0.048)** (0.027)**
Constant 12.898 -15.822 5.264 -22.039 6.104 -2.075 7.646 6.679
(0.078)** (9.296) (0.044)** (5.118)** (0.044)** (7.636) (0.035)** (4.298)
Panel B: Excluding Tennessee Technical University
TN*Post-TELS -0.174 -0.329 0.150 0.079 -0.303 -0.384 -0.325 -0.407
(0.105) (0.152)+ (0.106) (0.087) (0.100)* (0.127)* (0.105)* (0.163)*
Post-TELS 0.552 0.096 0.282 0.028 0.365 0.145 0.268 0.065
(0.116)** (0.133) (0.071)** (0.048) (0.073)** (0.052)* (0.048)** (0.094)
Constant 12.898 -2.868 5.265 -16.393 6.106 3.445 7.645 14.078
(0.078)** (8.743) (0.044)** (4.432)** (0.044)** (7.520) (0.035)** (4.904)*
Observations 2,363 2,338 2,363 2,338 2,363 2,338 2,363 2,338
Number of Institutions 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
Institution FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Additional Controlling Variables YES YES YES YES
Driscoll-Kraay SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses





institutional grant and entire class average institutional grant amount post-TELS.  Figure 
4.5 shows a summary of the post-TELS responses for Tennessee public four-year 
institutions with and without Tennessee Technical University.  However, the results by 
Carnegie Classification suggest that much of the reduction in institutional grant post-
TELS was concentration in Tennessee Doctoral Intensive and Master’s 
Colleges/Universities.   
 
 
Figure 4.5. Summary of institutional grant aid responses post-TELS at Tennessee public 







 The series of models suggest that Tennessee public four-year institutions did 
respond by changing their institutional grant aid with the creation of the TELS program.  
The best evidence from this chapter will be summarized here.  First, Tennessee public 
four-year institutions reduced their recipient average, which was the single finding that 
held across specifications.  This suggests that Tennessee public four-year institutions 
reduced their average award amount by 22.1%, when converting log-points to 
percentages, which is nearly a $929 dollar decline (constant dollars).  However, 
additional analysis by Carnegie Classification suggested that Tennessee Doctoral 
Intensive and Master’s College/Universities where driving much of the reduction.  
Second, the leave-one-out analysis suggested that Tennessee Tech was an outlier biasing 
the results.  After removing Tennessee Tech, the remaining institutions reduced total 
institutional grant aid amount post-TELS.  Third, the models examining Tennessee public 
four-year institutions separately by Carnegie Classification suggested some differential 
responses to the TELS program.  For instance, Tennessee public Doctoral Extensive 
institutions increased the number of institution grant aid recipients post-TELS, where 
increases occurred in most post-TELS years.  However, Tennessee public Doctoral 
Intensive institutions decreased institutional grant aid post-TELS across all 
parameterization of the dependent variable.  Similarly, Tennessee public Master’s 
Colleges and Universities 1 reduced their entire class average and recipient average 











 This chapter begins with a summary discussion of the findings for each research 
question.  Second, a section putting these findings in the context of existing literature will 
be presented.  Third, this study’s contributions to literature will be discussed.  Fourth, 
conclusions from this study will be reviewed.  Lastly, a series of implications for theory, 
research, and policy will be addressed followed by some avenues for future research.        
  
Discussion of Finding by Research Question 
 
Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year institutions to 
change their total expenditures on institutional grants given to first-time, full-time 
students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
 The preliminary difference-in-differences models suggested that Tennessee public 
four-year institutions did not behave in a consistent and different manner than other 
public four-year institutions nationally.  Even though the budget comparison provided a 
better comparison group with more precise standard errors, it still was not enough to 
yield statistically significant and different post-TELS results between Tennessee and 
other public four-year institutions.  The leave-one-out analysis was conducted to 
determine if a single Tennessee public institution was potentially biasing the results, 
which suggested that the Tennessee Technical University was responding antithetically 





Tennessee Tech was dropped from the analysis, the remaining eight public Tennessee 
public four-year institutions reduced their institutional grant aid by 26.1% between 2005 
and 2009 (p<.05), where they decreased total institutional grant aid in every year post-
TELS.  These overall results suggest that other eight Tennessee public four-year 
institutions were reducing their total institutional grant aid after the TELS program was 
implemented in 2005.   
 The total institutional grant analysis within each Carnegie Classification provide 
even further evidence of nuanced responses by Tennessee public four-year institutions.  
Tennessee public DR1s showed a slight decrease in total institutional grant aid post-
TELS but it was not statistical significant from other public DR1s nationally (β=-0.039, 
n.s.).  However, Tennessee DR2s and MCU1s appeared to respond post-TELS relative 
their counterparts within their Carnegie Classification.  Tennessee DR2s reduced total 
institutional grant aid by 55.4% post-TELS when compared to other public DR2s 
nationally (p<.01).  After excluding Tennessee Tech, the other Tennessee MCU1s 
reduced total institutional grant aid by 17.4% post-TELS when compared to other public 
MCU1s nationally (n.s.).  Thus, it is clear that much of the overall decrease found in total 
institutional grant is driven by Tennessee DR2s.  
 
Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year institutions to 
change the number of first-time, full-time students receiving institutional awards when 
compared to similar institutions in other states?   
 The initial overall generalized difference-in-differences models suggested that 





recipients by 14.3% when compared with all other public four-year institutions nationally 
(p<.01).  However, the leave-one-out analysis suggested that Tennessee Technical 
University was an outlier and might bias the results upward.  When Tennessee Tech was 
removed from the analysis, the other eight Tennessee public four-year institutions 
increased their number of institutional grant aid recipients by only 4.8% when compared 
to all public four-year institutions nationally (n.s.).   
 The generalized and separate post-TELS years DID models were applied to each 
Carnegie Classification.  Tennessee public DR1s increased their number of institutional 
grant aid recipients by 20.5% post-TELS when compared to other public DR1s nationally 
(p<.05), where the increase was in nearly every post-TELS year.  Tennessee public DR2s 
actually reduced their number of institutional grant aid recipients by 24.3% post-TELS 
when compared to other DR2s nationally (p<.05).  Tennessee DR2s experienced a 
dramatic decrease in the number of institutional grant aid recipients in the first year but 
this began to taper in subsequent years.  Tennessee MCU1s increased their number of 
institutional grant aid recipients by 29.7%, (p<.01) but this diminished to 7.9% (n.s.) after 
excluding Tennessee Tech from the analysis.   
      
Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year institutions to 
change their entire class average institutional award amount for first-time, full-time 
students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
The models with all Tennessee public four-year institutions together suggested 
that Tennessee did not respond post-TELS in a systematic, different way than other 





institutions reduced the entire class average by 6.7% relative to all other public four-year 
institutions nationally (n.s.).  However, the leave-one-out analysis indicated that 
Tennessee Technical University was potentially biasing the results upward.  Without 
Tennessee Tech included in the analysis, the other eight Tennessee public four-year 
institutions reduced the entire class average by 22.5% post-TELS when compared with 
all other public institutions nationally (p<.05).    
As with the other research questions, the difference-in-differences models were 
run separately for each Carnegie Classification.  Tennessee DR1s reduced their entire 
class average institutional grant aid by 8.2%, but this was not statistically significant.   
Tennessee DR2s decreased their entire class average institutional grant aid by 34.5% 
when compared with other public DR2s nationally (p<.05).  When Tennessee Tech was 
excluded, the other Tennessee MCU1s reduced their entire class average institutional 
grant aid by 30.3% without additional controls (p<.05) and 38.4% with additional 
controls (p<.05).  The inclusion of additional covariates did not improve the precision of 
the estimates in the MCU1 analysis.   
 
Did increased state merit aid funding induce Tennessee public four-year institutions to 
change their recipient average institutional award amount for first-time, full-time 
students when compared to similar institutions in other states?   
The Tennessee post-TELS changes in recipient average institutional grant aid was 
one of the more consistent findings, where results were either marginally or statistically 
significant across model specifications.  The early generalized DID model using all 





post-TELS relative to all other public four-year institutions nationally by 20.9% without 
additional covariates (p<.05) and 25% with additional covariates (p<.01).  The models 
with post-TELS years parameterized separately suggested that Tennessee public four-
year institutions reduced their recipient average in every year with largest decrease 
occurring in the third year, with a 36.2% decrease in the recipient average award amount. 
The leave-one-out analysis suggested the Tennessee institutions did not differ in their 
post-TELS response since all post-TELS coefficients were with a standard deviation of 
the overall model.  Consequently, the overall models were sufficient in reporting 
Tennessee post-TELS responses.   
The difference-in-differences analysis within each Carnegie Classification helped 
illuminate where Tennessee public four-year institutions are responding differently 
relative to institutions more similarly situated.  Tennessee DR1s did reduce their recipient 
average institutional award but not in a manner different than other public DR1s 
nationally (β=-0.244, n.s.).  Tennessee DR2s did reduce their recipient average 
institutional award amount by 31.6% post-TELS relative to other public DR2s nationally 
(p<.01).  Tennessee MCU1s also reduced their recipient average institutional award 
amount by 17% with Tennessee Tech (p<.10) and   32.5% without Tennessee Tech 
included (p<.05).  While it appears much of the post-TELS response is driven by the 
DR2s, these Tennessee specific post-TELS coefficients across Carnegie Classifications 






Study Findings in the Context of Existing Literature 
Limited research exists examining how state financial aid influences institutional 
grant aid with the exception of a few studies (e.g. Curs & Dar, 2010a; 2010b; Long, 
2002; 2004), which make it difficult to make direct comparisons with the findings in this 
study.  The findings from this study suggested that Tennessee public institutions may 
have responded differently post-TELS.  Mainly, Tennessee Technical University was an 
outlier, which pulled the results in another direction.  Eight Tennessee public institutions 
(excluding Tennessee Technical University) reduced their total institutional grant aid, 
entire class average, and recipient average but did not have a discernable change in the 
number of institutional grant aid recipients.  This general response of Tennessee 
institutions reducing institutional aid support aligns with private institution behavior 
when the Georgia HOPE scholarship program was created, where average institutional 
per FTE declined (Long, 2004).  Institutional grant aid at public institutions was not an 
outcome measured in Long’s (2004) DID study, so more direct corollaries do not exist.  
However, an earlier iteration of Long’s (2002) study on the Georgia HOPE Scholarship 
found that two public four-year institutions (e.g. University of Georgia and Albany State 
College) reduced their average institutional awards per FTE by 57 percent when the 
Georgia HOPE scholarship was created.  Curs and Dar (2010a) found that increases in 
average state grant aid were associated with an increase in average institutional grants in 
their fixed effects regression models.  However, when Curs and Dar (2010b) 
disaggregated state grant aid into need and merit based aid, the association in fixed effect 
regression models between state merit aid and average institutional grant aid was not 





grant for students eligible for the federal education tax credits.  The mixed results in other 
research is likely a byproduct of different study designs and methods.  For instance, Curs 
and Dar (2010a; 2010b) examined average state grant aid but did not explicitly account 
for states with large merit aid programs.  Data availability at the time would have limited 
Long’s ability to study institutional aid responses for first-time undergraduate students.  
The findings of this study fill a void in the research on how public institutions change 
institutional grant aid in response to state merit aid programs.   
 Given the structure of available data, where institutional aid could not be 
disaggregated into need- and merit-based aid or be measured at the student level, this 
study cannot contribute to the literature addressing equity in financial aid awarding.  
Tennessee was one of the first states to provide a broader mix of merit- and need-based 
criterion as part of their state merit aid program, which could have provided a greater 
opportunity to study its effect had Tennessee been collecting comprehensive student level 
data before and after the creation of the TELS program.  In addition, since comprehensive 
student level award data did not exist before the TELS, this study could not assess the 
effect of the TELS program on racial/ethnic, geographic, and socioeconomic diversity at 
Tennessee public institutions.  A series of assessments by Heller (2002; 2004) reviewed 
state merit aid and come to the general conclusion that state merit aid programs are likely 
not enhancing equity.  Dynarski (2000) found that the Georgia state merit aid mostly 
went to students who would have already attended college in the first place suggesting 
that it is not contributing to access and equity.  There is a need for additional research on 






Contributions to the Literature 
 This study provides three distinct contributions to the literature on financial aid in 
higher education.  First, this study more acutely measures institutional aid responses at 
public four-year institutions by focusing on institutional aid for first-time, full-time 
students, which localizes the institutional response more closely to those students eligible 
for the state merit aid programs.  Prior studies focused more on private nonprofit 
institutional responses to state merit aid programs (Long, 2004) or looked at total 
institutional aid given to all student levels, which included graduate students distinctly 
not eligible for the state awards or undergraduate students not eligible because they 
entered before the merit aid program was created (Long, 2002).  This study examined the 
institutional aid response with the TELS program at all Tennessee public four-year 
institutions, which is the first study to focus specifically on Tennessee four-year public 
institutions and their multifaceted institutional aid responses.  In addition, this study 
examined how these public four-year institutions responded within the context of their 
Carnegie Classification, by comparing Tennessee institutions to other public institutions 
within a similar Carnegie Classification.   
 Second, this study combined principal agent and resource dependence theories to 
provide a more comprehensive set of institutional responses.  Many other studies on 
institutional grant aid responses to federal or state aid did not use principal agent or 
resource dependence theory, but rather focused on proving/disproving the Bennett 
hypothesis (Long, 2004; McPherson & Shapiro,1993; Turner, 2012).  However, the 
Bennett hypothesis is not a well-developed theory by itself since it assumes institutions 





governance structures within public higher education.  Principal agent theory provides a 
more comprehensive landscape of the governance and operation in public higher 
education by defining roles, context and actions, but by itself would still suggest that 
public institutions would behave opportunistically and seek their own self-interest.  
However, institutions are complex entities that may not behave opportunistically even if 
left unmonitored.  The inclusion of resource dependence theory helps describe the 
complex nature of institutions, where they may increase their willingness to pay for 
students receiving the TELS award in order to maintain or increase net revenue.   
The combination of principal agent and resource dependence theories can help 
explain the results of this study.  The Tennessee DR2 public institutions responded post-
TELS as principal agent theory would have suggested by reducing total, entire class 
average, and recipient average institutional grant aid as well as decreasing the number of 
institutional grant aid recipients.  Alternatively, Tennessee public DR1 institutions 
increased the number of institutional grant aid recipients and in some years Post-TELS 
increased total institutional grant (n.s.).   Presumably, both Tennessee public DR1 and 
DR2 institutions were acting in their own self-interest, but one set choose to 
opportunistically decrease institutional grant and the other choose a modest expansion of 
institutional grant aid access.  These differing responses highlight the inadequacy of 
principal agent theory by itself, since this theory would have suggested that Tennessee 
public DR1 institutions should have behaved like the Tennessee public DR2 institutions 
because institutions were not being monitored by the state.  However, the inclusion of 
resource dependence theory, in concert with principal agent theory, suggest that 





which in this case could be enrollment, tuition revenue, prestige, or market share (e.g. 
Bowen, Kurtzweil, & Tobin, 2005; Brewer, Gates, & Goldman, 2009; Hillman, 2012).  
While both theories suggest an institution will act in its own self-interest, the combination 
show that monitoring is not essential for productive responses, such as giving 
institutional aid to more students.  This study’s pairing of principal agent and resource 
dependence theories help to explain increases and decreases in institutional grant aid.   
 Third, this study identified a comparison group that can be used in other studies 
on institutional financial aid and more broadly on public institution finances.  The budget 
comparison group in this study provided more efficient estimates (e.g. smaller standard 
errors), which suggest that less variation existed in this subgroup than in the overall 
comparison group.  This study defined the budget comparison group as all public 
institutions subject to consolidated governing boards and coordinating boards with 
consolidated budget authority.  Other studies that included a governance element to their 
study only included consolidated governing boards (e.g. Tandberg, 2013) or both 
governing boards and coordinating boards as separate parameters/variables (e.g. Curs & 
Dar, 2010a).  However, when looking at institutional financial aid or other institutional 
finances, it seems more appropriate to isolate those governing entities that have budget 
authority since they have the ability to review and approve institutional budgets.  In the 
case of this study, governing entities with budget responsibilities would have some 
authority over the institutional financial aid budget, which did provide a more precise 
subgroup to compare Tennessee public four-year institutions.  Given the increased 





studies that address institutional financial aid to focus beyond only consolidated 
governing boards and include all governing entities that budget authority.   
 
Conclusions 
First, this study found that Tennessee public four-year institutions changed their 
institutional grant aid behavior after the TELS program was created.  The methodological 
approach allowed for a more nuanced set of findings to examine changes in institutional 
grant aid with respect to the total amount, number of recipients, entire class average and 
recipient average.  When grouped together, the Tennessee public four-year institutions 
increased the number of institutional aid recipients and decreased the average award 
given to recipients.  At the same time, there were not any discernable differences in the 
total institutional grant or the entire class average institutional grant at Tennessee public 
four-year institutions relative to other public four-year institutions nationally.  This 
suggests that Tennessee public four-year institutions expanded the access of their 
institutional grant aid to more first-time, full-time students by providing smaller awards 
to recipients.  This study builds on and expands prior research by including more aspects 
of institutional grant aid, where prior studies have focused only on average institutional 
aid (e.g. Long, 2004).  The four institutional aid variables provide a more comprehensive 
set of institutional responses to state merit aid.   
Second, the examination of these institutional grant aid variables within Carnegie 
Classification was incredibly instructive and shows how each institution may have 
responded differently to the creation of the TELS program.  Research using DID 





institutions within different Carnegie Classification (e.g. Long, 2004; Hillman, Tandberg 
& Gross, 2014).  Tennessee public Doctoral Extensive institutions only had a discernable 
difference in the number of institutional grant aid recipients, where they increased the 
number of recipients post-TELS when compared to other similar institutions nationally. 
On its face, the expansion of institutional aid grant recipients would suggest a productive 
response to the TELS program.  However, this study could not determine if the recipient 
expansion was given to students with financial need or in-state residents, so it is difficult 
to assess who benefited from the expansion.  The Tennessee Doctoral Intensive and 
Master’s Colleges/Universities (excluding Tennessee Technical University) decreased 
their institutional grant aid in nearly every category.  This finding suggested that 
Tennessee Doctoral Intensive and Master’s Colleges/Universities were utilizing the 
TELS program as a means to subsidize their institutions, which would indicate more of 
an opportunistic response to the TELS program.  However, if an institution can spend less 
in institutional aid to achieve the same outcome, then is it really an opportunistic 
response?  The answer to this questions is one for future research into how institutions 
that capture subsidies from financial aid spend those resources.  Given the difference 
found within each Carnegie Classification, this study demonstrates the importance of 
moving beyond just sector distinctions (e.g. public four-year sector) and look within 
institutions on Carnegie Classification.  
Third, for all that this study can suggest based on its findings, it still cannot 
directly address anything regarding how institutional and state grant aid changes the 
equity and access to Tennessee higher education.  The available data in IPEDS and 





merit- and need-based aid.  Dynarski’s (2000) analysis of Georgia indicated that most 
state merit aid went to students who would already go to college, which suggests the 
program did not expand access.  If the same is true in Tennessee, then any institutions 
reducing or redistributing institutional grant aid could be a productive response if it 
improves equity, access, or reduces educational expenses.  In particular if the institutional 
grant aid was better targeted in way to benefit outcomes that Bowen and associates 
(2005) define as effective uses of institutional aid, such as ensuring institutions enroll at 
capacity and enhance quality.  However, the data does not exist to provide any 
confirmation on who benefited from the public Tennessee Doctoral Extensive institutions 
expanding access to institutional grant aid or how the other public Tennessee institutions 
reallocated their reduced spending on institutional grant aid.  These aspects cannot be 
addressed with existing quantitative data, but could be an area for future research.   
 
Implications for Theory 
 This study integrated principal agent and resource dependence theories, which 
provided a more comprehensive set of institutional responses to the creation of a state 
merit aid program.  Many studies examining institutional financial aid or tuition price 
changes sought to prove or disprove the Bennett hypothesis (Long, 2004; McPherson & 
Shapiro, 1993; Turner, 2012).  However, the Bennett hypothesis assumes a monolithic, 
opportunistic response, where institutions will increase tuition price or reduce 
institutional aid when students receive more generous federal or state financial aid.  In 
addition, studies relying solely on principal agent theory may not provide a full set of 





potential responses that Tennessee public four-year institutions might take post-TELS by 
pulling together principal agent theory, resource dependence theory, and existing 
literature.  The theoretical framework in this study suggested that institution might 
increase, maintain or decrease their institution grant in response to the TELS program.   
The results of this study affirm parts of principal agent and resource dependence 
theory while suggesting that they should be used in concert with each other on financial 
aid policy research.  This study’s results with respect to Doctoral Intensive (DR2) and 
Master’s Colleges/Universities 1 (excluding Tennessee Technical University) affirm the 
agency problem (e.g. moral hazard) in principal agent theory, where institutions will 
behave opportunistically if left unmonitored.  However, principal agent theory by itself 
does not explain why Tennessee Doctoral Extensive (DR1) institutions increased the 
number of institutional grant aid recipients post-TELS.  Kivisto (2008) acknowledges 
principal agent theory’s weakness of assuming only a self-interested, opportunistic 
response.  The findings of this study affirm this weakness in the principal agent theory 
since some Tennessee institutions, such as public DR1 institutions, did not reduce 
institutional grant aid post-TELS.  This study’s findings suggest that principal agent 
theory should be paired with another theory to explain why an institution might behave 
productively even if not monitored by the principal.  In the context of financial aid 
studies, resource dependence theory provides a suitable match to explain why institutions 
might increase its generosity or willingness to pay for students receiving a state grant.   
Resource dependence theory suggests institutions will seek to maintain and increase 
resources/revenue, where they may adapt their policies/practices to obtain/sustain new 





institutions’ increase in the number institutional grant aid recipients could have been an 
effort to maintain or expand their market share of enrollment, tuition revenue, or TELS 
recipients.  These differing responses by Tennessee public institutions post-TELs suggest 
that principal agent theory needs a companion theory to explain non-opportunistic 
responses even through the principal does not impose monitoring.  In the context of 
studies on financial aid, resource dependence theory provides an appropriate complement 
to principal agent theory.  Thus, future studies on financial aid and other public financing 
in higher education should consider combining principal agent and resource dependence 
theories.   
 
Implications for Research  
This study explored different comparison groups to ensure findings were 
consistent when held up against different comparison groups.  Beyond the comparison 
with other public four-year institutions nationally, this study compared Tennessee public 
four-year institutions to others subject to a governing or coordinating board with budget 
authority and states with a large merit aid program.  The other public four-year 
institutions subject to a governing or coordinating board with budget authority provided 
more precise estimates for nearly all dependent variables.  The public four-year 
institutions subject to a governing entity with budget authority might provide a better 
subgroup for other research on financial aid or higher education finance.  Typically, 
research studies have only focused on institutions with a consolidated governing board 
(e.g. Tandberg, 2013).  However, the statewide governing entities with budget authority 





review and approve budgets.  Research on higher education budget and finances should 
consider including statewide coordinating boards with budget authority since they are 
similar to consolidated boards as both review and approve institutional/system budgets.   
Beyond examining different comparison groups, this study looked within different 
public four-year institutions to see if there were different responses based on Carnegie 
Classification.  The DID models that include all Carnegie Classification together still had 
large standard errors on the Tennessee specific variables, which suggest that there was 
more variation within the public institutions.  The disaggregation by Carnegie 
Classification allow for one way of segmenting the responses and variation by more 
similar institutions.  Separate models were run for each Carnegie Classification to ensure 
that the corrections for estimation disturbances (e.g. autocorrelation, cross-sectional 
dependence, and heteroscedasticity) were more localized to each type of public four-year 
institution.  Carnegie Classifications still serve as a means to segment public four-year 
institutions and remains relevant for future research.        
   
Implications for Policy 
The findings of this study can help inform future policy on state financial aid 
programs.  This study demonstrated that some institutions, namely Tennessee Doctoral 
Intensive and Masters’s Colleges/Universities, reduced their institutional grant aid when 
the TELS program was created.  During the policy process, Tennessee lawmakers were 
so focused on the award criteria (e.g. GPA, test scores, and financial need) and which 
institutions were eligible (Ness, 2008), which may have left little room for policies and 
regulations on institutional behavior.  The initial legislation was entirely student focused 





parameters on monitoring or regulating institutions (Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-9-901-940).  
With the TELS program providing $1.6 billion in its first six years, the Tennessee state 
government should have put in place some monitoring protocols that cut across public 
and private institutions.  Thus, future policy on state financial aid should consider the 
effects of the policy on institutions in addition to students.  Monitoring of institutions is 
one way of ensuring state objectives are being met, but there are others ways for the state 
to ensure their funding is utilized as intended.    
As an alternate to monitoring as a solution for the agency problem, state 
governments and institutions at the outset of a new policy could collaborate more to 
ensure new funding or policies meet both the state government and public institution 
interests.  Given that some Tennessee institutions reduced their institutional awards, state 
lawmakers and institutions could have worked together more to ensure state merit aid 
funds were packaged in a way that supported students who needed it most to enroll in 
college or change college choices (e.g. stay in-state for college).  By analyzing historic 
trends in packaging, the state government and institutions could have identified 
populations of students needing more financial support to achieve both state and 
institutions objectives.  This would have allowed for state merit- and need-based funding 
to be more targeted to those student who need it most to influence student behavior.   
Instead, state merit aid is likely more a blunt policy instrument that is inefficiently 
allocating aid to students since merit aid recipient would likely already enroll in college 
(e.g. Bowen et al., 2005; Dynarski, 2000; Farrell, 2004; Heller, 2004).   Instead of 





grant/appropriation for financial aid, where institutions could select and award financial 
aid that align with each institutions mission and still serves state goals.   
There are a number of common goals/objectives shared by states and public 
institutions.  In fact, many of the state goals in creating merit aid programs were already 
shared by public institutions.  With respect to undergraduate education, these common 
goals could include access to higher education, affordability, enrolling large shares of 
state residents, educational attainment, and efficiency in operation.   These goals align 
with those commonly referenced in the creation of state merit aid programs, which were 
to reward academic talent, encourage the best and brightest to stay in state, and increase 
access and attainment (Heller, 2002).   Financial aid provides a tool to serve these goals, 
but states and institutions need to align their awarding criteria and funding mechanism to 
achieve these common goals while efficiently using public resources.  Prior to the TELS 
program, public institutions were already providing grants and scholarships to entering 
students between $1.8 and $2.5 million per year (2013 constant dollars), and yet this was 
not addressed in the TELS creation.  It is possible that Tennessee institutions were 
already rewarding academic achievement in high school through scholarships, since 
many institutions provide such scholarships to attract talented students (e.g. Bowen et al., 
2005; Ehrenburg, Zhang, & Leven, 2005).  State and institutions need to assess financial 
aid and educational tax benefits provided to students to ensure an equitable distribution of 
benefits to serve their common goals.  More synchronization between states and public 






Recommendations for Future Research 
 This study focused on institutional responses to the creation of a large state merit 
aid program, where observations were made at the institution level.  This study explored 
the possibility of obtaining student level data, but Tennessee did not collect student level 
statewide data before the TELS program.  In addition, the data collected post-TELS was 
incredibly limited, which made it difficult to observe institutional responses at the student 
level.  Thus, future research is warranted to further investigate institutional responses to 
state merit aid by analyzing student level data, which would allow for many extensions of 
the research questions examined in this study.  For instance, with adequate student level 
data, future research could determine if institutions change merit- or need-based aid 
differentially after the creation of a large state merit aid program.  In addition, future 
research could determine if certain types of students are treated differently after a state 
merit aid program is created.  The availability of student level data could enhance future 
research on institutional responses to state merit aid.   
Second, future research is needed to examine why Tennessee Technical 
University responded differently than the other eight Tennessee public four-year 
institutions post-TELS.  Certainly, student level data could help determine why 
Tennessee Tech was behaving differently enough to bias the results upward.   For 
instance, student level data could help determine if Tennessee Tech had issues with 
enrollment or was trying to build its prestige through attracting better qualified students.  
However, a qualitative analysis looking specifically at Tennessee Tech could also provide 
insight into the rationale for it responding differently post-TELS.  In particular, a case 





post-TELS as well as address the potential motivation for pursuing a different path than 
the other Tennessee institutions.  More investigation into Tennessee Tech could shed 
light on aspects of their principal-agent relationship with the state that may have 
contributed to their response.  Tennessee Technical University provides a great line of 
inquiry for additional research on institutional financial aid.   
Third, additional research is needed to further probe the differential responses 
found by Carnegie Classification.  This study identified that public Tennessee Doctoral 
Extensive (DR1) institutions increased their number of institutional grant aid recipients.  
However, since the data was collected at the institution level, there is not a way to 
determine if these Tennessee DR1s provided more institutional grant aid to in-state 
versus out-of-state students or low- versus high-income students.  Or, did these DR1 
institutions not need the additional financial resources since they may have had access to 
other revenue streams (e.g. nonresident tuition revenue, research funding, or other 
donative funding)?  In the case of the public Tennessee Doctoral Intensive and Master’s 
College/Universities, it is possible that these Tennessee institutions did not need to spend 
as much on institutional grant aid to recruit students, which could be better identified 
with student level from prospective students.  Or did these institutions need to cut 
institutional aid funding in order to fund other parts of institutions?  In other words, how 
did they use any reduction in institutional grant aid funding to cross-subsidize other parts 
of their operation?  Future research could address these and other questions with better 
quantitative data, such as student level data or through qualitative analysis.      
Fourth, the focus of this study was on institutional financial aid, but future 





at public institutions can be a problematic area of research since tuition setting authorities 
and philosophies vary by state and institution (Carlson, 2013).  In addition, tuition and 
state appropriations can be jointly determined or at the very least interrelated, where 
tuition is set in response to state appropriation of vice versa.  This makes tuition a 
difficult variable to examine as a dependent variable and might lead to reverse causality.  
A difference-in-differences estimation strategy could be used to analyze tuition 
responses, but it would require careful attention to the tuition setting processes in 
treatment and control groups.  Future research examining potential tuition responses to 
the TELS program is warranted and would help frame the findings from this study.          
Fifth, this study explored a few different modes of comparing Tennessee public 
four-year institutions with other public four-year institutions in the United States.  The 
different comparison groups helped validate the overall findings by showing that they are 
relatively similar regardless of the various comparison groups.  In addition, this study 
found interesting differences in institutional responses within Tennessee public four-year 
institutions when examined by Carnegie Classification.  However, future research could 
explore different methods of developing a comparison group that match institutions more 
closely to similar institutions on multiple aspects.  This study took steps to move from a 
broad comparison group to relatively small comparison groups in an effort to show 
results did not change much across comparison groups.  While this study took steps to 
explore comparison groups, there is always more work that can be done to improve a 
comparison group and reduce pre-treatment variation, such as through synthetic controls 
(Abadie, Diamond, Hainmueller, 2010), which would take parts of states and construct 





quantitative research methods relevant to this line of inquiry, including DID model 
alternatives to the parallel path assumption, which were not needed for this study but 
should be consider in future research. Mora and Reggio (2014) propose alternatives to 
flexibly account pre-treatment trends and address changes in growth and acceleration of 
the dependent variable that differ between treated and control groups.  In addition, 
qualitative research methods could help address questions on how and why some 
Tennessee public institutions reduced their institutional grant aid.  For instance, case 
studies on Tennessee public institutions could help to unpack this institutional decision-







APPENDIX A:  
Tennessee State Context 
 
A brief exposition on Tennessee is warranted to contextualize the state economic, 
demography, political, higher education governance and higher education market.  These 
five domains will help explain how and why Tennessee created a scholarship program 
and what it means for the principal agent contract that exists between the state and public 
four-year institutions.   
First, leading up to the enactment of the Tennessee state lottery and merit aid 
program, the state’s economic position was in flux.  In particular, state revenue was not 
adequately covering state expenditures, which in part was due to a lack of state income 
tax and growing public healthcare expenses (Ness, 2008).  Leading up to the passage of 
TELS program, state appropriations for Tennessee public institutions was declining and 
tuition was increasing in price (Ness, 2008).  The state lottery revenue was viewed by 
many political actors, including colleges and universities, as the only additional funding 
they might garner from the constrained state budget (Ness, 2008).  In a case study on 
Tennessee, Ness (2008) noted, “the high education community realized that this lottery 
revenue was the only source of new money their sector would claim for years to come” 
(pp. 119).  Given the limit state resources, public institutions might maximize the new 
revenue from the TELS program by reducing institutional aid.  This makes Tennessee an 
interesting state to investigate given how higher education leaders perceived the TELS 
award as the only new funding they would receive for a few years.    
Second, the demography in Tennessee followed relative similar patterns as other 





the US Census Bureau.  The overall total population in Tennessee grew from just under 
five million in 1990 to over six million in 2009.  This growth was similar to the average 
of the remaining 49 states.  The Tennessee population of traditional college aged students 
(18 to 24 year olds) remained over half a million during this time period.  However, 
between 2001 and 2009, there was some fluctuation in the traditional college age 
population, where it peaked at just over 576,000 in 2005 followed by a modest decline to 
just under 549,000 in 2006, but increased again to over 585,000 in 2009.   The share of 
Tennessee population 65 and older grew by nearly one percent between 2001 and 2009, 
which was a larger and faster rate of increase than other states.   Since prior research 
found associations between state population aspects and state financial support for public 
higher education (e.g. McLendon et al., 2009), Tennessee’s population changes are an 
important aspect to consider when comparing it to other states on higher education 
finance and policy.  
Third, the political environment in Tennessee is another aspect to consider in the 
state context.  The Tennessee political environment leading up to the creation of a lottery 
funded state merit aid program was chronicled by Ness (2008) in his qualitative 
investigation in numerous states that adopted similar scholarship programs. The 
governor’s office in Tennessee has substantive executive powers and it was held by a 
Republican from 1994 to 2002, which coincided with the passage of the state education 
lottery referendum (Ness, 2008).  On average, Republicans represented 42% of the House 
and 46% of the Senate in Tennessee between 1989 and 2009 (Council of State 
Government, 2011).  Legislative interest in a state lottery first developed in the early-





Georgia enacted its HOPE scholarship in 1993 (Ness, 2008).  However, real political 
traction for the state lottery to fund higher education didn’t develop until 2002 when 
referendum was put on state ballots, which develop in part from a state budget crisis 
(Ness, 2008).  While it was a voter referendum that authorized state lottery revenue to 
fund higher education, it was the state legislature that finalized the details of the 
Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) program (Ness, 2008).  The details of 
the TELS program were discussed in a joint House and Senate taskforce that included 
higher education leaders for institutions and system governing/coordinating entities 
(Ness, 2008).   
Fifth, closely related to Tennessee’s political environment with respect to public 
higher education are the governance structures/systems put in place to oversee and 
coordinate operation of Tennessee’s public four-year institutions.  Public higher 
education in Tennessee is governed by two boards, the University of Tennessee System 
and Tennessee Board of Regents.  The governor has the authority to make appointments 
to any open position on both boards and non-appointed members come from the 
Governor’s cabinet.  The members of the boards must be distribute to represent each 
electoral jurisdiction in Tennessee.  The University of Tennessee System includes 17 
members representing each of the congressional districts, two faculty, two students, and 
five ex-officio members of the Governor’s cabinet (Tennessee Code Annotated, § 49-9-
202(a)).   The Tennessee Board of Regents includes 14 members (12 lay members, one 
faculty, and one student) and the remaining four non-voting members include the 
governor and members of his/her cabinet (Tennessee Code Annotated, § 49-8-201).  In 





agency to approve programs and provide advice/guidance to the state legislature (Ness, 
2008).   The governor appoints members to THEC as well.  Appointments to the 
governing boards can last for up to six years, which stretch beyond a governor’s term, but 
the gubernatorial power to make appointments affords the governor with substantial 
control over higher education.  These boards and agency centralize coordinating and 
governing of public higher education in Tennessee.   
Sixth, aspects of the higher education industry are important aspect to consider 
when assess state policy especially the public higher education landscape.  Within 
Tennessee, there nine public four-year institutions split between the two state governing 
boards.  The University of Tennessee System controls three campuses in Knoxville, 
Chattanooga, and Martin, but also includes a health science center.  The Tennessee Board 
of Regents governs six public four-year institutions, thirteen community colleges, and 27 
applied technical colleges.  Total enrollment at all these Tennessee public institutions 
combined was over 208,000 in fall 2000 and grew sixteen percent by fall 2012 to just 
over 235,000 students (US Depart of Education, 2013).  Tennessee four-year public 
institutions enrolled 61 percent of students attending any public four- or two-year degree-
granting institution (US Depart of Education, 2013).   While still the largest share of 
colleges enrollments, public four-year institution enroll 42 percent of students attending 
any public, nonprofit, or for-profit degree granting institution, so other sectors and 
institutional types have substantive role in Tennessee as well (US Depart of Education, 
2013).  Yet, Tennessee public four-year institutions represent the largest enrollment share 





All of these economic, demographic, and political, higher education governance, 
and higher education industry aspects were operating when Tennessee adopted a lottery 
and implemented a statewide merit aid program.   Tennessee was one of the more recent 
states to adopt a state-wide merit aid program.  The impetus for the Tennessee merit 
scholarship program was a voter referendum in 2002 (Ness, 2008; Ness & Noland, 2007).  
The most contentious part of the debates on implementing a merit aid program were if 
private nonprofit institutions were eligible to receive scholarship recipients, which they 
were allowed in the end (Ness, 2008).  The program was enacted in 2003 to utilize state 
lottery revenue to fund scholarships for Tennessee residents to attend college in-state 
(Ness, 2008).  The Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) program was 
initially implemented for the 2004-05 academic year.  In its first year, Tennessee 
provided scholarships for 40,195 recipients with roughly $93.4 million in award funding 
(Tennessee Higher Education Commission, 2011; Tennessee Education Lottery, 2005).  
As of 2011, the TELS program funded 532,000 students for a cumulative total $1.6 
billion in scholarship funding (Tennessee Higher Education Commission, 2011).  In order 
to get to these funding levels, Tennessee set up its merit aid award program using a 
slightly different model than other states.    
As the most recent state merit aid program, Tennessee had quite a few other merit 
aid scholarship programs to review when creating the TELS program.  However, the 
TELS program was based primarily on the Georgia HOPE Scholarship model, but with 
some noticeable differences (Ness & Noland, 2007).  In particular, Tennessee included 
more flexibility and multi-tiered awards based on academic and financial need criterion 





needed to have at least a 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT composite test score to receive the base 
award or Tennessee HOPE scholarship of $3,000 per year in college.  In addition, 
students with at least 3.75 and 29 ACT composite score would receive the General 
Assembly Merit Scholarship (GAMS), which provided an additional $1,000 annually.   
Aspire Awards were a second supplemental award available to families with incomes 
below $36,000 and where students met the base HOPE scholarship academic 
requirements, which made available an additional $1,000.  In order to provide access for 
the neediest families (e.g. family AGI less than $36,000), an Access Award was created 
for students who did not meet the other award criterion but who had at least 2.75 GPA 
and 18 ACT composite test score, which provide $2,000 for the first year of college.  
While these were the award criteria and amounts at implementation in 2004-05, 
policymakers in Tennessee increased the awards periodically to ensure the scholarships 
kept pace with tuition and fee increases at colleges.  Table 1 displays the selected years of 
the award program to highlight some of the changes in award amounts.  Another 
important facet of the state merit aid programs is the scholarship renewal criteria.  From 
2004-05 to 2007-08, renewal of the HOPE, GAMS, and Aspire awards required a 
cumulative 3.0 college GPA.  Beginning in fall 2008, Tennessee created alternate 
avenues for students who fell below the 3.0 cumulative GPA as a means for students to 






The TELS program was more multifaceted than other state merit programs, where 
it provided multiple paths for students to receive awards based on academic achievement 
and financial need.  While the Tennessee merit aid program was modeled on the Georgia 
HOPE scholarship, TELS offered more access points to funding than the Georgia HOPE 
program at their respective implementation years (Ness, 2008).  When the Georgia HOPE 
scholarship was implemented in 1993, their only academic criterion to determine 
eligibility was a 3.0 GPA in high school.  Tennessee’s merit scholarships allowed 
students to receive some funding for various level of achievement based high school 
GPA or ACT test scores.  In addition, the TELS program included need based 
Table 1
Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship Award Summary for Selected Years
4-yr 2-yr 4-yr 2-yr 4-yr 2-yr
Hope
Academic 3.0 HS GPA or 19 
ACT $3,000 $1,500 $4,000 $2,000 $4,000 $2,000
Financial N/A
GAMS




Academic 3.00 HS GPA or 19 
ACT
Financial AGI < $36,000
Access 
Award
Academic 2.75-2.99 HS GPA 
and 18-20 $2,000 $1,250 $2,750 $1,750 $2,750 $1,750





















































components, which created lower academic entry points to the scholarship for the states’ 
neediest students/families.  These advances in student criterion for merit are interesting in 
that show how state program learned from earlier iteration of other state merit aid 
programs.  However, Tennessee did not impose any restrictions on colleges and 
universities could set tuition and room/board prices or allocate institutional aid as part of 









These appendix table provide additional to those reported in Chapter Four, where the 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 4.6B         
          
Total Institutional Grant Aid Post-Years Difference-in-Differences Specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total Total Total Total 
          
TN*Post-TELS Yr1 -0.026 -0.026 -0.117 -0.117 
  (0.269) (0.078) (0.236) (0.102) 
TN*Post-TELS Yr2 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.019 
  (0.206) (0.078) (0.193) (0.082) 
TN*Post-TELS Yr3 -0.102 -0.101 -0.228 -0.234 
  (0.246) (0.078) (0.191) (0.094)* 
TN*Post-TELS Yr4 0.077 0.077 -0.073 -0.084 
  (0.247) (0.075) (0.208) (0.098) 
TN*Post-TELS Yr5 -0.001 -0.001 -0.060 -0.075 
  (0.232) (0.075) (0.170) (0.079) 
State Appropriations     0.255 0.241 
      (0.180) (0.218) 
Private Gifts     -0.002 -0.024 
      (0.028) (0.011)+ 
Investment Income     0.007 0.007 
      (0.003)* (0.002)* 
Federal Grant Aid     0.646 0.662 
      (0.155)** (0.166)** 
Population of 18-yr-
olds     0.014 0.121 
      (0.892) (0.657) 
Post-TELS Yr1 0.646 0.379 0.390 0.266 
  (0.089)** (0.090)** (0.104)** (0.028)** 
Post-TELS Yr2 0.691 0.424 0.487 0.365 
  (0.088)** (0.090)** (0.093)** (0.032)** 
Post-TELS Yr3 0.860 0.593 0.577 0.453 
  (0.086)** (0.090)** (0.112)** (0.031)** 
Post-TELS Yr4 0.877 0.610 0.497 0.368 
  (0.090)** (0.086)** (0.136)** (0.043)** 
Post-TELS Yr5 1.081 0.814 0.603 0.473 
  (0.084)** (0.086)** (0.143)** (0.052)** 
Constant 13.332 13.599 -0.482 -1.271 
  (0.071)** (0.088)** (10.050) (5.030) 
          
Observations 3,983 3,983 3,938 3,938 
R-squared 0.112   0.214   
Number of unitid 399 399 399 399 
Institution FE YES YES YES YES 
Time Effect YES YES YES YES 
XTREG YES   YES   
Robust SE YES   YES   
Driscoll-Kraay SE   YES   YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       





Appendix Table 4.7B         
          
Number of Institutional Grant Aid Recipients Post-Years Difference-in-Differences 
Specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Number Number Number  Number 
          
TN*Post-TELS Yr1 0.114 0.114 0.079 0.080 
  (0.231) (0.036)* (0.219) (0.030)* 
TN*Post-TELS Yr2 0.158 0.158 0.159 0.159 
  (0.113) (0.036)** (0.109) (0.029)** 
TN*Post-TELS Yr3 0.203 0.204 0.134 0.128 
  (0.133) (0.036)** (0.117) (0.032)** 
TN*Post-TELS Yr4 0.245 0.245 0.171 0.161 
  (0.152) (0.035)** (0.137) (0.033)** 
TN*Post-TELS Yr5 0.251 0.251 0.212 0.199 
  (0.129)+ (0.035)** (0.111)+ (0.033)** 
State Appropriations     0.111 0.099 
      (0.082) (0.087) 
Private Gifts     0.004 -0.014 
      (0.016) (0.009) 
Investment Income     0.009 0.010 
      (0.002)** (0.003)* 
Federal Grant Aid     0.290 0.304 
      (0.065)** (0.057)** 
Population of 18-yr-olds     0.770 0.879 
      (0.492) (0.243)** 
Post-TELS Yr1 0.331 0.165 0.209 0.104 
  (0.046)** (0.055)* (0.055)** (0.025)** 
Post-TELS Yr2 0.395 0.229 0.288 0.184 
  (0.046)** (0.055)** (0.050)** (0.024)** 
Post-TELS Yr3 0.496 0.329 0.341 0.236 
  (0.047)** (0.055)** (0.059)** (0.024)** 
Post-TELS Yr4 0.530 0.364 0.304 0.193 
  (0.051)** (0.053)** (0.070)** (0.027)** 
Post-TELS Yr5 0.612 0.446 0.349 0.239 
  (0.046)** (0.053)** (0.072)** (0.030)** 
Constant 5.604 5.771 -9.536 -10.404 
  (0.036)** (0.054)** (5.545)+ (2.926)** 
          
Observations 3,983 3,983 3,938 3,938 
R-squared 0.119   0.191   
Number of unitid 399 399 399 399 
Institution FE YES YES YES YES 
Time Effect YES YES YES YES 
Robust SE YES   YES   
Driscoll-Kraay SE   YES   YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       






Appendix Table 4.8B         
          
Entire Class Average Institutional Grant Aid Post-Years Difference-in-Differences 
Specification 










          
TN*Post-TELS Yr1 -0.024 -0.023 -0.070 -0.069 
  (0.250) (0.066) (0.227) (0.075) 
TN*Post-TELS Yr2 -0.038 -0.037 -0.033 -0.033 
  (0.205) (0.066) (0.194) (0.067) 
TN*Post-TELS Yr3 -0.081 -0.081 -0.131 -0.136 
  (0.245) (0.066) (0.214) (0.073)+ 
TN*Post-TELS Yr4 0.034 0.034 -0.042 -0.051 
  (0.260) (0.065) (0.236) (0.076) 
TN*Post-TELS Yr5 0.004 0.004 -0.007 -0.020 
  (0.248) (0.065) (0.218) (0.068) 
State Appropriations     0.059 0.041 
      (0.090) (0.076) 
Private Gifts     0.001 -0.016 
      (0.018) (0.009)+ 
Investment Income     0.006 0.006 
      (0.002)** (0.003)* 
Federal Grant Aid     0.333 0.346 
      (0.083)** (0.098)** 
Population of 18-yr-olds     -0.647 -0.510 
      (0.524) (0.511) 
Post-TELS Yr1 0.431 0.269 0.306 0.210 
  (0.054)** (0.055)** (0.061)** (0.021)** 
Post-TELS Yr2 0.472 0.310 0.379 0.284 
  (0.055)** (0.055)** (0.057)** (0.026)** 
Post-TELS Yr3 0.564 0.402 0.443 0.346 
  (0.054)** (0.055)** (0.065)** (0.028)** 
Post-TELS Yr4 0.592 0.431 0.459 0.357 
  (0.058)** (0.053)** (0.079)** (0.039)** 
Post-TELS Yr5 0.747 0.586 0.539 0.436 
  (0.055)** (0.053)** (0.083)** (0.038)** 
Constant 6.267 6.428 7.893 6.792 
  (0.044)** (0.054)** (6.020) (4.370) 
          
Observations 3,983 3,983 3,938 3,938 
R-squared 0.125   0.188   
Number of unitid 399 399 399 399 
Institution FE YES YES YES YES 
Time Effect YES YES YES YES 
Robust SE YES   YES   
Driscoll-Kraay SE   YES   YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       





Appendix Table 4.9B         
          
Recipient Average Institutional Grant Aid Post-Years 
Difference-in-Differences Specification     










          
TN*Post-TELS Yr1 -0.140 -0.140 -0.197 -0.197 
  (0.222) (0.105) (0.213) (0.094)* 
TN*Post-TELS Yr2 -0.176 -0.176 -0.178 -0.178 
  (0.222) (0.102)+ (0.213) (0.095)+ 
TN*Post-TELS Yr3 -0.306 -0.306 -0.362 -0.362 
  (0.222) (0.125)* (0.213)+ (0.084)** 
TN*Post-TELS Yr4 -0.168 -0.168 -0.243 -0.243 
  (0.222) (0.122) (0.213) (0.103)* 
TN*Post-TELS Yr5 -0.255 -0.255 -0.272 -0.272 
  (0.222) (0.121)* (0.213) (0.081)** 
State Appropriations     0.153 0.153 
      (0.064)* (0.124) 
Private Gifts     -0.006 -0.006 
      (0.013) (0.018) 
Investment Income     -0.003 -0.003 
      (0.028) (0.002) 
Federal Grant Aid     0.355 0.355 
      (0.019)** (0.098)** 
Population of 18-yr-olds     -0.807 -0.807 
      (0.315)* (0.513) 
Post-TELS Yr1 0.311 0.311 0.179 0.179 
  (0.043)** (0.057)** (0.044)** (0.062)** 
Post-TELS Yr2 0.291 0.291 0.196 0.196 
  (0.043)** (0.055)** (0.044)** (0.057)** 
Post-TELS Yr3 0.361 0.361 0.234 0.234 
  (0.043)** (0.055)** (0.045)** (0.066)** 
Post-TELS Yr4 0.341 0.341 0.192 0.192 
  (0.043)** (0.055)** (0.051)** (0.080)* 
Post-TELS Yr5 0.466 0.466 0.254 0.254 
  (0.043)** (0.053)** (0.049)** (0.084)** 
Constant 7.738 7.738 9.490 9.490 
  (0.030)** (0.045)** (3.768)* (6.163) 
          
Observations 3,983 3,983 3,938 3,938 
R-squared 0.057 0.057 0.140 0.140 
Number of unitid 399 399 399 399 
Institution FE YES YES YES YES 
Time Effect YES YES YES YES 
Robust SE   YES   YES 
Driscoll-Kraay SE         
Robust standard errors in parentheses       








Post-Years Difference-in-Differences Comparison Groups: Total Institional Grant Aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total
TN*Post-TELS Yr1 -0.026 -0.117 0.038 -0.013 -0.111 -0.162 -0.122 -0.172
(0.078) (0.102) (0.050) (0.050) (0.082) (0.086)+ (0.081) (0.076)+
TN*Post-TELS Yr2 -0.018 -0.019 0.041 0.037 -0.021 -0.008 -0.027 -0.003
(0.078) (0.082) (0.050) (0.047) (0.082) (0.068) (0.081) (0.058)
TN*Post-TELS Yr3 -0.101 -0.234 -0.028 -0.094 -0.084 -0.124 -0.044 -0.061
(0.078) (0.094)* (0.050) (0.037)* (0.082) (0.049)* (0.081) (0.047)
TN*Post-TELS Yr4 0.077 -0.084 0.072 -0.059 0.280 0.193 0.120 0.039
(0.075) (0.098) (0.050) (0.043) (0.082)** (0.061)* (0.081) (0.072)
TN*Post-TELS Yr5 -0.001 -0.075 0.030 -0.013 -0.017 -0.044 -0.069 -0.089
(0.075) (0.079) (0.050) (0.037) (0.082) (0.064) (0.081) (0.071)
State Appropriations 0.241 -0.002 0.433 0.237
(0.218) (0.078) (0.135)* (0.175)
Private Gifts -0.024 -0.037 -0.084 -0.097
(0.011)+ (0.028) (0.029)* (0.040)*
Investment Income 0.007 1.094 -0.917 -0.182
(0.002)* (0.236)** (1.297) (1.806)
Federal Grant Aid 0.662 0.486 0.395 0.287
(0.166)** (0.082)** (0.096)** (0.097)*
Population of 18-yr-olds 0.121 -0.613 -1.590 -2.774
(0.657) (0.856) (1.347) (1.864)
Post-TELS Yr1 0.379 0.266 0.314 0.212 0.463 0.369 0.474 0.409
(0.090)** (0.028)** (0.078)** (0.043)** (0.124)** (0.094)** (0.121)** (0.093)**
Post-TELS Yr2 0.424 0.365 0.366 0.327 0.428 0.386 0.434 0.404
(0.090)** (0.032)** (0.078)** (0.036)** (0.124)** (0.078)** (0.121)** (0.082)**
Post-TELS Yr3 0.593 0.453 0.520 0.413 0.576 0.515 0.536 0.551
(0.090)** (0.031)** (0.078)** (0.054)** (0.124)** (0.124)** (0.121)** (0.155)**
Post-TELS Yr4 0.610 0.368 0.615 0.514 0.407 0.332 0.567 0.651
(0.086)** (0.043)** (0.078)** (0.089)** (0.124)** (0.182) (0.121)** (0.247)*
Post-TELS Yr5 0.814 0.473 0.783 0.573 0.830 0.698 0.883 0.899
(0.086)** (0.052)** (0.078)** (0.088)** (0.124)** (0.186)** (0.121)** (0.229)**
Constant 13.599 -1.271 13.646 -9.182 13.419 38.855 13.472 42.181
(0.088)** (5.029) (0.078)** (9.683) (0.117)** (35.024) (0.113)** (48.010)
Observations 3,983 3,938 2,426 2,395 680 680 600 600
Number of unitid 399 399 243 243 68 68 60 60
Institution FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Budget Authority YES YES YES YES
Strong Merit YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses








Post-Years Difference-in-Differences Comparison Groups: Number of Institutional Grant Aid Recipients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number
TN*Post-TELS Yr1 0.114 0.080 0.118 0.082 0.063 0.034 0.062 0.030
(0.036)* (0.030)* (0.024)** (0.017)** (0.031)+ (0.022) (0.031)+ (0.022)
TN*Post-TELS Yr2 0.158 0.159 0.156 0.135 0.163 0.164 0.188 0.191
(0.036)** (0.029)** (0.024)** (0.018)** (0.031)** (0.030)** (0.031)** (0.032)**
TN*Post-TELS Yr3 0.204 0.128 0.217 0.134 0.210 0.184 0.256 0.238
(0.036)** (0.032)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.031)** (0.028)** (0.031)** (0.032)**
TN*Post-TELS Yr4 0.245 0.161 0.228 0.111 0.367 0.327 0.335 0.289
(0.035)** (0.033)** (0.024)** (0.022)** (0.031)** (0.024)** (0.031)** (0.028)**
TN*Post-TELS Yr5 0.251 0.199 0.237 0.154 0.288 0.275 0.263 0.240
(0.035)** (0.033)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.031)** (0.033)** (0.031)** (0.036)**
State Appropriations 0.099 0.011 0.523 0.329
(0.087) (0.044) (0.120)** (0.119)*
Private Gifts -0.014 -0.036 -0.043 -0.053
(0.009) (0.016)+ (0.012)** (0.021)*
Investment Income 0.010 0.331 -0.784 -0.659
(0.003)* (0.167)+ (0.493) (0.416)
Federal Grant Aid 0.304 0.300 0.263 0.209
(0.057)** (0.047)** (0.053)** (0.066)*
Population of 18-yr-olds 0.879 0.824 0.207 -0.578
(0.243)** (0.367)+ (0.559) (0.818)
Post-TELS Yr1 0.165 0.104 0.161 0.097 0.216 0.145 0.217 0.166
(0.055)* (0.025)** (0.051)* (0.025)** (0.056)** (0.031)** (0.052)** (0.029)**
Post-TELS Yr2 0.229 0.184 0.231 0.201 0.224 0.184 0.200 0.173
(0.055)** (0.024)** (0.051)** (0.020)** (0.056)** (0.024)** (0.052)** (0.023)**
Post-TELS Yr3 0.329 0.236 0.316 0.229 0.323 0.212 0.277 0.223
(0.055)** (0.024)** (0.051)** (0.029)** (0.056)** (0.036)** (0.052)** (0.057)**
Post-TELS Yr4 0.364 0.193 0.380 0.247 0.242 0.056 0.273 0.200
(0.053)** (0.027)** (0.051)** (0.044)** (0.056)** (0.056) (0.052)** (0.101)+
Post-TELS Yr5 0.446 0.239 0.460 0.278 0.409 0.224 0.435 0.347
(0.053)** (0.030)** (0.051)** (0.046)** (0.056)** (0.059)** (0.052)** (0.094)**
Constant 5.771 -10.404 5.791 -14.291 5.603 7.505 5.610 18.177
(0.054)** (2.926)** (0.052)** (7.047)+ (0.056)** (12.744) (0.053)** (13.479)
Observations 3,983 3,938 2,426 2,395 680 680 600 600
Number of unitid 399 399 243 243 68 68 60 60
Institution FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Budget Authority YES YES YES YES
Strong Merit YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses








Post-Years Difference-in-Differences Comparison Groups: Entire Class Average Institutional Grant Aid


















TN*Post-TELS Yr1 -0.023 -0.069 0.006 -0.016 -0.052 -0.090 -0.048 -0.070
(0.066) (0.075) (0.052) (0.053) (0.061) (0.070) (0.061) (0.067)
TN*Post-TELS Yr2 -0.037 -0.033 -0.011 0.004 -0.035 -0.017 -0.029 0.006
(0.066) (0.067) (0.052) (0.051) (0.061) (0.064) (0.061) (0.063)
TN*Post-TELS Yr3 -0.081 -0.136 -0.055 -0.064 -0.083 -0.096 -0.032 -0.031
(0.066) (0.073)+ (0.052) (0.048) (0.061) (0.057) (0.061) (0.060)
TN*Post-TELS Yr4 0.034 -0.051 0.011 -0.051 0.144 0.095 0.097 0.049
(0.065) (0.076) (0.052) (0.052) (0.061)* (0.056) (0.061) (0.065)
TN*Post-TELS Yr5 0.004 -0.020 -0.012 -0.001 -0.035 -0.035 -0.078 -0.070
(0.065) (0.068) (0.052) (0.049) (0.061) (0.058) (0.061) (0.068)
State Appropriations 0.041 -0.078 0.163 -0.173
(0.076) (0.039)+ (0.114) (0.159)
Private Gifts -0.016 -0.018 -0.028 -0.036
(0.009)+ (0.023) (0.014)+ (0.026)
Investment Income 0.006 0.965 -1.248 -0.286
(0.003)* (0.168)** (1.622) (2.174)
Federal Grant Aid 0.346 0.273 0.211 0.136
(0.098)** (0.062)** (0.076)* (0.082)
Population of 18-yr-olds -0.510 -1.062 -2.054 -3.113
(0.511) (0.699) (0.783)* (1.258)*
Post-TELS Yr1 0.269 0.210 0.240 0.178 0.298 0.270 0.294 0.275
(0.055)** (0.021)** (0.050)** (0.032)** (0.056)** (0.055)** (0.046)** (0.044)**
Post-TELS Yr2 0.310 0.284 0.284 0.258 0.308 0.307 0.302 0.305
(0.055)** (0.026)** (0.050)** (0.027)** (0.056)** (0.045)** (0.046)** (0.037)**
Post-TELS Yr3 0.402 0.346 0.376 0.326 0.404 0.441 0.353 0.462
(0.055)** (0.028)** (0.051)** (0.044)** (0.056)** (0.071)** (0.046)** (0.088)**
Post-TELS Yr4 0.431 0.357 0.453 0.453 0.320 0.396 0.368 0.595
(0.053)** (0.039)** (0.050)** (0.074)** (0.056)** (0.105)** (0.046)** (0.152)**
Post-TELS Yr5 0.586 0.436 0.602 0.512 0.625 0.642 0.668 0.805
(0.053)** (0.038)** (0.050)** (0.071)** (0.056)** (0.108)** (0.046)** (0.138)**
Constant 6.428 6.792 6.467 -4.550 6.219 50.632 6.211 49.706
(0.054)** (4.369) (0.051)** (7.847) (0.055)** (34.476) (0.046)** (44.307)
Observations 3,983 3,938 2,426 2,395 680 680 600 600
Number of unitid 399 399 243 243 68 68 60 60
Institution FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Budget Authority YES YES YES YES
Strong Merit YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses







Post-Years Difference-in-Differences Comparison Groups: Recipient Average Institutional Grant Aid


















TN*Post-TELS Yr1 -0.140 -0.197 -0.078 -0.094 -0.172 -0.193 -0.182 -0.204
(0.105) (0.094)* (0.107) (0.099) (0.121) (0.120) (0.126) (0.131)
TN*Post-TELS Yr2 -0.176 -0.178 -0.116 -0.097 -0.184 -0.170 -0.215 -0.196
(0.102)+ (0.095)+ (0.104) (0.097) (0.121) (0.112) (0.126)+ (0.123)
TN*Post-TELS Yr3 -0.306 -0.362 -0.245 -0.221 -0.294 -0.293 -0.301 -0.288
(0.125)* (0.084)** (0.126)+ (0.109)* (0.141)* (0.125)* (0.145)* (0.137)*
TN*Post-TELS Yr4 -0.168 -0.243 -0.157 -0.161 -0.087 -0.112 -0.216 -0.229
(0.122) (0.103)* (0.122) (0.108) (0.186) (0.176) (0.141) (0.142)
TN*Post-TELS Yr5 -0.255 -0.272 -0.207 -0.155 -0.316 -0.311 -0.332 -0.314
(0.121)* (0.081)** (0.122)+ (0.101) (0.138)* (0.133)* (0.140)* (0.140)*
State Appropriations 0.153 0.012 -0.072 -0.007
(0.124) (0.060) (0.224) (0.270)
Private Gifts -0.006 0.008 -0.011 -0.016
(0.018) (0.022) (0.037) (0.037)
Investment Income -0.003 0.667 -0.612 -0.016
(0.002) (0.365)+ (1.199) (0.944)
Federal Grant Aid 0.355 0.161 0.063 0.012
(0.098)** (0.072)* (0.134) (0.145)
Population of 18-yr-olds -0.807 -1.517 -1.893 -2.226
(0.513) (0.536)** (1.075)+ (1.085)*
Post-TELS Yr1 0.311 0.179 0.198 0.141 0.393 0.371 0.406 0.397
(0.057)** (0.062)** (0.053)** (0.060)* (0.132)** (0.159)* (0.149)** (0.189)*
Post-TELS Yr2 0.291 0.196 0.180 0.148 0.349 0.337 0.384 0.374
(0.055)** (0.057)** (0.053)** (0.056)** (0.133)* (0.142)* (0.151)* (0.168)*
Post-TELS Yr3 0.361 0.234 0.248 0.209 0.399 0.448 0.408 0.476
(0.055)** (0.066)** (0.045)** (0.059)** (0.133)** (0.176)* (0.151)** (0.202)*
Post-TELS Yr4 0.341 0.192 0.279 0.296 0.311 0.430 0.443 0.601
(0.055)** (0.080)* (0.046)** (0.081)** (0.184)+ (0.272) (0.152)** (0.250)*
Post-TELS Yr5 0.466 0.254 0.367 0.326 0.577 0.647 0.596 0.717
(0.053)** (0.084)** (0.047)** (0.084)** (0.134)** (0.238)** (0.150)** (0.271)*
Constant 7.738 9.490 7.816 7.800 7.676 42.799 7.719 33.741
(0.045)** (6.163) (0.036)** (9.483) (0.100)** (30.559) (0.113)** (28.842)
Observations 3,983 3,938 2,426 2,395 680 680 600 600
R-squared 0.057 0.140 0.060 0.076 0.077 0.094 0.104 0.133
Number of unitid 399 399 243 243 68 68 60 60
Institution FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Budget Authority YES YES YES YES
Strong Merit YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Doctoral Extensive (DR1) Carnegie Classification Post-Years Difference-in-Differences 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)











TN*Post-TELS Yr1 -0.092 0.031 0.115 0.201 -0.162 -0.075 -0.207 -0.170
(0.423) (0.196) (0.240) (0.078)* (0.443) (0.274) (0.183) (0.124)
TN*Post-TELS Yr2 -0.192 -0.045 0.003 0.113 -0.226 -0.118 -0.195 -0.158
(0.339) (0.069) (0.099) (0.123) (0.339) (0.136) (0.245) (0.174)
TN*Post-TELS Yr3 -0.231 -0.102 0.139 0.223 -0.236 -0.137 -0.370 -0.325
(0.519) (0.208) (0.192) (0.062)** (0.515) (0.286) (0.330) (0.250)
TN*Post-TELS Yr4 -0.045 0.098 0.270 0.371 -0.027 0.082 -0.315 -0.274
(0.582) (0.296) (0.269) (0.075)** (0.594) (0.382) (0.315) (0.240)
TN*Post-TELS Yr5 -0.345 -0.178 0.006 0.118 -0.295 -0.163 -0.351 -0.296
(0.506) (0.255) (0.196) (0.053)* (0.507) (0.321) (0.313) (0.247)
Constant 14.958 6.865 6.731 -2.660 6.951 4.703 8.231 9.530
(0.055)** (7.573) (0.048)** (7.236) (0.055)** (7.490) (0.029)** (6.723)
Observations 1,010 999 1,010 999 1,010 999 1,010 999
R-squared 0.388 0.434 0.294 0.342 0.269 0.298 0.155 0.169
Number of unitid 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101
Institution FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Additional Controlling Variables YES YES YES YES
Robust SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses







Doctoral Intensive (DR2) Carnegie Classification Basic Difference-in-Differences Using Robust Standard Errors






TN*Post-TELS -0.466 -0.207 -0.277 -0.263
(0.150)** (0.096)* (0.132)* (0.078)**
Post-TELS 1.176 0.548 0.971 0.632
(0.440)** (0.238)* (0.224)** (0.228)**
Constant 28.830 11.824 12.932 16.951
(35.451) (18.806) (19.531) (18.838)
Observations 601 601 601 601
Institution FE YES YES YES YES
Time Effect YES YES YES YES
Additional Controlling YES YES YES YES
Robust SE YES YES YES YES
Driscoll-Kraay SE NO NO NO NO
Standard errors in parentheses









Doctoral Intensive (DR2) Carnegie Classification Post-Years Difference-in-Differences 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)









TN*Post-TELS Yr1 -0.550 -0.746 -0.493 -0.652 -0.374 -0.458 -0.057 -0.098
(0.136)** (0.127)** (0.066)** (0.072)** (0.130)* (0.106)** (0.078) (0.072)
TN*Post-TELS Yr2 -0.409 -0.463 -0.109 -0.165 -0.346 -0.363 -0.303 -0.303
(0.136)* (0.114)** (0.066) (0.071)* (0.130)* (0.108)** (0.078)** (0.061)**
TN*Post-TELS Yr3 -0.464 -0.611 -0.001 -0.147 -0.343 -0.406 -0.466 -0.469
(0.136)** (0.101)** (0.066) (0.071)+ (0.130)* (0.120)** (0.078)** (0.051)**
TN*Post-TELS Yr4 -0.117 -0.445 0.117 -0.150 -0.059 -0.251 -0.238 -0.300
(0.136) (0.118)** (0.066) (0.079)+ (0.130) (0.120)+ (0.078)* (0.058)**
TN*Post-TELS Yr5 -0.098 -0.296 0.152 -0.015 0.033 -0.060 -0.253 -0.282
(0.136) (0.099)* (0.066)* (0.072) (0.130) (0.128) (0.078)* (0.052)**
Constant 13.708 29.419 5.832 12.563 6.557 13.800 7.879 16.760
(0.160)** (19.873) (0.088)** (9.598) (0.095)** (13.284) (0.074)** (13.897)
Observations 610 601 610 601 610 601 610 601
Number of groups 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Institution FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Additional Controlling Variables YES YES YES YES
Driscoll-Kraay SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses







Master's Colleges and Universities One (MCU1) Carnegie Classification Basic Difference-in-Differences 
Using Robust Standard Errors







Panel A: All MCU1  
TN*Post-TELS 0.040 0.299 0.029 -0.259
(0.380) (0.228) (0.418) (0.155)+
Post-TELS 0.384 0.201 0.296 0.177
(0.124)** (0.063)** (0.076)** (0.079)*
Constant -17.236 -21.740 3.729 5.101
(10.482) (6.145)** (7.055) (7.219)
Panel B: Excluding Tennessee Technical University
TN*Post-TELS -0.339 0.075 -0.383 -0.413
(0.258) (0.161) (0.289) (0.100)**
Post-TELS 0.014 0.036 0.151 -0.031
(0.156) (0.079) (0.096) (0.097)
Constant -16.681 -21.526 3.927 5.448
(10.364) (6.112)** (7.020) (7.120)
Observations 2,338 2,338 2,338 2,338
Number of Institution 237 237 237 237
Institution FE YES YES YES YES
Time Effect YES YES YES YES
Additional Controlling YES YES YES YES
Robust SE YES YES YES YES
Driscoll-Kraay SE NO NO NO NO
Standard errors in parentheses









Master's Colleges and Universities One (MCU1) Carnegie Classification Post-Years Difference-in-Differences 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)











TN*Post-TELS Yr1 0.351 0.194 0.517 0.461 0.266 0.186 -0.167 -0.270
(0.075)** (0.142) (0.039)** (0.033)** (0.068)** (0.107) (0.084)+ (0.142)+
TN*Post-TELS Yr2 0.272 0.200 0.375 0.348 0.192 0.153 -0.103 -0.147
(0.075)** (0.111) (0.039)** (0.034)** (0.068)* (0.095) (0.084) (0.118)
TN*Post-TELS Yr3 0.124 -0.097 0.331 0.221 0.079 -0.026 -0.209 -0.318
(0.075) (0.129) (0.039)** (0.035)** (0.068) (0.105) (0.084)* (0.131)*
TN*Post-TELS Yr4 0.152 -0.090 0.258 0.154 0.015 -0.113 -0.106 -0.242
(0.070)+ (0.131) (0.040)** (0.037)** (0.065) (0.107) (0.080) (0.132)
TN*Post-TELS Yr5 0.109 -0.014 0.369 0.296 -0.014 -0.068 -0.264 -0.312
(0.070) (0.099) (0.040)** (0.035)** (0.065) (0.089) (0.080)** (0.107)*
Constant 12.898 -17.375 5.264 -22.596 6.104 2.764 7.646 5.839
(0.078)** (10.139) (0.044)** (5.099)** (0.044)** (7.467) (0.035)** (5.145)
Observations 2,363 2,363 2,363 2,363 2,363 2,363 2,363 2,363
Number of groups 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237
Institution FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Additional Controlling Variables YES YES YES YES
Driscoll-Kraay SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)











TN*Post-TELS Yr1 -0.054 -0.210 0.304 0.245 -0.165 -0.247 -0.359 -0.457
(0.104) (0.165) (0.102)* (0.077)* (0.093) (0.124)+ (0.106)** (0.178)*
TN*Post-TELS Yr2 -0.105 -0.211 0.189 0.146 -0.225 -0.282 -0.294 -0.356
(0.104) (0.145) (0.102)+ (0.080) (0.093)* (0.119)* (0.106)* (0.161)+
TN*Post-TELS Yr3 -0.240 -0.439 0.112 0.010 -0.321 -0.415 -0.352 -0.448
(0.104)* (0.152)* (0.102) (0.078) (0.093)** (0.123)** (0.106)** (0.168)*
TN*Post-TELS Yr4 -0.224 -0.468 0.024 -0.085 -0.388 -0.516 -0.246 -0.381
(0.101)+ (0.161)* (0.103) (0.079) (0.091)** (0.126)** (0.102)* (0.174)+
TN*Post-TELS Yr5 -0.248 -0.347 0.122 0.060 -0.416 -0.455 -0.373 -0.407
(0.101)* (0.128)* (0.103) (0.080) (0.091)** (0.109)** (0.102)** (0.146)*
Constant 12.898 -12.836 5.265 -21.039 6.106 4.138 7.645 8.881
(0.078)** (9.701) (0.044)** (5.051)** (0.044)** (7.660) (0.035)** (4.695)+
Observations 2,353 2,329 2,353 2,329 2,353 2,329 2,353 2,329
Number of groups 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236
Institution FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Additional Controlling Variables YES YES YES YES
Driscoll-Kraay SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Master's Colleges and Universities One (MCU1) Carnegie Classification Post-Years Difference-in-
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